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This research addresses two problems associated with developing smaller multi-vendor
satellites for Small Space. These two problems interrelate and this research addresses them
together. The Development Problem deals with the development of modular, reusable, and
secure space systems while the Security Problem encompasses securing these space systems.
This research addresses the Development Problem by conducting a series of five surveys,
referred to as Space Industry Software Development Practices and Attitudes (SISDPA), to
asses current attitudes and state of practice among space system developers. This crys-
tallized a need in space system development — modular reusable open networks can help
Small Space realize its potential, but there is still a need to address certain security threats.
This research addresses the Security Problem by creating Secured Space Plug-and-Play
Services Manager (SSSM), a secure modular reusable open-network software development
framework based off of Space Plug-and-Play Services Manager (SSM). SSSM adds security
provisions while minimizing the impact on developers using the framework. An evaluation
of SSSM shows that it preserves the ease-of-use of SSM while adding policy enforcement in




Developing and Securing Software For Small Space Systems
Brandon L. Shirley
The space systems industry is moving towards smaller multi-vendor satellites, known
as Small Space. This shift is driven by economic and technological factors that necessitate
hardware and software components that are modular, reusable, and secure. This research
addresses two problems associated with the development of modular, reusable, and secure
space systems: developing software for space systems (the Development Problem) and se-
curing space systems (the Security Problem). These two problems are interrelated and this
research addresses them together.
The Development Problem encompasses challenges that space systems developers face
as they try to address the constraints induced by reduced budgets, design and develop-
ment lifecycles, maintenance allowances, multi-vendor component integration and testing
timelines. In order to satisfy these constraints a single small satellite might incorporate
hardware and software components from dozens of organizations with independent work
forces and schedules. The Security Problem deals with growing need to ensure that each
one of these software or hardware components behaves according to policy or system design
as well as the typical cybersecurity concerns that face any information system.
This research addresses the Development Problem by exploring the needs and barriers
of Small Space to find the best path forward for the space systems industry to catch up
with the methodology advancements already being widely used in other software fields. To
do this exploration a series of five surveys, referred to as SISDPA, was conducted to asses
current attitudes and state of practice among space system developers. This crystallized a
need in space system development — modular reusable open networks can help Small Space
realize its potential, but there is still need to address certain security threats.
v
This research addresses the Security Problem by augmenting a modular reusable open-
network software development framework, called SSM, by adding policy enforcement in the
form of authentication, access control, and encryption provisions, to create a new devel-
opment framework, SSSM. This design and implementation adds security provisions while
minimizing the impact on developers using the framework. SSSM is evaluated in terms of
developer and system resource burden and shows that SSSM does not significantly increase
developer burden and preserves the ease-of-use of SSM.
vi
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The space systems industry is moving away from large monolithic satellites, known as
Big Space, to smaller multi-vendor satellites, known as Small Space. This shift, driven by
demand for lower costs, shorter schedules, new technology, and the ongoing government
capability space race, requires hardware and software components to be substantially more
modular, reusable, and secure than in the past. For example, a single small satellite might
incorporate hardware and software components from dozens of organizations with indepen-
dent work forces and schedules. To be efficient, not only do these organizations need to
complete their components with minimal coordination, the components need to be decou-
pled as much possible so they are isolated from change in other parts of the system. Also,
if the components, be it hardware or software, are modular with good abstractions and
encapsulation, then they will be more reusable and thereby help reduce development costs
in future space systems. The downside of having multiple independent organizations, with
varying levels of trust, provide components for a space system is that the system’s security
provisions have to ensure that each component behaves according to policy or system de-
sign. This research addresses two problems associated with the development of modular,
reusable, and secure space systems: developing software for space systems (the Develop-
ment Problem) and securing space systems (the Security Problem). These two problems
interrelate and this research addresses them together.
The Development Problem encompasses challenges that space systems developers face
as they try to address the constraints induced by reduced budgets, design and development
lifecycles, maintenance allowances, multi-vendor component integration and testing time-
lines. Big Space vehicles have had long development cycles, low risk postures, and require
high information assurance; this typically results in high cost, difficulty with untrusted
parts and software sourcing, and lag behind other industries [1–3]. Developers often de-
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velop one-off solutions while leveraging past successes, particularly with respect to achieving
reliability and power efficiency [1]. There will likely always be a place for these types of
systems, but there are a growing number of applications where this approach is no longer
the gold standard, e.g. low earth orbit (LEO) applications, applications with short lifecy-
cles, swarms, constellations, and high-risk applications. The space industry is realizing this
new standard under the banner of Small Space.
The idea of using modularity and reuse to reduce cost in space system development
is not a new concept; it has been tried before. Modularity has been explored in many
aspects of space system design going back to the 1970s [4]. However, the various attempts
do not seem to advance much past their originator or impact external development efforts.
This could be due to the protected nature of space systems, especially when developed by
government agencies, or it could be due to a failure to adopt development practices and
tools that could facilitate this transition. Is it possible that the technology was not available
yet to truly realize the reuse and modularity needed? Can Small Space ideals be coupled
with reuse, modularity, and security to push and sustain this next evolutionary step in
space system development? To explore these and other questions and to fully understand
the development problem as well as the best path-forward for the space systems industry,
this research designed and conducted a series of five surveys, referred to as SISDPA, to asses
current attitudes and state of practice among space system developers. Chapter 3 describes
the five SISDPA surveys and Appendix A shows the actual survey instruments.
To enable space systems development to be more modular, reusable, and secure, it is
first necessary to better understand the current software development practices and per-
ceptions among space system developers. Open networks are well-understood solutions for
integrating systems of systems, as evidenced by the Internet of Things (IOT) and the Inter-
net at large. An open network can enable high degrees of reuse, flexibility, and extensibility,
because it lends itself to good abstraction, modularity, and encapsulation [5]. However, its
openness can lead to additional challenges when it comes to security. The results of the
SISDPA surveys support these assessments of the benefits and barriers for open network
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adoption in space systems development. See Chapter 4. Understanding the barriers, in
particular, can help the industry eventually overcome these barriers and catch up with the
methodology advancements already being widely used in other fields.
More specifically, Chapters 3 and 4 crystallize a need in space system development
— modular reusable open networks can help Small Space realize its potential, but they
still need to address certain security threats. This is the second problem this dissertation
addresses and is simply referred to here as the Security Problem. It encompasses challenges
that relate to the secure integration of components from different vendors and organizations.
To address the Security Problem, this research augments a modular reusable open-
network software development framework, called SSM. SSM is set of software services that
allow components to communicate over heterogeneous networks without knowledge of the
network protocols or addressing schemes [6, 7]. This research adds policy enforcement to
SSM in the form of authentication, access control, and encryption provisions, to create a
new framework, SSSM. Its design adds security provisions while aiming to minimize the
impact on developers using the framework. See Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 evaluates SSSM in terms of developer and system resource burden, because
an increase in developer burden affects how easy a component is to use and therefore reuse
and an increase in system resource burden reduces the set of applications where a component
can be applied when criteria like size, weight, and power (SWaP) are driving factors. The
evaluation shows that SSSM does not significantly increase developer burden. In other
words, SSSM preserves the ease-of-use of SSM. Chapter 6 also shows that both SSM and
SSSM have upper bounds on their network throughput that are tied to CPU and memory
limitations and not the actual network. SSSM tops out before SSM and generally uses
slightly more resources under nominal operation. The net result is a decrease in reusability
from a system resource perspective. Therefore, an extremely resource-limited system that
might be able to to use SSM might not be able to use SSSM. Chapter 6 identifies some
ways around this problem by tweaking how a developer uses the API.
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the contributions of this dissertation relative to both
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the Development and Security Problems. It argues that the SISDPA surveys provide an in-
depth understanding of the attributes and current practices in space systems development
and that this has led to a better understanding of the benefits and barriers associated with
using open networks in space systems. It also concludes that SSSM effectively addresses
both problems. From a development perspective, SSSM provides an easy-to-use framework
that allows developers to create space systems with better abstraction, modularity, and
encapsulation. From a security perspective, it addresses the security concerns that were





The Development Problem and the Security Problem can be addressed by a solution
that encompasses reuse, modularity, and security. Modularity enables reuse, and good ab-
straction and encapsulation enable modularity [5]. Developing software with clear bound-
aries helps lead to designs with good abstraction and encapsulation. Network architectures
or development frameworks naturally define boundaries that help with abstraction and
encapsulation enabling modularity. MONAs are a realization of this idea and there are
examples of these in space systems development, [8–10] but MONAs are struggling to see
widespread adoption. Increasing the usage of these architectures and approaches would
help bring more modern software development processes and tools to spaces systems devel-
opment while benefiting from the modularity, abstraction, and encapsulation that enable
reuse.
A literature review of work related to the Development Problem did not uncover any
other research that had undertaken the task of understanding the problem by surveying
space system developers to understand their current practices and attitudes, particularly
in relation to modularity, reuse, and security. Nevertheless, these important software engi-
neering principles are common themes in space system development literature. Section 2.2
provides an overview of modularity and reuse in space systems literature, while Section 2.3
covers concepts that relate to security.
2.2 Modularity and Reuse in Space Systems
The idea of using modularity and reuse to reduce cost in space vehicle development
is not a new concept; it has been tried before. Modularity has been explored in many
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aspects of space vehicle design going back to the 1970s [4]. The United States National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) started developing a multi-mission space-
craft standard in 1978 [11] that was used in six space vehicles over a twelve year period
starting in 1980 [12]. However, the various attempts do not seem to advance much past
their originator or proliferate to external development efforts. This could be due to the
protecting nature of space systems especially when developed by government agencies, or
it could be due to a failure to realize the development practices and tools that could really
facilitate this transition. For example, not too long ago the case was that software for space
systems developed in C++ might not be allowed to use dynamic memory allocation or the
Standard Template Library (STL) [7]. And it was not until the success of the Spirit and
Opportunity Mars rovers in 2004, running VxWorks, that operating systems were even used
on space systems [13]. Being able to use an operating system (OS) on a space system is a
major reusability and modularity enabler.
This paradigm is making a resurgence as more and more commercial entities get into
space and development gets more competitive. It is also making a resurgence on the gov-
ernment side as the need to test and produce new capabilities in shorter more cost effective
time-spans is driven by both science and defense needs. The Department of Defense (DoD)
sees open systems architectures as a way to reduce the cost to develop, maintain, and update
systems [14, 15]. The DoD acquisition policy has even required that system providers use
open system architectures where feasible [16], but exceptions, especially in space systems
development, have been common. The DoD goes on to say “Open systems and modular
architectures provide valuable mechanisms for continuing competition and incremental up-
grades, and to facilitate reuse across the joint force.” [17] Open systems architectures are
viewed, by the DoD, as contributing to increased competition, reduced life-cycle cost, en-
hanced interoperability, cheaper and faster maintenance, schedule reduction, and increased
innovation [18]. This relates to efforts like Northrop Grummans Modular Space Vehi-
cle (MSV) Bus, Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC)s Standard Network Adapter for
Payloads (SNAP), NASA’s Core Flight System (CFS) System, and Air Force Research Lab-
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oratory (AFRL)’s SPA [8–10, 19] which also look to promote and create various pieces of
reusable software.
CFS, the Spacecraft Onboard Interface Services (SOIS) architecture, and the SPA
standards are examples of research and effort that has been put into developing reusable
development frameworks that support open systems development and reuse across applica-
tions by various entities within the United States government. These endeavors have had
various degrees of success within their respective organizations, but have not propagated
much beyond the organizational boundaries.
NASA developed CFS to reduce repetition of effort in systems design and development
that was resulting in soaring costs and extended development schedules [19–21]. CFS is
built around a reusable core flight executive that uses a layered architecture to provide a
standard middleware/bus and an API. This allows for a reusable component library to be
built up that achieves some level of plug-and-play capability [22]. Layered approaches can be
key to reusing software and well defined APIs are also critical. CFS provides a software bus
that applications can use to relay data. Adding a new piece of hardware entails developing
a new device driver. A software application must also be written to communicate with the
new device, but an application can communicate with one or more hardware devices. The
software application acts as the link between the hardware and the software bus and relays
data between the two; the software bus is essentially a channel or pipe that applications
may use to pass messages. The message passing protocol can stay the same even as new
hardware is added. Once the application and driver is created it can, in theory, be reused
with minimal effort from a software development perspective in other space systems that
leverage CFS. CFS has been used in various NASA missions [23].
The SOIS architecture is an effort by an international committee, called Consultative
Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS), to standardize interfaces for various functions
and space systems components. This effort was again looking to reduce cost and promote
reuse in space systems development. The CCSDS SOIS committee considering making SOIS
SPA compliant to share development effort and promote reuse [7], but SOIS largely remains
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an architecture without an implementation due to a lack of a consensus, e.g. should SOIS be
CFS or SPA compliant? The common thread here is that there has been a decent amount
of development within each kingdom, but not much cross-pollination or consensus between
kingdoms; the failure here might simply be tied to the nature of government agencies and
budget infighting or it might stem from the difficulty of developing systems for the harsh
space environment.
There are some issues with space systems development that are not present in terrestrial
systems development and there has been research into the differences between software de-
veloped for space [6,24] but there has not been any significant research into how developer
preference and attitude about development practices differs from space systems develop-
ment to terrestrial systems development. It may be that there are practices that can be
done away with during the transition to lower cost shortened development cycles with high
risk postures. This research furthers the understanding of why reuse has lagged and how
terms like modularity and interoperability are perceived by the space systems development
community to understand what can or should be coupled with Small Space development in
order to realize a more agile and cost effective development process.
Finally, SSM is a development framework that implements the SPA networking stan-
dard [6, 25, 26]. It also adds an API to make is easy to develop with while adhering to
the standard. AFRL developed the SPA standards for reasons very similar to the reasons
NASA endeavored in developing CFS. This effort was nurtured by AFRL to support the
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) effort. This work was continued through the coming
years [27, 28], and SPA got its first mention by name in the Responsive Space conference
in 2005 [29]. The Responsive Space Testbed (RST) [30] was started at Kirtland Air Force
Base (AFB) as a testbed for plug-and-play technology for space systems. These efforts were
led by Dr. Lyke and Dr. Cannon [26,31] and AFRL continued as a center for plug-and-play
development for the next 7 years.
The idea was to provide a unified set of protocols that provide for the discovery and
exchange of data and commands between modular space system components [7]. SSM made
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the networking component of SPA a reality and addressed some of its weaknesses via up-
dates to the protocols. Components can now communicate on a heterogeneous open-network
without the need for specialized hardware using standard networking buses and well defined
software interfaces. This is a significant enabler for reuse as it provides for modularity, in-
teroperability, and openness. SSM is starting to see more usage within government entities,
but has seen little use outside the government due to restrictions on availability and limita-
tions in implementation like determinism. Section C.1 of Appendix C covers SSM in more
detail if more context is needed to understand the modifications to SSM that Chapter 5
details.
A sizable amount of work has gone into making space software systems more reusable.
SSM has taken an approach that leverages an open-network topology that lends itself to
building modular components enabled by good abstraction and encapsulation. The ap-
proach also opens the door to leveraging technology, protocols, and methodology for secur-
ing the systems. Adding security, if done right, can actually increase reusability because
it can be reused in more applications, i.e. systems with more stringent information assur-
ance (IA) requirements or concerns. Chapter 4 analysis suggest that this lack of security
in development frameworks like SSM might be one of the factors restricting use. SSM is
well-situated as a open-network development framework to address security concerns be-
cause security mechanisms can be added to software component egress points to protect
and regulate traffic.
2.3 Security for Space Systems
Assessing and surveying the currently available solutions and ongoing research relate
to the space system cybersecurity problem did not yield any research or existing technology
that provides a secure modular reusable open network software development framework for
space systems. Much of the research falls into policy, process, security tools, hardening, and
different types of solutions for space systems and similar systems like the smart grid or IOT
systems. These solutions and research are all solving pieces of the larger problem: how to
secure heterogeneous networks of heterogeneous systems in diverse, sometimes harsh, and
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inaccessible environments. Everything is interconnected and space is increasingly becoming
part of ground infrastructure from Global Position System (GPS) to satellite Internet to
power grids [32]; compromising a space system has very real consequences on the ground [32–
36].
The related research can be broken down into a few different camps: policy and princi-
ples, process and tools, and actual security provisions. There is a lot of interest in this area
and body of research, this section covers a representative body of work but is not meant
to be comprehensive. First, this section reviews some of the policy and principles research
around cybersecurity for space systems as well as the specific set of security principles that
fed into the design of SSSM and whose importance is validated by results for the survey
analysis. Next comes process and tools research that has and is going into making the
development of space systems more secure by helping to define how space systems software
can be developed more securely and how that security can be tested. Finally, this section
covers security provisions that are being developed or researched for space systems generally
and reusable space system specifically.
2.3.1 Policy and Principles
Cybersecurity for space systems has largely been unregulated, the main international
body that regulates space systems is the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and
they are concerned mainly with frequency interference. The ITU did put forth an agenda
to begin to address cybersecurity in space systems in 2007, but it has not be updated since
then [32]. This is a huge issue as it means there is not a set of standards for defining and
validating a secure space system. This means that space system are often the weakest link in
any infrastructure or data system. This is complicated further by the difficultly in patching
or upgrading these system and the ballooning number of sources for hardware and software
that might go into a single space system all developed to different security standards, no
security standards at all, or possibly with actual malicious intent.
Figure 2.1 illustrates a compromise via a satellite-to-satellite attack using a malicious
payload with a separate radio. This is one example, the payload does not need its own
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radio, the compromise could come anywhere along the chain once the satellite is exposed
to terrestrial and space-based networks; also note that core components, like an attitude
determination and control system (ADCS), might be sourced from third parties and provide
the same type of backdoor into a space system. In Figure 2.1, the malicious payload would
have been sourced from a third-party and even then the software and components that make























Fig. 2.1. Malicious Satellite to Satellite Scenario. Potential attack scenario illustrating
issues with sourcing components and software from various providers with differing security
standards.
trend, especially in small satellites or CubeSats, towards the integration multiple commercial
of-the-shelf (COTS) parts to reduce cost and schedule [32,33]. NASA even goes as far as to
have a catalog of approved vendors, but cybersecurity at the level of firmware and software
is not always addressed [32]. There is ongoing research going into addressing this lack of
cohesive security standards and component vetting or validation process, some of this falls
under policy and principles and will be covered here, and some of it falls under process and
tools and will be covered in Section 2.3.2.
A good place to start is with a set of security principles that can be used to secure a
space system or set of space systems. A working set of principles for security provides a lens
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for understanding security for space systems and systems like them. Figure 2.1 illustrates a
few points, but on of the key ones is a lack of access control, if the malicious payload comes
from an untrusted source, but it is required and cannot be further vetted then a space
system should have a way to implement the concept of least privilege where access is only
granted to the level the component or piece of software needs to do its job. If it is a sensor
then it is only allowed to provide a telemetry stream, but cannot issue commands or access
other telemetry streams. This is a form of access control, and the first set of principles
covered are from smart grid cybersecurity and deal with access control. “National Institute
of Standards and Technology Interagency Report (NISTIR) 7628 Guidelines for Smart Grid
Cybersecurity” establish a set of principles for providing security [37]. These principles are
listed below along with brief description of how they relate to access control specifically:
1. Identity Management — Communicating entities need to establish their identities
so that authentication can proceed
2. Mutual Authentication — Once identity is established, the communicating entities
need to authenticate each other’s identity
3. Authorization — Once authenticated permissions and rules can be used to authorize
or deny access based on entity identities
4. Auditing — Tracking pertinent events for troubleshooting system issues and for
detecting unauthorized behavior
5. Confidentiality — Interactions between entities need to be private, otherwise con-
trolling access has little effect
6. Integrity — Interactions between entities need to be free of alteration or other sub-
version, otherwise the resource was not truly accessed
7. Availability — Services or assets need to be available when expected
These principles where developed with power and utility grids in mind, but these
systems face many of the same problems facing space systems as they become more in-
terconnected and accessible [38–42]. Space and the grid previously enjoyed some level of
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security due to their inaccessibility, and both now need to address security as they become
more accessible and expand their component sourcing.
The design and implementation of SSSM relied on these principles, along with the
following additional principles from Ingols et al. at Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) for developing secure kernels [42].
1. Fail Slowly — Commands that are dangerous for a space system should take a while
before they execute so there is time to recover before there is irreversible damage.
2. Crypto Beyond Communications Security (COMSEC) — Cryptographically
enforce role-based access control.
3. Root of Recovery — Have a way to reassert control of the vehicle given that physical
access is generally not possible.
4. Ablative Defense — Ensure the defense mechanisms do not jeopardize the space
systems utility in terms of it purpose
5. Reboot and Succeed Quickly — ensure the process to recovery, if it requires
restarting the system, is quick so that normal operations be resume quickly.
There is a body of research that sees the lack of internal regulation and standards for
space systems as a growing area of concern; the assertion of this research is that space
systems need an international regulatory body to drive standards and regulations to bring
the same level of protection and control that is present for terrestrial systems [32–34]. Falco
et al. [32] do an in-depth dive on the special problem area that is space system’s cyberse-
curity. They review the ramifications and difficult problems of space systems and suggest
that a good deal of it can be addressed by bringing space systems regulation up to par with
terrestrial standards and regulations. They put the onus on governments, space asset orga-
nizations, and policy makers to develop these standards and suggest that common ground
practices like having a center for sharing threat information and maintaining documentation
of space system cybersecurity principles and standards.
2.3.2 Process and Tools
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Even if policies, principles, and standards are put in place, there is a need for pro-
cesses and development tools that lead to secure systems and validation tools that validate
the security of these systems. There are various groups putting effort towards developing
processes and integrating tools that allow for secure space systems development even when
parts and software are sourced from many different vendors or repurposed from different in-
dustries. One such group is Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SpaWar) [41,43].
A current goal of this group is to securely address traditional space system cost drivers.
Integrating relatively low cost COTS components while addressing IA is essential to be-
ing able to develop and field systems quickly. To do this they are looking at net-centric
technologies that keep prices down and promote reuse while trying to borrow concepts and
components from supervisor control and data acquisition (SCADA) and industrial control
system (ICS) technology, which have security problems [39, 44]. SpaWar is mapping a cy-
bersecurity overlay to the typical small satellite life-cycle so that security is baked into the
development process as shown below [43]:
 Concept Development and Design — Assess vulnerabilities and plan security
controls
 Payload and Subsystem Development — Incorporate security controls, and gray
box and black box testing of interfaces
 Bus, Payload, and Ground Subsystem Acceptance — static and dynamic anal-
ysis and reverse engineering
 System-level Integration and Testing — dynamic analysis and testing of vulner-
ability to signal interference, inception, and injection
 Launch, On-orbit Operations and Maintenance — monitor and defend network
and components
The idea being to also take a layered approach where hardware, firmware, OS, flight soft-
ware, and network interfaces are assessed. They propose integrating standard vulner-
ability scanners, and static and dynamic analysis tools, like assured compliance assess-
ment solution (ACAS), Open Vulnerability Assessment System (OpenVAS), Network Map-
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per (Nmap), Metasploit, and Interactive Disassembler (IDA) Pro. They are also looking
into ICS monitoring tools like Sophia to provide continuous monitoring of network flow.
These tools, modeling, and testbeds can help ensure that the aggregate system is secure as
well as test the efficacy of a software development framework like SSSM.
There is a lot similar work with SCADA and ICS in terms of the industrial automation
and smart grids that is looking at modeling, analysis, scanning, and monitoring that looks
at analyzing and testing systems during development as well as actively and passively
monitoring them once they are deployed using various tools [38,39,44].
2.3.3 Implementations
One of the fundamental tenants of cybersecurity for network systems is “CIA”, which
stands for Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. However, many small space systems,
reusable systems, modular open systems, IOT systems, and smart grid systems have priori-
tized these terms as “AIC” [41], where the access to the data or connectivity to the asset is
more important than protecting the data or securing the asset. This might not be as critical
when a system is on the ground and it is turning off a light switch, but it becomes very
critical when an attacker is stealing sensitive information, causing a blackout, or redirecting
a satellite into another satellite. Once control is lost on a remote space system it might not
be impossible to to recover, there typically is no way to physically reassert control [42], it
is very important to make sure control is never lost or that there is a robust path to re-
covery or graceful end-of-life (EOL). There is various ongoing research into adding security
layers or mechanisms to space systems; and a specific assertion that space systems need
encryption for use on-board satellites as another layer of protection beyond the COMSEC
boundary [42, 45]. This is the bucket of research that into which SSSM falls. First, other
research in this area is discussed and then SSSM is briefly discussed in terms of the related
technology and research it utilizes, this is of course covered in more detail in Chapter 5.
There is various ongoing research into implementing cybersecurity space systems, there is
also some relevant research into IOT and smart grids.
SpaWar, in conjunction with their procedure and tools efforts, are taking the Defense
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Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) High-Assurance Cyber Military Systems
(HACMS) program and applying it to their High-Assurance Cyber Space Systems (HACSS)
approach to securing space systems [41]. This starts with a secure kernel that secure software
components can be run against and the goes back to their process and tools for generating
and validating secure software. The idea would be to leverage a secure separation kernel
that would provide separate containers for running the flight components and a virtual
machine for running legacy Linux applications, third-party software and interfacing with
third-party hardware. There would still be an issue when these components need to talk
and certain access needs to be available between the secure and unsecured domains. This
type of secured foundation would be an excellent base for SSSM as SSSM could provide
for a secured interface between the flight software components and COTS hardware and
software on the local subnet, or across heterogeneous space system networks with systems
on other processors.
In a very related vein, Ingols et al. at MIT are also looking at using a secure microker-
nel called security enhanced L4 (seL4) [42]. seL4 was developed by National Information
and Communications Technology Australia (NICTA) and the DARPA HACMS program.
seL4 is piece of the their secure development platform that encompasses Zynq 7000 series
parts, Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C) and Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) based devices for
communication, and are actively porting CFS as reusable flight software. CFS provides an
operation system abstraction layer (OSAL) layer for Linux, FreeRTOS, and VxWorks, but
in the case of seL4 they have to and are implementing this layer themselves. OSAL expects
some features that seL4 does not provide, but they were able to work around this for the
support they needed and opt to ignore any networking support. If all this work can come
together then it will provide a reusable development platform. This effort is the closet in
spirit to the SSSM research and starts from the ground up, it however does not support net-
working and is limited to the buses described and its Inter-Process Communication (IPC)
message passing for component communication and appears to be very tied to the set of
hardware they have chosen to support.
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SSSM is modeled after the security protocols in Kerberos. It was chosen after looking
at various options that would have required invasive modification of SSM that might have
affected ease-of-use or that might have required external management of policy. Kerberos
was initially developed by MIT in conjunction with Project Athena and is still under active
development [46, 46, 47]. The protocols from Kerberos are combined with OpenSSL for
symmetric Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption to round out the solution.
SSSM does not provide for process isolation and makes no claims about the security of the
OS it resides on so software components would need to reside on separate processing nodes
and/or leverage a secure separation kernel or something like seL4 microkernel as previously





As mentioned in Chapter 1, space systems development needs to become more modular,
reusable, and secure. To achieve this transition it is first necessary to understand the current
software development practices and perceptions in the space system industry. To this end,
this research includes a series of five surveys, labeled: CC , OSAM , Security, RIPCC , and
Network. Collectively, the surveys include questions that aim to shed light on the following,
for practitioners in the space system industry:
1. Perception of and experience with reuse, portability, interoperability, and security;
along with development area allocation. The CC Survey looks at these areas.
2. Attitudes toward modular open-network software development frameworks as they
impact or relate to interoperability, integration, adaptability, and reusability. The
OSAM Survey covers this area.
3. Experience with and the perceived importance of various security mechanisms and
open source software. The Security Survey addresses these areas.
4. Perception and experience with reuse, interoperability, portability, and code complex-
ity in relation to various aspects of space systems and space systems development.
The RIPCC Survey addresses these topics.
5. Experience with and perception of various network types in space systems and how
these networks affect space system aspects like security, code complexity, adaptability,
fault tolerance, and interoperability. The Network Survey addresses these areas.
3.2 Survey Questions
In the spirit of good modularity and reuse, the surveying itself was broken up into five
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independent surveys, each with its own instruments, but the instruments relied on common
types of questions:
Likert Scale — These question used either a 3-point or 5-point Likert scale, and typically
asked participants to rate items in terms of importance or difficulty.
Ranking — These questions asked participants rank a set of items, and typically asked
participants to rank items in term of importance or difficulty.
Polar — These questions asked participants to answer a question with a binary choice of
answers, typically a yes-no question.
Percentage — These questions ask participants to give a percentage or share of an area.
Check-all-that-apply — These questions allow participants to provide multiple answers
to a single question.
Pro-neutral-con — These questions gave participants a item and asked them to categorize
its effect on a common set of items related to space system development by qualifying
the items effect as either beneficial or Pro, neutral, negative or Con. The common
set of items is always the same, Appendix A, Section A.10 gives a full listing of items
and definitions that were available to the participants.
Appendix A presents the full instrumentation for each survey as presented to the partic-
ipants. Here is the breakdown and description of the questions used for each of the five
surveys:
CC Survey — Used in questions related to code complexity, reuse, networking, and se-
curity. The full survey instrumentation is covered in Appendix A, Section A.5.
CC 2.1 — Likert Scale. Asks participants to rate the importance of reuse, portabil-
ity, interoperability, minimal code complexity, rapid development, cost of own-
ership, and security on a one-to-five Likert scale in relation to Space Flight
Software (SFS), other software fields, Space Ground Software (SGS), and space
test software (STS).
CC 2.2 — Ranking. Asks participants to rank reuse, portability, interoperability,
minimal code complexity, rapid development, cost of ownership, and security.
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OSAM Survey — Used in questions related to modular open-network system approaches,
networking, and security. The full survey instrumentation is covered in Appendix A,
Section A.6.
OSAM 2.4 — Polar. Asks participants to indicate yes or no if their organization
has employed, is employing, or will be employing open system architecture or
open network architecture.
OSAM 2.5 — Percentage. Asks participants to indicate the percentage of projec-
t/missions use OSA, MONA, closed proprietary systems, or other.
OSAM 2.6 — Check-all-that-apply. Ask participants to indicate all the factors that
might prohibit their organization from using open systems approaches. The full
listing of factors is shown in Table 4.34 of Chapter 4 as well as the Section A.6
of Appendix A.7.
Security Survey — Used in questions related to networking and security. The full survey
instrumentation is covered in Appendix A, Section A.7.
Security 2.1 — Pro-neutral-con. Asks participants to indicate the effect of internal
security on each of the common items.
Security 2.2 — Polar. Asks participants to indicated if they have direct security ex-
perience with Space Flight System (SFSYS)s, Space Ground System (SGSYS)s,
space test system (STSYS)s, penetration testing, or other.
Security 2.6 — Likert Scale. Asks participants to rate the importance of Iden-
tify Management, Mutual Authentication, Authorization, Auditing, Confiden-
tiality, Integrity, Availability, Well-defined Interfaces, Abstraction layers, Access
Control, Network Segmentation, Compliance, Testing, Recovery, Migration, and
Other in relation to Open-network SFSYSs and Traditional SFSYSs.
Security 2.7 — Likert Scale. Asks participants to rate the difficulty of providing for
Identify Management, Mutual Authentication, Authorization, Auditing, Confi-
dentiality, Integrity, Availability, Well-defined Interfaces, Abstraction layers, Ac-
cess Control, Network Segmentation, Compliance, Testing, Recovery, Migration,
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and Other in relation to Open-network SFSYSs and Traditional SFSYSs.
Security 2.8 — Ranking. Asks participants to rank Identify Management, Mutual
Authentication, Authorization, Auditing, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability,
Well-defined Interfaces, Abstraction layers, Access Control, Network Segmenta-
tion, Compliance, Testing, Recovery, Migration, and Other in terms of impor-
tance with relation to SFSYSs.
RIPCC Survey — Used questions related to code complexity and reusability. The full
survey instrumentation is covered in Appendix A, Section A.8.
RIPCC 2.10 — Pro-neutral-con. Asks participants to indicate the effect of software
reuse on each of the common items.
RIPCC 2.13 — Pro-neutral-con. Asks participants to indicate the effect of code
complexity on each of the common items.
RIPCC 2.15 — Likert Scale. Asks participants to rate the importance of cyclo-
matic complexity, depth of inheritance, class coupling, methods per class, lock
of cohesion, data complexity, data flow complexity, decisional complexity, lan-
guage complexity, interface complexity, lines of code, and other with regard to
measuring code complexity.
Network Survey — Used a question related to modular open-network system approaches,
networking, and security. The full survey instrumentation is covered in Appendix A,
Section A.9.
Network 2.3 — Pro-neutral-con. Asks participants to indicate the effect of inter-
nally networked space systems on each of the common items.
The CC and RIPCC Survey questions used show that developers perceive minimal
code complexity to be important and beneficial for space systems. These surveys also show
that developers feel that reusability is important and beneficial for space systems. The
Network and OSAM Survey questions used show that developers see open-network systems
to be largely beneficial and increasing in use. The CC , OSAM , Security, and Network
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Surveys questions used show that developers see open-network space systems as having a
negative impact on security, but an overall positive impact.
Each survey also includes a common set of background questions, these questions used
the same question types as above. Appendix A includes the specific background questions
for each survey, and Appendix B provides an overview of the background question results.
These questions ask participants about the roles they have participated in, years of experi-
ence in various areas, perception of development phase, duration, total mission or project
count, typical concurrent project or mission count, and organization type affiliation.
3.3 Survey Distribution
To reach out to various developers, engineers, and managers within the space systems
development, the participant solicitation targeted multiple distribution lists. The potential
participant pool makeup consisted of about 900 from the American Institute of Aeronautics
and Astronautics (AIAA)/USU Conference on Small Satellites, 785 from the CubeSat Mail-
ing list, 1500 from the Radio Amateur Satellite Corporation (AMSAT-NA) Bulletin Board
Mailing List list, and about 20 – 40 from the Space Dynamics Laboratory (SDL) software
developers mailing list. Outlined below are each of the mailing lists used to distribute the
surveys:
1. AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites: The Commerce of Small Satellites 2014
Participation — provides direct access to email addresses from the 2014 conference.
Invitation to participate was sent to the addresses on this list directly via the Qualtrics
email system.
2. Cubesat Mailing List — provides access to educators, developers, and some vendors
that have a specific interest in small satellites, specifically cubesats or U-class space-
craft [48]. Access to this list is available via the cubesat@cubesat.org email address.
3. AMSAT-NA Bulletin Board Mailing List — provides access to a group that is pri-
marily made up of amateur satellite builders and users, with a particular emphasis on
radio. Access to this list is available via the amsat-bb@amsat.org email address and
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coordination with the maintainers.
4. SDL — provides access to software developers within SDL.
The method of invitation to participate varied based on the distribution list. For
example, the participation in List 1 described above were sent email invitation directly.
Those in Lists 2 and 3 were invited through email messages sent to their respective group
email addresses. Those in List 4 where invited by email message sent by an SDL employee
who had access to all employee email addresses.
Although each survey focuses on a specific set of ideas, each was designed to stand on
its own. Therefore, for the series to gather useful information, it is not necessary for all
participants to complete all surveys.
The main incentive for respondents to participate is helping to increase the body of
knowledge that relates to software development for space systems and helping to direct
future research. Also, taking a survey provides participants with an opportunity to reflect
on their current software development practices and how these practices affect the projects
on which they have worked in the past, are working currently, and will work in the future.
The survey-specific drawings gave two randomly selected participants a $25 gift card. The
overall drawing gave two randomly selected participants from the pool of all participants of
any survey a $200 gift card. At the end of each of the surveys, a participant was redirected
to a web-page that asks for an email address. A participant had to enter a valid email
address to be considered for that surveys drawing or the overall drawing; email addresses
were tracked separately from surveys.
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CHAPTER 4
SURVEY SERIES RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the primary findings from a detailed analysis of responses from
the five SISDPA surveys. The findings of this analysis establish the importance of securing
space systems and developing secured modular reusable software development frameworks,
like SSSM, for space systems. This shows that a secured modular reusable software develop-
ment framework is key in addressing the Development and Security Problems. Section 4.2
presents an overview of the participation numbers for each survey, with a more in depth
breakdown of the participant demographic covered in Appendix B. Sections 4.3 through 4.6
analyze results related to code complexity, reusability, modular open-network architectures
or open systems approaches, and security. Each of these sections covers one of these topic
areas, e.g. code complexity, and analyzes the set of survey questions that relate to the area
and had significant results. Typically each section starts with an overview of the findings
in terms of the high-level topic area, e.g. code complexity, and then describes the sub-areas
that are analyzed and make up this high-level topic area. Each subsection covers one of
these sub-topics, e.g. Code Complexity Importance and Benefit, and has sub-subsections
that present the survey question analysis as it relates to the sub-topics and the high-level
topic. Section 4.7 concludes with a summary of the findings and some general insights.
All the results tables use a color coding scheme to help visualize strong-positive, weak,
and strong-nevative t-values. Table 4.1 shows the typical t-value ranges designated for each
color. Very strong negative t-values are shown in red, this is typically below −4. Strong
negative t-values are shown in orange, this is typically from below the negative critical t-
value, usually around −2, down to −4; this will vary based on the degrees of freedom for
the test.
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Table 4.1. Color Key for t-value Row Coloring in Question Results Tables. The −2 and 2
values vary a bit and are dependent on the degrees of freedom for the given test.




Strong negative −4 ≤ t ≤ −2
Weak −2 ≤ t ≤ 2
Strong positive 2 ≤ t ≤ 4
Very strong positive t ≥ 4
Larger numbers of participants require a lower t-value to be significant. Neutral t-
values are shown in gray. Strong positive t-values are shown in green, this is typically from
above the positive critical t-value, usually around 2, up to 4. Very strong positive t-values
are shown in blue, this is typically above 4.
4.2 Survey Series Participation
Table 4.2 illustrates that the usable response rate is between 0.9% and 3.1%. The
average usable response rate for the surveys is ∼1.5% with a standard deviation of ∼0.5.
Each survey went through multiple rounds of email solicitations to achieve this response
rate.
The CC survey saw the best yield with a total of 97 usable participants, this is even after
removal of the invalid and partial responses. Table 4.2 shows that the CC Survey started
with a total of 176 survey responses. A total of 64 blank responses left 112 potentially
usable participant responses. The CC survey was the first survey administered and as a
result suffered from the problem where participants only took the background portion of
the survey. Later surveys had the order of the background and the survey specific sections
reversed to mitigate this problem. Segregating out the background-only participation left 97
participants, meaning 15 participants only filled out the background section of this survey;
this is why 97 participants are shown as usable in Table 4.2. This leaves a usable response
rate of 3.1%, which is double the next best response rate.
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The CC Survey was available online for about 6 months, this was arguably too long a
duration to let the survey run, but this survey did get the most responses. This was not
a sustainable duration to let the remaining surveys run as administering all 6 would have
taken 3 years. Another option would have been to let them overlap, but there was already
confusion about which survey was which and questions from participants about whether or
not they had taken a survey. Survey participation had to be anonymous so participants were
not able to be removed from the distribution list once they participated in a given survey,
also some of the distribution lists were blind lists, so email addresses could not be removed.
USU’s Internal Review Board (IRB) thought it would be too stressful for participants take
the survey series as one long survey. In total 5 recruitment emails were sent out over that
6 month duration with a thank you email at the end. The other surveys were delivered at
a much higher cadence, typically with 4 recruitment emails about a week apart over the
course of a month.










CC 3173 176 97 5.5% 3.1%
OSAM 3085 115 44 3.7% 1.4%
Security 3060 107 31 3.5% 1.0%
RIPCC 3038 83 29 2.7% 0.9%
Network 3024 93 32 3.1% 1.0%
Table 4.2 shows that the other 4 surveys all had similar respondent counts and usable
rates leaving each of them with about 30 to 40 usable responses. Care was taken during
analysis so that the groupings used to understand participant responses did not over segment
the respondents to the point where only one or two respondents were left in a dominant
category. For example, a question that used an 1-to-5 importance scale might be reduced
to a 1-to-3 importance scale.
Over the course of the survey 149 potential participants opted out of the future sur-
vey participation, this number was only driven by those who could be solicited via direct
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Qualtrics delivery. There was not a way to opt out participants that belong to the Cubesat
or AMSAT mailing lists. This opt out rate did not have a notable effect on Usable Rate
or Usable Responses, i.e. the 3173 that the pool started with versus the 3024 that the pool
ended with did not really have a significant effect on percentages or Usable Responses. It
is not clear how many participants mentally opted out of the survey mailing lists.
It should be noted that the responses to the Background sections of the survey series
show that software engineer (SE)s had strong representation and the participants have good
development experience mixtures, and that certain management roles tended to be multi-
role. The Background results where explored but not formally analyzed, so the findings
from this exploration are covered in Appendix B.
4.3 Participant Perception of Code Complexity
This section presents findings related to software code complexity. These findings
stem from analyzing response to questions in the CC and RIPCC surveys. These findings
present the participating space systems developers’ perception of the importance and benefit
of minimal code complexity as well as important code complexity measurement methods.
Section 4.3.1 shows a a general consensus among participants that minimal code com-
plexity is important and beneficial to space systems and space systems development. Fur-
ther, the results show that minimal code complexity is the most important for SFS. Sec-
tion 4.3.2 covers participating developers’ perception that some code complexity metrics
are more important for measuring code complexity for space systems software.
Developer perception of the importance of minimal code complexity relates to the
security portion of this research because is shows that developers believe that minimizing
code complexity is important to space systems development. This gives strength to the
idea that adding security to a software development framework, like SSM, with minimal
increase to code complexity is a valuable contribution to the space systems development
community. This analysis also shows that participants believe that the lack of cohesion
and cyclomatic complexity metrics are the most important for measuring code complexity.
This information is generally useful to the space systems development community, but also
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relates to the code complexity metrics that could be used to measure the delta in code
complexity between SSM and SSSM.
4.3.1 Code Complexity Importance and Benefit
The consensus among the space systems developers that participated in the CC and
RIPCC Surveys is that minimizing code complexity is important and beneficial to software
developed for space systems. This is generally relevant as it suggests at least one way of
quantitatively measure the quality of code.
This section analyzes the responses to CC Survey, Questions 2.1 and 2.2, as they
relate to the importance of code complexity. This section also analyzes the responses to
RIPCC Survey, Question 2.13. Analysis of Question 2.1 shows that participants perceive
minimizing code complexity to be generally important for S*S and other software, and that
they found it to be the most important for SFS. The participants found code complexity
to be generally less important than reusability. Section 4.3.1.1 presents the analysis of
Question 2.1. Analysis of Question 2.2 shows that participants perceive code complexity to
have an average importance ranking mean. Section 4.3.1.2 presents the analysis of Question
2.2. Analysis of Question 2.13 shows that participants perceive minimizing code complexity
to be generally beneficial, and specifically beneficial to aspects that related to usability of
the code, aspects that, in theory, make the software easier to use. Section 4.3.1.3 presents
the analysis of Question 2.13.
4.3.1.1 CC Survey, Question 2.1 Analysis, Part 1
This section shows that the participants perceive code complexity to be important
for SFS, SGS, STS, and other software fields. This section also shows that participants
perceive code complexity to be more important for SFS than for SGS, STS, or other software
fields. This section shows that minimizing code complexity is seen to be generally more
important for space systems software than for other software. Finally, this section shows
code complexity is generally seen as less important than reuse, but equal in importance to
security for space systems related software and other software fields.
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CC Survey, Question 2.1 is a Pros-neutral-cons rating question, for these questions, a
special caveat was listed for how neutrally impacted aspects would be counted:
“All items should be placed for the answer to be considered complete by the
system. In considering partial or incomplete answers, unplaced items will be
considered neutral.”
This means that aspects that were not placed can be counted as neutral, if no aspects
where placed then the response was dropped. If the participant placed some of the items
then the analysis proceeded with two interpretations, i.e. one where non-placed aspects
were assumed neutral, and one where non-placed aspects were dropped. There was little
statistical difference between the two interpretations so the assumed neutral variant is used
for all Pros-neutral-cons rating questions. This analysis covers three statistical tests. Test
1, a one-sample t-test, looks at code complexity importance for software in general. Test 2,
a matched-pairs t-test, compares code complexity across different software areas. Test 3, a
second matched-pairs t-test, compares code complexity to other software aspects.
Test 1
Summary: Participants see code complexity as being important for SFS, SGS, STS,
and other software fields.
Question: Question 2.1 asks each participant to rate the importance of code com-
plexity for SFS, SGS, STS, and other software fields on a 5-point Likert scale.
Analysis: One-sample t-test with test value of 3, which represents a neutral value.
Hypothesis: Software developers will find code complexity to have a non-neutral
importance.
H0: µCodeComplexityImportance = 3
HA: µCodeComplexityImportance 6= 3
Table 4.3 shows the statistics for this test. Table 4.3 shows that all the means for code
complexity importance are above neutral, including the overall mean.
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Table 4.3. CC 2.1, Part 1 — Code Complexity Importance Mean One-sample Test Statis-
tics, Test Value 3, 5-point Likert Scale
Area N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
SFS 90 3.98 0.960 0.101
SGS 90 3.36 0.975 0.103
STS 89 3.51 1.035 0.110
Other Software 79 3.44 1.010 0.114
Overall 93 3.61 0.746 0.077
Table 4.4 shows that all of the categories, S*S individually and overall, as well as other
software fields, show strong evidence against the hypothesis that participants perceive code
complexity importance to be neutral. This means that code complexity is generally seen as
important for all of the software areas under consideration by the participants.
The general importance of code complexity means that it should be considered and
weighed against the gains provided by reuse and security that a open-network software
development framework might offer.
Table 4.4. CC 2.1, Part 1 — Code Complexity Importance Mean, One-sample Test Results,














SFS 1.9870 9.666 89 0.000 0.978 0.78 1.18
SGS 1.9870 3.459 89 0.001 0.356 0.15 0.56
STS 1.9873 4.609 88 0.000 0.506 0.29 0.72
Other Software 1.9909 3.901 78 0.000 0.443 0.22 0.67
S*S Overall 1.9861 7.853 92 0.000 0.608 0.45 0.76
Test 2
Summary: Participants perceive code complexity to be more important for SFS than
for SGS, STS, or other software fields. The participants perceived code complexity
to be more important for space systems in general than for other software. They also
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perceive code complexity to be less important than reuse and equivalent to security
for both space systems software and other software fields.
Question: Question 2.1 asks each participant to rate the importance of code com-
plexity for SFS, SGS, STS, and other software fields on a 5-point Likert scale.
Analysis: Matched-pairs t-test to compare means of various combinations of SFS,
SGS, STS, and other software fields.
Hypothesis:
H0: µS*S = µOtherSoftware
HA: µS*S 6= µOtherSoftware
Table 4.5 shows that the mean for SFS is above all the other means. Table 4.5 also shows
that S*S in general is above other software.
Table 4.5. CC 2.1, Part 1 — Code Complexity Importance Mean, Matched-pairs Test
Statistics, 5-point Likert Scale





Pair A1 SFS 3.93 76 0.998 0.114
Other Software 3.46 76 1.012 0.116
Pair A2 SGS 3.43 77 0.952 0.108
Other Software 3.44 77 1.019 0.116
Pair A3 STS 3.53 76 1.013 0.116
Other Software 3.45 76 1.012 0.116
Pair A4 SFS 3.98 87 0.964 0.103
STS 3.52 87 1.044 0.112
Pair A5 STS 3.51 87 1.044 0.112
SGS 3.36 87 0.988 0.106
Pair A6 SFS 3.97 88 0.964 0.103
SGS 3.38 88 0.975 0.104
Pair A7 S*S 3.62 78 0.758 0.086
Other Software 3.44 78 1.014 0.115
Table 4.6 shows the results for this test. The low p-values and strong positive t-values
for Pairs A1, A4, A6, and A7 give strong evidence that the group perceives code complexity
32
to be more important for SFS than for any of the other software categories considered by
the survey. Minimizing code complexity helps keep software systems simple and often
more robust; this can help with resiliency, integration and testing, and development speed.
Simpler systems can also translate into reduced resource load for systems that are typically
constrained in terms of SWaP, as well as processing and memory resources. This suggests
that any system the might look to promote reuse, e.g. SSM, or add security, e.g. SSSM,
needs to balance these gains against their effects on code complexity when it comes to SFS.
Pairs A2, A3, and A5 did not show a significant difference in importance averages; this
means that participants attribute a similar amount of importance to code complexity for
STS, SGS, and other software.
Table 4.6. CC 2.1, Part 1 — Code Complexity Importance Mean, Matched-pairs Test









































0.149 0.922 0.099 -0.047 0.346 1.9879 1.512 86 0.134
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.6. CC 2.1, Part 1 — Code Complexity Importance Mean, Matched-pairs Test



























0.184 0.780 0.088 0.008 0.360 1.9913 2.080 77 0.041
Test 3
Summary: The participants perceive code complexity to be less important than
reuse and equivalent to security for both space systems software and other software
fields.
Question: Question 2.1 asks each participant to rate the importance of code com-
plexity, reusability, and security for SFS, SGS, STS, and other software fields on a
5-point Likert scale.
Analysis: Matched-pairs t-test to compare means of various combinations of code
complexity, reusability, and security.
Hypothesis:
H0: µSoftwareAspect = µOtherSoftwareAspect
HA: µSoftwareAspect 6= µOtherSoftwareAspect
Table 4.7 shows that the mean for code complexity is noticeably less important than it is
for reuse in space systems software and other software while roughly equivalent for security
importance.
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Table 4.7. CC 2.1 — Code Complexity vs. Reuse vs. Security Importance Mean, Matched-
pairs Test Statistics, 5-point Likert Scale





Pair D1 S*S Reuse 3.86 93 0.733 0.076
S*S Code Complexity 3.61 93 0.746 0.077
Pair D2 S*S Reuse 3.86 93 0.733 0.076
S*S Security 3.73 93 0.864 0.090
Pair D3 S*S Code Complexity 3.61 93 0.746 0.077
S*S Security 3.73 93 0.864 0.090
Pair D4 Other Software Reuse 3.75 79 0.967 0.109
Other Software Code Complexity 3.44 79 1.010 0.114
Pair D5 Other Software Reuse 3.73 79 0.970 0.109
Other Software Security 3.49 79 1.061 0.119
Pair D6 Other Software Code Complexity 3.44 78 1.014 0.115
Other Software Security 3.50 78 1.066 0.121
Table 4.8 shows, in the case of Pair D1 and Pair D4, that reuse is generally seen as more
important than code complexity for space systems software and for other software. This
suggests that while code complexity needs to be strongly considered for SFS it needs to be
balanced against the overall importance of reuse. This suggests a benefit from open-network
software development frameworks that can promote reuse and security while abstracting or
minimizing code complexity for the end developer. Finally, the D* pairs that relate to
security show very weak evidence against the null meaning that the importance of security
in relation to reuse and complexity is equal with regard to space systems software and other
software.
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Table 4.8. CC 2.1 — Code Complexity vs. Reuse vs. Security Importance Mean, Matched-



















Pair D1 0.256 1.015 0.105 0.047 0.465 1.9861 2.434 92 0.017
Pair D2 0.129 1.027 0.107 -0.083 0.342 1.9861 1.211 92 0.229
Pair D3 -0.127 1.110 0.115 -0.356 0.101 1.9861 -1.106 92 0.271
Pair D4 0.304 1.202 0.135 0.035 0.573 1.9909 2.246 78 0.028
Pair D5 0.241 1.157 0.130 -0.019 0.500 1.9909 1.847 78 0.068
Pair D6 -0.064 1.231 0.139 -0.342 0.213 1.9913 -0.460 77 0.647
4.3.1.2 CC Survey, Question 2.2 Analysis, Part 1
This section shows that participants see code complexity as having an “average” rank-
ing using a one-sample t-test. This test shows that the participants do not perceive minimal
code complexity to be the most important but it is still very relevant.
Summary: Participants perceive code complexity to have a mean that is very close
to 4 or an “average” ranking.
Question: CC Survey, Question 2.2 asks each participant to rank the provided soft-
ware characteristics from 1 to 7, 1 being the highest ranking.
Analysis: One-sample t-test with test value of 4, which represents a middle-of-the-
pack ranking.
Hypothesis: Participants will perceive code complexity to have a non-average rank-
ing when compared against the 7 other characteristics.
H0: µCharacteristicRanking = 4
HA: µCharacteristicRanking 6= 4
Table 4.9 shows that minimal code complexity has a mean very close to 4 or the average
value for the ranking scale; this does not mean that code complexity is unimportant, in fact
participants found complexity to be important as indicated by analysis already presented
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in this section. Participants just found some of the other aspects to be more important
overall, e.g. the D* pairs from Section 4.3.1.1 indicate that reusability is more important.
Table 4.9. CC 2.2, Part 1 — Software Characteristic Importance Ranking Means, One-
sample Test Statistics, Test Value 4, 1 to 7 Ranking Scale
Aspect N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Reuse 96 2.83 1.560 0.159
Portability 96 4.38 1.564 0.160
Interoperability 96 3.93 1.773 0.181
Minimal Code Complexity 96 3.97 2.250 0.230
Rapid Development 96 4.23 2.034 0.208
Cost of Ownership 96 4.81 1.860 0.190
Security 96 3.85 2.312 0.236
The ranking of code complexity indicates that it should be considered, but that devel-
opment aspects like reusability should be given more weight when developing software for
space systems. This follows the trend towards MONAs and OSAs that promote reuse. This
trend is resulting in a increased need to protect these systems as shown in Section 4.6.3.2.
Section 4.6.3.2 that shows security is more important for open-network space systems. This
indicates there is a benefit from open-network software development frameworks that can
promote reuse and security, frameworks like SSSM.
Table 4.10. CC 2.2, Part 1 — Software Characteristic Importance Ranking Means, One-















Reuse 1.9852 -7.325 95 0.000 -1.167 -1.48 -0.85
Portability 1.9852 2.349 95 0.021 0.375 0.06 0.69
Interoperability 1.9852 -0.403 95 0.688 -0.073 -0.43 0.29
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.10. CC 2.2, Part 1 — Software Characteristic Importance Ranking Means, One-

















1.9852 -0.136 95 0.892 -0.031 -0.49 0.42
Rapid
Development
1.9852 1.104 95 0.272 0.229 -0.18 0.64
Cost of
Ownership
1.9852 4.280 95 0.000 0.813 0.44 1.19
Security 1.9852 -0.618 95 0.538 -0.146 -0.61 0.32
4.3.1.3 RIPCC Survey, Question 2.13 Analysis
This section shows that participants perceive reducing or minimizing code complexity
to have an overall positive affect on the space systems aspects in question.
Summary: Participants see minimizing code complexity as beneficial overall. There
is very strong evidence against the null for the Overall mean. This is true because
there are a lot of aspects with very strong, strong, or neutral t-values and no aspects
that have a significant negative t-value.
Question: RIPCC Survey, Question 2.13 asks each participant to record the impact
of minimizing code complexity on a range of system aspects in terms of Pros, Neutral,
and Cons. Pros is coded as a 3, Neutral is coded as a 2, and Cons is coded as a 1.
Analysis: One-sample t-test with test value of 2, which represents a neutral value.
Hypothesis: Participants will perceive code complexity to have a non-neutral affect
on space system aspects.
H0: µCodeComplexityImpact = 2
HA: µCodeComplexityImpact 6= 2
Table 4.11 shows that most of the aspects have a mean benefit rating at or above 2.
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Table 4.11. RIPCC 2.13 — Minimal Code Complexity Benefits on System-aspects Means,
One-sample Test Statistics, Test Value 2, 1 to 3 Cons-Neutral-Pros Scale
Aspect N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Regression reduction 21 2.8095 0.51177 0.11168
Code design 21 2.5238 0.81358 0.17754
Development cost 21 2.4286 0.81064 0.17690
Maintenance cost 21 2.6190 0.66904 0.14600
Development productivity 21 2.4286 0.81064 0.17690
Development efficiency 21 2.2381 0.83095 0.18133
Code complexity 21 2.8571 0.47809 0.10433
Maintainability 21 2.6190 0.66904 0.14600
Integration 21 2.4762 0.60159 0.13128
Adaptability 21 2.1429 0.79282 0.17301
Documentation/Examples 21 2.3810 0.58959 0.12866
Encapsulation 21 2.2857 0.56061 0.12234
Bug detection 21 2.8571 0.35857 0.07825
Code quality 21 2.6190 0.66904 0.14600
Code robustness 21 2.5238 0.60159 0.13128
Best practices 21 2.5714 0.50709 0.11066
Schedule 21 2.3333 0.73030 0.15936
Code or algorithm
optimization/efficiency
21 2.0476 0.86465 0.18868
Uniformity of coding style 21 2.2857 0.78376 0.17103
Domain knowledge 21 2.0952 0.53896 0.11761
Code readability 21 2.6667 0.57735 0.12599
Security 21 2.0952 0.62488 0.13636
I/0 efficiency 21 1.9524 0.66904 0.14600
Radiation hardness 21 2.0000 0.44721 0.09759
Fault tolerance 21 1.7619 0.62488 0.13636
Hardware complexity 21 2.1429 0.47809 0.10433
Latency 21 1.9048 0.70034 0.15283
Determinism 21 2.1905 0.60159 0.13128
Interoperability 21 2.0476 0.74001 0.16148
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.11. RIPCC 2.13 — Minimal Code Complexity Benefits on System-aspects Means,
One-sample Test Statistics, Test Value 2, 1 to 3 Cons-Neutral-Pros Scale (continued)
Aspect N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Portability 21 2.0476 0.80475 0.17561
Testing 21 2.5238 0.67964 0.14831
Reusability 21 2.1905 0.74960 0.16358
Software upgradability 21 2.2381 0.70034 0.15283
Hardware
changes/flexibility
21 2.0476 0.66904 0.14600
Adoption rates/software
proliferation
21 2.2857 0.64365 0.14046
Ease of use 21 2.5238 0.60159 0.13128
Mission/Project
requirement changes
21 2.2381 0.76842 0.16768
Information Assurance 21 2.1905 0.51177 0.11168
Mission Assurance 21 2.1905 0.60159 0.13128
Overall 21 2.3175 0.32295 0.07047
Table 4.12 shows that 18 of the 39 aspects are positively affected by minimizing code
complexity Table 4.12 shows 21 aspects that participants did not think code complexity
affected. Finally, Table 4.12 shows that there are no aspects that are negatively affected.
The results also show that the Overall mean affect had a very strong positive t-value,
meaning that overall minimizing code complexity was seen as beneficial.
Table 4.12. RIPCC 2.13 — Code Complexity Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-

















2.0860 7.249 20 0.000 0.80952 0.5766 1.0425
Code design 2.0860 2.950 20 0.008 0.52381 0.1535 0.8941
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.12. RIPCC 2.13 — Code Complexity Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-















Development cost 2.0860 2.423 20 0.025 0.42857 0.0596 0.7976
Maintenance cost 2.0860 4.240 20 0.000 0.61905 0.3145 0.9236
Development
productivity
2.0860 2.423 20 0.025 0.42857 0.0596 0.7976
Development
efficiency
2.0860 1.313 20 0.204 0.23810 -0.1401 0.6163
Code complexity 2.0860 8.216 20 0.000 0.85714 0.6395 1.0748
Maintainability 2.0860 4.240 20 0.000 0.61905 0.3145 0.9236
Integration 2.0860 3.627 20 0.002 0.47619 0.2024 0.7500
Adaptability 2.0860 0.826 20 0.419 0.14286 -0.2180 0.5037
Documentation/
Examples
2.0860 2.961 20 0.008 0.38095 0.1126 0.6493
Encapsulation 2.0860 2.335 20 0.030 0.28571 0.0305 0.5409
Bug detection 2.0860 10.954 20 0.000 0.85714 0.6939 1.0204
Code quality 2.0860 4.240 20 0.000 0.61905 0.3145 0.9236
Code robustness 2.0860 3.990 20 0.001 0.52381 0.2500 0.7976
Best practices 2.0860 5.164 20 0.000 0.57143 0.3406 0.8023





2.0860 0.252 20 0.803 0.04762 -0.3460 0.4412
Uniformity of
coding style
2.0860 1.671 20 0.110 0.28571 -0.0711 0.6425
Domain
knowledge
2.0860 0.810 20 0.428 0.09524 -0.1501 0.3406
Code readability 2.0860 5.292 20 0.000 0.66667 0.4039 0.9295
Security 2.0860 0.698 20 0.493 0.09524 -0.1892 0.3797
I/0 efficiency 2.0860 -0.326 20 0.748 -0.04762 -0.3522 0.2569
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.12. RIPCC 2.13 — Code Complexity Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-

















2.0860 0.000 20 1.000 0.00000 -0.2036 0.2036
Fault tolerance 2.0860 -1.746 20 0.096 -0.23810 -0.5225 0.0463
Hardware
complexity
2.0860 1.369 20 0.186 0.14286 -0.0748 0.3605
Latency 2.0860 -0.623 20 0.540 -0.09524 -0.4140 0.2236
Determinism 2.0860 1.451 20 0.162 0.19048 -0.0834 0.4643
Interoperability 2.0860 0.295 20 0.771 0.04762 -0.2892 0.3845
Portability 2.0860 0.271 20 0.789 0.04762 -0.3187 0.4139
Testing 2.0860 3.532 20 0.002 0.52381 0.2144 0.8332
Reusability 2.0860 1.164 20 0.258 0.19048 -0.1507 0.5317
Software
upgradability








2.0860 2.034 20 0.055 0.28571 -0.0073 0.5787




2.0860 1.420 20 0.171 0.23810 -0.1117 0.5879
Information
Assurance
2.0860 1.706 20 0.104 0.19048 -0.0425 0.4234
Mission
Assurance
2.0860 1.451 20 0.162 0.19048 -0.0834 0.4643
Overall 2.0860 4.505 20 0.000 0.31747 0.1705 0.4645
Minimizing code complexity was largely seen as beneficial to aspects that related to the
usability of the code, i.e. code readability, ease of use, best practices, code robustness, code
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quality, bug detection, encapsulation, documentation/examples, integration, maintainabil-
ity, development productivity, and code design. These are all aspects that, in theory, make
the software easier to use. If the software is easier to use then it translates into some of the
other benefits the participants identified, i.e. schedule, regression reduction, development
cost, and testing. It follows that the perceived benefits of code complexity address a lot
of the issue facing software-systems development for space systems, and designers should
consider code complexity during design and implementation of software for space systems.
This does have to be balanced against other aspects that help reduce cost and schedule
like reusability and adaptability that can drive code complexity. Software development
frameworks like SSM that may be internally complex help to limit the complexity for an
end user by abstracting the complexity and allowing reuse and adaptability.
4.3.2 Code Complexity Metrics
There is a consensus among RIPCC Survey participants on the more important ways
to measure code complexity for software developed for space systems. The previous section,
Section 4.3.1, discussed developer perception of the importance and benefit of minimal code
complexity, and it follows that the development community would want to agree on ways
to measure code complexity. The participants did not seem to agree on one particular code
complexity metric as being the most important, but coalesced around two metrics that
would be the most important in determining a piece of software’s code complexity. This by
itself is useful to the space systems software development community because it suggests a
couple of metrics that are more important for measuring code complexity.
Participants in the Security Survey believe that internal security provisions have a
negative impact on code complexity, as detailed in Section 4.6.5. Analysis of code complexity
in SSM versus SSSM will be left for future work and may show SSSM as a way to add internal
security provisions without a significantly increasing code complexity.
The front running code complexity metrics where cyclomatic complexity and lack of
cohesion. They would therefor be the most important metrics to target or measure software
against when attempting to minimize code complexity.
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4.3.2.1 RIPCC Survey, Question 2.15 Analysis
This section shows that participants perceive cyclomatic complexity and lack of co-
hesion to be the only code complexity metrics with positive non-neutral importance for
measuring code complexity.
Summary: Participants perceive cyclomatic complexity and lack of cohesion to have
above average importance; the participants felt that all of the other metrics have
neutral or average importance.
Question: Question 2.15 asks the participants to rate the importance of each code
complexity metric on a 5-point Likert scale.
Analysis: One-sample t-test with test value of 3, which represents a neutral value.
Hypothesis: Participants will perceive the different code complexity metrics to have
a non-neutral importance.
H0: µCodeComplexityMetricImportance = 3
HA: µCodeComplexityMetricImportance 6= 3
Table 4.13 shows that most of the code complexity metrics have a mean importance rating
at or slightly above 3.
Table 4.13. RIPCC 2.15 — Code Complexity Importance Means, One-sample Test Statis-
tics, Test Value 3, 5-point Likert Scale Scale
Aspect N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Cyclomatic complexity
(McCabe Metric)
27 3.59 1.366 0.263
Depth of inheritance 27 3.15 1.064 0.205
Class coupling 26 3.04 0.958 0.188
Methods per class 27 2.89 0.892 0.172
Lack of cohesion 27 3.67 1.359 0.261
Data complexity (Chapin
Metric)
27 3.33 1.000 0.192
Data flow complexity
(Elshof Metric)
27 3.41 1.047 0.202
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.13. RIPCC 2.15 — Code Complexity Importance Means, One-sample Test Statis-
tics, Test Value 3, 5-point Likert Scale (continued)
Aspect N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Decisional complexity
(Mcclure Metric)
27 3.44 1.251 0.241
Language complexity
(Haltsead Metric)




27 3.33 1.301 0.250
Lines of code 27 3.04 1.224 0.236
Other 13 2.54 1.664 0.462
Overall 27 3.24 0.723 0.139
Table 4.14 shows that 2 of the 12 metrics, including Other, had means on the important
side of the scale. However, only lack of cohesion and cyclomatic complexity have strong
evidence against the null. This means that lack of cohesion and cyclomatic complexity are
the only two metrics that have non-neutral or important means. Lack of cohesion is when a
class represents more than one abstraction and cyclomatic complexity deal with the number
of linearly independent paths through a program.
Table 4.14 shows that the remaining metrics had neutral means. The results also show
that Overall mean importance had a neutral mean.
Other portions of this analysis show that participants believe that minimizing com-
plexity is generally important for space systems software and other software; and that it
is specifically more important for SFS. Putting these points together it follows that the
participants perceive minimizing code complexity to be important and so achieving good
lack of cohesion and cyclomatic complexity scores would be the most important metrics to
manage, particularly in the case of SFS where minimizing code complexity was shown to
be the most important.
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Table 4.14. RIPCC 2.15 — Code Complexity Importance Means, One-sample Test Results,


















2.0555 2.254 26 0.033 0.593 0.05 1.13
Depth of
inheritance
2.0555 0.724 26 0.476 0.148 -0.27 0.57
Class coupling 2.0596 0.205 25 0.840 0.038 -0.35 0.43
Methods per class 2.0555 -0.648 26 0.523 -0.111 -0.46 0.24
Lack of cohesion 2.0555 2.550 26 0.017 0.667 0.13 1.20
Data complexity
(Chapin Metric)


















2.0555 1.331 26 0.195 0.333 -0.18 0.85
Lines of code 2.0555 0.157 26 0.876 0.037 -0.45 0.52
Other 2.1788 -1.000 12 0.337 -0.462 -1.47 0.54
Overall 2.0555 1.692 26 0.103 -0.235 -0.05 0.52
4.4 Participant Perception of Reusable Software
This section presents the findings related to developing reusable software for space
systems. These findings stem from analysis of answers to questions in the CC and RIPCC
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surveys. This analysis shows that participants view reuse as important and beneficial for
software developed for space systems.
Developer perception of the importance and benefits of software reuse relates to benefits
and importance of SSM, a software development framework designed to enable and promote
reuse. Other portions of the survey series analysis show that developers perceive that open-
network systems, such as SSM, are beneficial and important and ultimately the direction
space systems development is heading, but that these same systems have a stronger need
for security. This gives strength to the idea that adding security to a software development
framework, like SSM, which promotes reuse and leverages OSA and MONA concepts, in
the from of SSSM, is a valuable contribution to the space systems development community.
4.4.1 Reusability Importance and Benefit
There is a consensus among the space systems developers that participated in the CC
Survey that reusability is generally beneficial to space systems and space systems develop-
ment. This section analyzes the responses to CC Survey, Questions 2.1 and 2.2; as they
relate to the importance of reusability. This section also analyzes the responses to RIPCC
Survey, Question 2.10. Analysis of Question 2.10 shows that participants perceive reusabil-
ity to be generally important for S*S and other software, and that they found it to be the
most important for SGS. The participants found reusability to be generally more impor-
tant than code complexity. Section 4.4.1.1 presents the analysis of Question 2.1. Analysis of
Question 2.2 shows that participants perceive reusability to have an above average impor-
tance ranking, it was the only system-characteristic measure to achieve this. Section 4.4.1.2
presents the analysis of Question 2.2. Analysis of Question 2.10 shows that participants
perceive maximizing reuse to be generally beneficial, especially in terms of aspects typically
thought of as relating to reuse. There are some aspects that the participants perceived to be
unaffected that would normally be thought as having a symbiotic relationship with reuse.
Coupling the perceived benefits of networking with a reusable software development frame-
work allow a system like SSM to address some of the shortfalls. Section 4.4.1.3 presents the
analysis of Question 2.10. These findings show the importance of open-network software
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development frameworks like SSM that promote reusability with the additional security
provisions in SSSM to secure them.
4.4.1.1 CC Survey, Question 2.1 Analysis, Part 2
This section shows that the participants perceive reuse to be important for SFS, SGS,
STS, and other software fields. This section also shows that participants perceive reuse to
be more important for SGS than for SFS, STS, or other software. The other disciplines did
not have any distinct separation from each other, this includes the difference between space
systems software and other software; this suggests that reuse is generally seen as important.
This analysis covers two statistical tests. Test 1, a one-sample t-test, looks at reusability
importance for software in general. Test 2, a matched-pairs t-test, compares reusability
importance across different software areas.
Test 1
Summary: Participants perceive reuse to be important for SFS, SGS, STS, and other
software fields.
Question: Question 2.1 asks each participant to rate the importance of reusability
for SFS, SGS, STS, and other software fields on a 5-point Likert scale.
Analysis: One-sample t-test with test value of 3, which represents a neutral value.
Hypothesis: Software developers will find reusability to have non-neutral impor-
tance.
H0: µReuseImportance = 3
HA: µReuseImportance 6= 3
Table 4.15 shows that all the importance means are above 3. All of the categories had
very strong t-values and very low p-values. This gives very strong evidence against the null,
meaning reuse is generally seen as important for all of the software areas under consideration
by the participants.
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Table 4.15. CC 2.1, Part 2 — Reuse Importance Mean, One-sample Test Statistics, Test
Value 3, 5-point Likert Scale
Area N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
SFS 92 3.60 1.038 0.108
SGS 92 4.27 0.915 0.095
STS 91 3.64 0.961 0.101
Other Software 80 3.74 0.964 0.108
S*S Overall 93 3.86 0.733 0.076
The general importance of reuse explains the trend towards MONAs and OSAs that
promote reuse and suggests that systems like SSM will increase in terms of relevance and
adoption. This in turn increases the need to protect these systems as evidenced by the find-
ings in Section 4.6.3.2 that say security is more important for open-network space systems.
Table 4.16. CC 2.1, Part 2 — Reuse Importance Mean, One-sample Test Results, Test














SFS 1.9864 5.522 91 0.000 0.598 0.38 0.81
SGS 1.9864 13.330 91 0.000 1.272 1.08 1.46
STS 1.9867 6.330 90 0.000 0.637 0.44 0.84
Other
Software
1.9904 6.839 79 0.000 0.737 0.52 0.95
S*S Overall 1.9861 11.370 92 0.000 0.864 0.71 1.01
Test 2
Summary: Participants perceive reusability to be more important for SGS than for
SFS, STS, or other software. Participants do not perceive there to be a distinction
between the importance of reuse for space systems in general and other software.
Participants do perceive reuse to be generally more important than code complexity.
Question: Question 2.1 asks each participant to rate the importance of reusability
for SFS, SGS, STS, and other software fields on a 5-point Likert scale.
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Analysis: Matched-pairs t-test to compare means of various combinations of SFS,
SGS, STS, and other software fields.
Hypothesis:
H0: µS*S = µOtherSoftware
HA: µS*S 6= µOtherSoftware
or
H0: µS*S = µS*S
HA: µS*S 6= µS*S
Table 4.17 shows the various means for SFS, SGS, STS, and other software fields as they
compare to each other. Table 4.17 shows that the mean for SGS is above all the other
means. Table 4.18 shows that Pair B2 and Pair B6 have strong evidence against the null
meaning the group perceives reuse to be more important for SGS than for other software
and STS.
Pair B4 shows a strong negative t-value, but because of the direction of the comparison,
this is actually still showing that reuse is more important for SGS than for SFS. This means
that reuse is perceived by the participants to be more important for SGS, than any other
software category under consideration. This suggests a strong emphasis on reuse for SGS,
but Test 1 shows that it is still important for all the areas, just more important for SGS.
Table 4.17. CC 2.1, Part 2 — Reuse Importance Mean, Matched-pairs Test Statistics,
5-point Likert Scale





Pair B1 SFS 3.65 78 1.030 0.117
Other Software 3.74 78 0.973 0.110
Pair B2 SGS 4.33 79 0.858 0.097
Other Software 3.75 79 0.967 0.109
Pair B3 STS 3.70 79 0.965 0.109
Other Software 3.75 79 0.967 0.109
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.17. CC 2.1, Part 2 — Reuse Importance Mean, Matched-pairs Test Statistics,
5-point Likert Scale (continued)





Pair B4 SFS 3.61 90 1.002 0.106
SGS 4.27 90 0.922 0.097
Pair B5 SFS 3.61 90 1.002 0.106
STS 3.63 90 0.965 0.102
Pair B6 SGS 4.62 91 0.917 0.096
STS 3.64 91 0.961 0.101
Pair B7 S*S 3.90 79 0.711 0.080
Other Software 3.75 79 0.967 0.109
The finding that reuse is more important for SGS than SFS is curious because SFS can
have very constrained schedules and financing, as well as an emphasis on flight heritage;
one takeaway from this finding is that the need for heritage in SFS might be waining. This
might be due higher risk postures in terms of mission assurance. Another thought stems
from code complexity, Section 4.3.1.1 shows that participants perceived code complexity to
be the most important for SFS. Both ground and flight are complex space systems and
often reusability can increase code complexity, at least internally and sometimes in terms
of what must be configured. Therefore, something like reusability would be less important
for SFS if code complexity is more important. The other issue is the cost associated with
developing a reusable system and with on-boarding new developers that must learn the
system. If only one mission or satellite is being developed then the complexity and cost is
not worth it, this might be another reason that reusability is less import for SFS: developers
might see SFS as more of one-off software than they do SGS. Keep in mind that reuse for
SFS is still seen as important, but this finding suggests a greater need for reusable SGS and
potentially the ability to handle multiple missions with the same SGS.
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0.148 0.847 0.095 -0.042 0.337 1.9909 1.550 78 0.125
Table 4.18 shows that the rest of the B* pairs to not have significant separation. This
means, for example, that reuse is not perceived to be more important for SFS than it is for
STS or vice versa.
4.4.1.2 CC Survey, Question 2.2 Analysis, Part 2
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This section shows that participants perceive reuse to have an above average importance
ranking.
Summary: Participants perceive reuse to have an above average ranking mean, reuse
has the strongest negative t-value, indicating a strong distinction between it and the
average ranking of 4.
Question: CC Survey, Question 2.2 asks each participant to rank the provided soft-
ware characteristics from 1 to 7, 1 being the highest ranking.
Analysis: One-sample t-test with test value of 4, which represents a middle-of-the-
pack ranking.
Hypothesis: Participants will perceive reusability to have a non-average ranking
when compared against the 7 other characteristics.
H0: µCharacteristicRanking = 4
HA: µCharacteristicRanking 6= 4
Table 4.19 shows the reusability measurement has a mean below the test value, on the
more important side of the ranking scale. Table 4.20 shows that the reusability measurement
has strong evidence against the null, meaning it has a higher than average ranking. Keep
in mind that 1 is the highest ranking so a strong negative t-value means a “higher” average
ranking. This means that reusability has an above average importance ranking, this coupled
with the D* pairs from Section 4.3.1.1 indicates that reusability is one of the more important
development characteristics of a software development framework.
Table 4.19. CC 2.2, Part 2 — Software Characteristic Importance Ranking Means, One-
sample Test Statistics, Test Value 4, 1 to 7 Ranking Scale
Aspect N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Reuse 96 2.83 1.560 0.159
Portability 96 4.38 1.564 0.160
Interoperability 96 3.93 1.773 0.181
Minimal Code Complexity 96 3.97 2.250 0.230
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.19. CC 2.2, Part 2 — Software Characteristic Importance Ranking Means, One-
sample Test Statistics, Test Value 4, 1 to 7 Ranking Scale (continued)
Aspect N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Rapid Development 96 4.23 2.034 0.208
Cost of Ownership 96 4.81 1.860 0.190
Security 96 3.85 2.312 0.236
This higher than average importance ranking for reuse is in line with the trend towards
MONAs and OSAs that promote reuse and suggests that systems like SSM will increase in
terms of relevance and adoption. This in turn increases the need to protect these systems
as evidenced by the findings in Section 4.6.3.2 that say security is more important for
open-network space systems. This indicates there is a benefit from open-network software
development frameworks that can promote reuse and security, frameworks like SSSM.
Table 4.20. CC 2.2, Part 2 — Software Characteristic Importance Ranking Means, One-















Reuse 1.9852 -7.325 95 0.000 -1.167 -1.48 -0.85
Portability 1.9852 2.349 95 0.021 0.375 0.06 0.69
Interoperability 1.9852 -0.403 95 0.688 -0.073 -0.43 0.29
Minimal Code
Complexity
1.9852 -0.136 95 0.892 -0.031 -0.49 0.42
Rapid
Development
1.9852 1.104 95 0.272 0.229 -0.18 0.64
Cost of
Ownership
1.9852 4.280 95 0.000 0.813 0.44 1.19
Security 1.9852 -0.618 95 0.538 -0.146 -0.61 0.32
4.4.1.3 RIPCC Survey, Question 2.10 Analysis
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This section shows that participants feel that maximizing reuse is generally beneficial
in terms of the development process and the developed product.
Summary: Participants perceive maximized reusability in space systems to be gen-
erally beneficial in terms of development process and the developed product. Only
two aspects where seen as being negatively affected, namely latency and code or al-
gorithm optimization/efficiency as shown in Table 4.22 in orange. All other aspects
where either neutrally or positively affected.
Question: RIPCC Survey, Question 2.10 asks each participant to record the impact
of maximizing reuse on a range of system aspects in terms of Pros, Neutral, and Cons.
Pros is coded as a 3, Neutral is coded as a 2, and Cons is coded as a 1.
Analysis: One-sample t-test with test value of 2, which represents a neutral value.
Hypothesis: Participants will perceive maximized reuse to have a non-neutral effect
or impact on system-aspects.
H0: µReuseImpact = 2
HA: µReuseImpact 6= 2
Table 4.22 shows that 24 of the 39 aspects that are seen as benefiting from reusability by the
participants. There are 2 aspects that are seen as being negatively affected by reusability.
Finally, there were 13 aspects that the participants perceive reusability to not affect. The
results also show that the Overall mean effect has a significant positive t-value, meaning
that overall reuse is seen as beneficial.
Table 4.21. RIPCC 2.10 — Reusability Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-sample
Test Statistics, Test Value 2, 1 to 3 Cons-Neutral-Pros Scale
Aspect N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Regression reduction 26 2.5769 0.70274 0.13782
Code design 26 2.7308 0.60383 0.11842
Development cost 26 2.6923 0.67937 0.13323
Maintenance cost 26 2.5769 0.64331 0.12616
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.21. RIPCC 2.10 — Reusability Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-sample
Test Statistics, Test Value 2, 1 to 3 Cons-Neutral-Pros Scale (continued)
Aspect N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Development productivity 26 2.6154 0.49614 0.09730
Development efficiency 26 2.3846 0.75243 0.14756
Code complexity 26 1.8077 0.80096 0.15708
Maintainability 26 2.6154 0.63730 0.12499
Integration 26 2.4615 0.58177 0.11410
Adaptability 26 2.0385 0.72004 0.14121
Documentation/Examples 26 2.5385 0.64689 0.12686
Encapsulation 26 2.4231 0.57779 0.11331
Bug detection 26 2.5000 0.50990 0.10000
Code quality 26 2.3846 0.57110 0.11200
Code robustness 26 2.5385 0.64689 0.12686
Best practices 26 2.6154 0.49614 0.09730
Schedule 26 2.3462 0.79711 0.15633
Code or algorithm
optimization/efficiency
26 1.6154 0.75243 0.14756
Uniformity of coding style 26 2.4231 0.64331 0.12616
Domain knowledge 26 2.1154 0.58835 0.11538
Code readability 26 2.3077 0.54913 0.10769
Security 26 2.1923 0.69393 0.13609
I/0 efficiency 26 1.8077 0.63367 0.12427
Radiation hardness 26 2.0000 0.40000 0.07845
Fault tolerance 26 2.1538 0.67482 0.13234
Hardware complexity 26 1.8846 0.32581 0.06390
Latency 26 1.6538 0.56159 0.11014
Determinism 26 2.1154 0.51590 0.10118
Interoperability 26 2.6538 0.56159 0.11014
Portability 26 2.4615 0.64689 0.12686
Testing 26 2.7692 0.42967 0.08427
Reusability 26 2.8077 0.40192 0.07882
Software upgradability 26 2.1154 0.71144 0.13953
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.21. RIPCC 2.10 — Reusability Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-sample
Test Statistics, Test Value 2, 1 to 3 Cons-Neutral-Pros Scale (continued)
Aspect N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Hardware
changes/flexibility
26 2.1923 0.74936 0.14696
Adoption rates/software
proliferation
26 2.5385 0.64689 0.12686
Ease of use 26 2.2692 0.60383 0.11842
Mission/Project
requirement changes
26 2.0385 0.72004 0.14121
Information Assurance 26 2.1923 0.56704 0.11121
Mission Assurance 26 2.3846 0.63730 0.12499
Overall 26 2.3215 0.22226 0.04359
As one might expect, aspects that are typically thought of as relating to reusability show
a very strong beneficial trend, i.e. aspects that relate to recombining components or using
components as building blocks that can be moved from system to system or application of
the software to application of the software, are positively affected by reusability. These are
aspects like development cost, maintenance cost, maintainability, integration, encapsulation,
interoperability, portability, testing, adoption, and mission assurance. These are aspects
that reusable software development frameworks, like SSM, try to address; it is good that
perception of the reusability benefits matches that effort.
Oddly, adaptability was not perceived to be positively affected. Normally software that
is not adaptable is harder to reuse, as it likely only has one specific use case. Adaptability
is typically thought of as one of the precepts of reusability. It may be that participants felt
that the scope of space systems software was more limited or specialized and so adaptability
suffered even as developers target reuse; this might be especially true for traditional point-
to-point systems where intra-space system communication might be very specific and tied
to hardware. In this case reuse of the software might mean reuse of the hardware.
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Table 4.22. RIPCC 2.10 — Reusability Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-sample


















2.0596 4.186 25 0.000 0.57692 0.2931 0.8608
Code design 2.0596 6.171 25 0.000 0.73077 0.4869 0.9747
Development cost 2.0596 5.196 25 0.000 0.69231 0.4179 0.9667
Maintenance cost 2.0596 4.573 25 0.000 0.57692 0.3171 0.8368
Development
productivity
2.0596 6.325 25 0.000 0.61538 0.4150 0.8158
Development
efficiency
2.0596 2.606 25 0.015 0.38462 0.0807 0.6885
Code complexity 2.0596 -1.224 25 0.232 -0.19231 -0.5158 0.1312
Maintainability 2.0596 4.924 25 0.000 0.61538 0.3580 0.8728
Integration 2.0596 4.045 25 0.000 0.46154 0.2266 0.6965
Adaptability 2.0596 0.272 25 0.788 0.03846 -0.2524 0.3293
Documentation/
Examples
2.0596 4.244 25 0.000 0.53846 0.2772 0.7997
Encapsulation 2.0596 3.734 25 0.001 0.42308 0.1897 0.6565
Bug detection 2.0596 5.000 25 0.000 0.50000 0.2940 0.7060
Code quality 2.0596 3.434 25 0.002 0.38462 0.1539 0.6153
Code robustness 2.0596 4.244 25 0.000 0.53846 0.2772 0.7997
Best practices 2.0596 6.325 25 0.000 0.61538 0.4150 0.8158





2.0596 -2.606 25 0.015 -0.38462 -0.6885 -0.0807
Uniformity of
coding style
2.0596 3.353 25 0.003 0.42308 0.1632 0.6829
Domain
knowledge
2.0596 1.000 25 0.327 0.11538 -0.1223 0.3530
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.22. RIPCC 2.10 — Reusability Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-sample
















Code readability 2.0596 2.857 25 0.008 0.30769 0.0859 0.5295
Security 2.0596 1.413 25 0.170 0.19231 -0.0880 0.4726
I/0 efficiency 2.0596 -1.547 25 0.134 -0.19231 -0.4483 0.0636
Radiation
hardness
2.0596 0.000 25 1.000 0.00000 -0.1616 0.1616
Fault tolerance 2.0596 1.162 25 0.256 0.15385 -0.1187 0.4264
Hardware
complexity
2.0596 -1.806 25 0.083 -0.11538 -0.2470 0.0162
Latency 2.0596 -3.143 25 0.004 -0.34615 -0.5730 -0.1193
Determinism 2.0596 1.140 25 0.265 0.11538 -0.0930 0.3238
Interoperability 2.0596 5.937 25 0.000 0.65385 0.4270 0.8807
Portability 2.0596 3.638 25 0.001 0.46154 0.2003 0.7228
Testing 2.0596 9.129 25 0.000 0.76923 0.5957 0.9428
Reusability 2.0596 10.247 25 0.000 0.80769 0.6454 0.9700
Software
upgradability








2.0596 4.244 25 0.000 0.53846 0.2772 0.7997




2.0596 0.272 25 0.788 0.03846 -0.2524 0.3293
Information
Assurance
2.0596 1.729 25 0.096 0.19231 -0.0367 0.4213
Mission
Assurance
2.0596 3.077 25 0.005 0.38462 0.1272 0.6420
(continued on next page)
59
Table 4.22. RIPCC 2.10 — Reusability Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-sample
















Overall 2.0596 7.376 25 0.000 0.32150 0.2317 0.4113
Section 4.5.1.1 shows that networking is seen as having a very positive affect on adapt-
ability and coupling networking and reusability addresses these developer perceptions. An
open-network software development framework, like SSM, is directly in line with this con-
cept. Progressing open-network software development frameworks that enable or promote
reusability, like SSM, allows more space systems to realize the reusability benefits perceived
by the participants while addressing adaptability; adding security in the from of SSSM
protects the open-network space systems where security it perceived to be more important.
4.5 Participant Perception of Modular Open-network System Approaches
This section presents findings related to modular open-network system approaches.
These findings stem from analysis of the results of questions in the Network and OSAM
surveys. These findings are presented in terms of the perception among participating space
systems developers with regard to the benefit of networking systems and the trend towards
OSAs and MONAs. There is a general consensus among participants that networking is
beneficial to space systems and space systems development as covered in Section 4.5.1.
Section 4.5.2 covers the perception among the participating developers that space systems
design and implementation is trending towards OSAs and MONAs at an organizational
level.
Developer perception of the benefits of networking relates to the benefits of SSM as
a software development framework that leverages networking for interprocess and inter-
component communication. Further, the participating developers perception of a network
and open systems centric implementation relates to SSM for the same reasoning. Other
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portions of the survey series analysis show that developers perceive security to be more
important and more difficult for open-network systems, such as SSM. This gives strength to
the idea that adding security to a open-network software development framework, like SSM,
which leverages OSA and MONA concepts, in the from of SSSM, is a valuable contribution
to the space systems development community.
4.5.1 Networking Benefits
There is a consensus among the space systems developers that participated in the Net-
work Survey that networking is generally beneficial to space systems and space systems
development. This section analyzes the responses to Network Survey, Questions 2.3. Anal-
ysis of Question 2.3 shows that participants perceive open-network systems to be largely
beneficial. Section 4.5.1.1 presents the analysis of Question 2.3. Additional analysis as it
relates directly to security, as one of the few negatively impacted aspects is covered in Sec-
tion 4.6.2.2. These perceptions of networking’s positive affect on systems-aspects show that
there is a need for open-network software development frameworks that allow developers to
realize all the benefits of networking. This coupled with the findings in Section 4.6.2.2 show
the importance of addressing security for open-network software development frameworks
like SSSM does for SSM.
4.5.1.1 Network Survey, Question 2.3 Analysis, Part 1
This section shows that participants perceive the effects of open-network space systems
to be largely beneficial to the various aspects of that system. Network Survey, Question 2.3
is a Pros-neutral-cons rating question.
Summary: Participants perceive open-network space systems to have a net-positive
impact on the aspects of that system. Only three aspects where seen as being strongly
negatively affected, namely security, latency, and determinism as shown in Table 4.24
in red.
Question: Network Survey, Question 2.3 asks each participant to record the impact
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that a open-network space system has on a range of system aspects in terms of Pros,
Neutral, and Cons. Pros is coded as a 3, Neutral is coded as a 2, and Cons is coded
as a 1.
Analysis: One-sample t-test with test value of 2, which represents a neutral value.
Hypothesis: Participants will perceive networking to have a non-neutral effect or
impact on system-aspects.
H0: µNetworkImpact = 2
HA: µNetworkImpact 6= 2
Table 4.24 shows that 19 of the 39 are positively affected. Table 4.24 shows that 17 aspects
are neutrally affected, and that only 3 aspects are negatively affected. The results also show
that Overall effect was positive.
Table 4.23. Network 2.3 — Network Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-sample Test
Statistics, Test Value 2, 1 to 3 Cons-Neutral-Pros Scale
Aspect N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Regression reduction 29 1.8621 0.63943 0.11874
Code design 29 2.2069 0.81851 0.15199
Development cost 29 2.1724 0.80485 0.14946
Maintenance cost 29 2.4483 0.73612 0.13669
Development productivity 29 2.4483 0.57235 0.10628
Development efficiency 29 2.4138 0.62776 0.11657
Code complexity 29 1.7241 0.79716 0.14803
Maintainability 29 2.2759 0.75103 0.13946
Integration 29 2.5862 0.68229 0.12670
Adaptability 29 2.8621 0.44111 0.08191
Documentation/Examples 29 2.1724 0.53911 0.10011
Encapsulation 29 2.3793 0.56149 0.10427
Bug detection 29 2.0000 0.80178 0.14889
Code quality 29 2.2069 0.49130 0.09123
Code robustness 29 2.2759 0.52757 0.09797
Best practices 29 2.3448 0.48373 0.08983
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.23. Network 2.3 — Network Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-sample Test
Statistics, Test Value 2, 1 to 3 Cons-Neutral-Pros Scale (continued)
Aspect N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Schedule 29 2.0345 0.62580 0.11621
Code or algorithm
optimization/efficiency
29 2.0345 0.73108 0.13576
Uniformity of coding style 29 2.1034 0.48879 0.09077
Domain knowledge 29 2.2759 0.64899 0.12051
Code readability 29 2.1034 0.40925 0.07600
Security 29 1.4828 0.63362 0.11766
I/0 efficiency 29 1.8276 0.80485 0.14946
Radiation hardness 29 2.1034 0.30993 0.05755
Fault tolerance 28 2.2500 0.70053 0.13239
Hardware complexity 29 1.7241 0.75103 0.13946
Latency 29 1.2759 0.52757 0.09797
Determinism 28 1.3929 0.56695 0.10714
Interoperability 29 2.7586 0.51096 0.09488
Portability 29 2.5862 0.68229 0.12670
Testing 29 2.2759 0.88223 0.16383
Reusability 29 2.6897 0.54139 0.10053
Software upgradability 29 2.4483 0.63168 0.11730
Hardware
changes/flexibility
29 2.5862 0.68229 0.12670
Adoption rates/software
proliferation
28 2.2500 0.51819 0.09793
Ease of use 29 2.2759 0.70186 0.13033
Mission/Project
requirement changes
28 2.3929 0.73733 0.13934
Information Assurance 29 1.8621 0.69303 0.12869
Mission Assurance 28 2.2500 0.51819 0.09793
Overall 29 2.1899 0.22063 0.04097
Aspects that relate to reusability show a very strong beneficial trend, i.e. aspects that
relate to recombining components or using components as building blocks are positively
affected by networking. These aspects, largely shown in blue in Table 4.24 all had strong
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positive t-values above 4, and low p-values. Adaptability was the aspect perceived to benefit
the most from network-approaches to system design and implementation. The ability to
adapt during development as well as between different development efforts allows for more
agile development as well as shared effort between programs or missions. This can help to
reduce cost and reduce schedule.
Table 4.24. Network 2.3 — Network Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-sample Test

















2.0484 -1.162 28 0.255 -0.13793 -0.3812 0.1053
Code design 2.0484 1.361 28 0.184 0.20690 -0.1044 0.5182
Development cost 2.0484 1.154 28 0.258 0.17241 -0.1337 0.4786
Maintenance cost 2.0484 3.279 28 0.003 0.44828 0.1683 0.7283
Development
productivity
2.0484 4.218 28 0.000 0.44828 0.2306 0.6660
Development
efficiency
2.0484 3.550 28 0.001 0.41379 0.1750 0.6526
Code complexity 2.0484 -1.864 28 0.073 -0.27586 -0.5791 0.0274
Maintainability 2.0484 1.978 28 0.058 0.27586 -0.0098 0.5615
Integration 2.0484 4.627 28 0.000 0.58621 0.3267 0.8457
Adaptability 2.0484 10.524 28 0.000 0.86207 0.6943 1.0299
Documentation/
Examples
2.0484 1.722 28 0.096 0.17241 -0.0327 0.3775
Encapsulation 2.0484 3.638 28 0.001 0.37931 0.1657 0.5929
Bug detection 2.0484 0.000 28 1.000 0.00000 -0.3050 0.3050
Code quality 2.0484 2.268 28 0.031 0.20690 0.0200 0.3938
Code robustness 2.0484 2.816 28 0.009 0.27586 0.0752 0.4765
Best practices 2.0484 3.839 28 0.001 0.34483 0.1608 0.5288
Schedule 2.0484 0.297 28 0.769 0.03448 -0.2036 0.2725
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.24. Network 2.3 — Network Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-sample Test



















2.0484 0.254 28 0.801 0.03448 -0.2436 0.3126
Uniformity of
coding style
2.0484 1.140 28 0.264 0.10345 -0.0825 0.2894
Domain
knowledge
2.0484 2.289 28 0.030 0.27586 0.0290 0.5227
Code readability 2.0484 1.361 28 0.184 0.10345 -0.0522 0.2591
Security 2.0484 -4.396 28 0.000 -0.51724 -0.7583 -0.2762
I/0 efficiency 2.0484 -1.154 28 0.258 -0.17241 -0.4786 0.1337
Radiation
hardness
2.0484 1.797 28 0.083 0.10345 -0.0144 0.2213
Fault tolerance 2.0518 1.888 27 0.070 0.25000 -0.0216 0.5216
Hardware
complexity
2.0484 -1.978 28 0.058 -0.27586 -0.5615 0.0098
Latency 2.0484 -7.392 28 0.000 -0.72414 -0.9248 -0.5235
Determinism 2.0518 -5.667 27 0.000 -0.60714 -0.8270 -0.3873
Interoperability 2.0484 7.995 28 0.000 0.75862 0.5643 0.9530
Portability 2.0484 4.627 28 0.000 0.58621 0.3267 0.8457
Testing 2.0484 1.684 28 0.103 0.27586 -0.0597 0.6114
Reusability 2.0484 6.860 28 0.000 0.68966 0.4837 0.8956
Software
upgradability








2.0518 2.553 27 0.017 0.25000 0.0491 0.4509
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.24. Network 2.3 — Network Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-sample Test



















2.0518 2.819 27 0.009 0.39286 0.1070 0.6788
Information
Assurance
2.0484 -1.072 28 0.293 -0.13793 -0.4015 0.1257
Mission
Assurance
2.0518 2.553 27 0.017 0.25000 0.0491 0.4509
Overall 2.0484 4.635 28 0.000 0.18989 0.1060 0.2768
Most aspects were seen as benefiting or not being impacted by open-network space
systems. This is shown by the strong positive t-value for the Overall mean for all the
aspects together. The participants only saw three aspects as being negatively affected:
security, latency, and determinism. This research looks to address the security aspect so
that this system type, that they generally perceive to beneficial and is specifically suited
to reduce cost can be utilized even when security is a significant concern. Aspects like
latency and determinism also need to be addressed in order for open-network space system
to become a universally applicable solution as there do exist applications where timing is so
critical that latency or determinism can rule out a open-network solution. That being said,
a solution like SSSM addresses one of the major perceived pitfalls of open-network space
system.
4.5.2 OSA and MONA Trends
This section analyzes the responses to OSAM Survey, Questions 2.4 and 2.5. Analysis of
Question 2.4 shows that participants perceive there to be strong organization-level usage of
MONAs and OSAs, and that this usage is increasing. Section 4.5.2.1 presents the analysis
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of Question 2.4. Analysis of Question 2.5 shows that the participants perceive that a
majority of systems are closed proprietary systems even though Section 4.5.2.1 shows very
strong organization-level use of OSA and MONA. The high organization-level use likely
stems from the perceived benefits of using networking in systems development, Section 4.5.1
describes this. The disparity between system-level and organization-level usage might stem
from missions or programs where security is a strong concern and the perceived negative
impact of networking on security comes into play, Section 4.6.2.2 covers this perception of
the negative impact of networking on security. Ideally organizations would have a more
unified approach that would help them realize the positive effects of networking and reuse,
a secured open-network software development framework, like SSSM, would help realize
that end by alleviating the security concern.
4.5.2.1 OSAM Survey, Question 2.4 Analysis
Test 1 shows that participants perceive OSAs and MONAs to have have strong organization-
level usage in the past, currently, and going into the future. This is different than the
mission/program-level usage that is analyzed in Section 4.5.2.2 where usage was not per-
ceived to be as strong. Test 2 shows that participants perceive OSA and MONA prolifera-
tion stayed pretty steady from past to present, and that they see a rise in organization-level
usage of OSA and MONA going into the future.
Test 1, a one-sample t-test, looks at the organization-level usage of OSAs and MONAs.
Test 2, a matched-pairs t-test, compares the past, present, and future organization-level
usage of OSAs and MONAs.
Test 1
Summary: Participants perceive that more than 50% of organizations have utilized
MONA and OSA in the past, are currently using them, and will continue to use them
in future.
Question: OSAM Survey, Question 2.4 asks each participant to indicate if their
organization has used MONA or OSA in the past, does use them currently, and if the
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organization will use them in future. The past, current, and future category selections
are not exclusive and MONA and OSA are indicated separately.
Analysis: One-sample t-test with test value of 1.5, which would mean that an equal
number of participants selected “Yes” as selected “No”.
Hypothesis: Organizational usage of OSAs and MONAs will tend to the not used
or the used side of the spectrum.
H0: µOSA/MONAUsage = 1.5
HA: µOSA/MONAUsage 6= 1.5
Table 4.25 shows that the mean for organization-level use of MONAs and OSAs is above
the test value for past, current, and future categories. This puts the mean on the “Yes”
side, or more than 50% organizational use for all categories.
Table 4.25. OSAM 2.4 — Organization-level Proliferation of MONAs and OSAs, One-
sample Test Statistics, Test Value 1.5, 1 to 2 No-Yes Scale
Aspect N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Past OSA 44 1.75 0.438 0.066
Past MONA 44 1.66 0.479 0.072
Current OSA 44 1.77 0.424 0.064
Current MONA 44 1.68 0.471 0.071
Future OSA 44 1.91 0.291 0.044
Future MONA 44 1.86 0.347 0.052
Table 4.26 shows that more than 50% of the participants believe their organizations
have used, are using, and will continue to use MONAs and OSAs; this suggests good
organization-level usage. One of the weaknesses in the question is that it does not address
what the participants think about other organizations. They might see their organization
as the out-lier, however, because the trend is pretty strong it should still carry a good deal
of weight, the exception being if the participants all work for the same organization which
seems unlikely. The averages for past and current seem to be relatively flat while future
use looks to be significantly higher. This trend will be analyzed in Test 2. The strong and
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consistent perception of MONA and OSA use support the need for a open-network software
development framework with security provisions, like the one this research implements.
Table 4.26. OSAM 2.4 — Organization-level Proliferation of MONAs and OSAs, One-















Past OSA 2.0167 3.786 43 0.000 0.250 0.12 0.38
Past MONA 2.0167 2.201 43 0.033 0.159 0.01 0.30
Current OSA 2.0167 4.268 43 0.000 0.273 0.14 0.40
Current
MONA
2.0167 2.560 43 0.014 0.182 0.04 0.33
Future OSA 2.0167 9.331 43 0.000 0.409 0.32 0.50
Future
MONA
2.0167 6.948 43 0.000 0.364 0.26 0.47
Test 2
Summary: Participants perceive organization-level usage of MONA and OSA to
have have stayed relatively flat from past to current. They perceive an increase in
usage going from past to future.
Question: Same question as Test 1.
Analysis: Matched-pairs t-test to compare mean of current to past, future to current,
and future to past organization-level usage of MONA and OSA.
Analysis: MONA and OSA organization-level usage will not stay the same across
the past, current, and future categories.
H0: µxUsage = µyUsage
HA: µxUsage 6= µyUsage
Table 4.27 shows that the past and current usage is pretty consistent. The table shows that
current to future usage shows a border-line increase for OSA and a significant increase for
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MONA. Finally, the table shows a significant increase in mean for both going from past to
future use.
Table 4.27. OSAM 2.4 — Organization-level Proliferation of MONAs and OSAs, Matched-
pairs Test Statistics, 1 to 2 No-Yes Scale




Pair 1 Current ORG OSA 1.77 44 0.424 0.064
Past ORG OSA 1.75 44 0.438 0.066
Pair 2 Current ORG MONA 1.68 44 0.471 0.071
Past ORG MONA 1.66 44 0.479 0.072
Pair 3 Future ORG OSA 1.91 44 0.291 0.044
Current ORG OSA 1.77 44 0.424 0.064
Pair 4 Future ORG MONA 1.86 44 0.347 0.052
Current ORG MONA 1.68 44 0.471 0.071
Pair 5 Future ORG OSA 1.91 44 0.291 0.044
Past ORG OSA 1.75 44 0.438 0.066
Pair 6 Future ORG MONA 1.86 44 0.347 0.052
Past ORG MONA 1.66 44 0.479 0.072
Table 4.28 shows that Pair 1, Pair 2, and Pair 3 give weak evidence against the null
hypothesis. This means that the difference in the averages is not significant. Past to current
stayed statistically the same, and that usage stayed statistically the same from current to
future for OSA.
Table 4.28 gives strong evidence against the null for Pair 4, Pair 5, and Pair 6. This all
suggests that developers perceive there to be an steady increase in organization-level usage of
MONAs as the results show significant positive difference between past and current, current
and future, and past and future. There is also evidence of a trend towards increased usage
for OSAs. OSAs did not show a significant difference between the time-adjacent categorizes,
but there is a significant rise from past to future anticipated use.
MONA and OSA organization-level usage is trending upwards, the trend for MONAs
is a bit stronger. This is interesting because a MONA is essentially a OSA that is network-
focused suggesting that while OSAs are generally increasing the main manifestation of OSAs
looks to be MONAs. This enforces an increasing need for secured open-network software
70
development frameworks as the usage of MONAs increase, but this need becomes even
stronger with the negative perception participants have of the effect of open-network space
systems on security. This highlights a growing need for open-network software development
frameworks like the one implemented for this research and described in Chapter 5.
Table 4.28.
acOSAM 2.4 — Organization-level Proliferation of MONAs and OSAs, Matched-pairs Test



















Pair 1 0.023 0.263 0.040 -0.057 0.103 2.0167 0.573 43 0.570
Pair 2 0.023 0.340 0.051 -0.081 0.126 2.0167 0.443 43 0.660
Pair 3 0.136 0.462 0.070 -0.004 0.277 2.0167 1.957 43 0.057
Pair 4 0.182 0.446 0.067 0.046 0.317 2.0167 2.705 43 0.010
Pair 5 0.159 0.479 0.072 0.013 0.305 2.0167 2.201 43 0.033
Pair 6 0.205 0.462 0.070 0.064 0.345 2.0167 2.940 43 0.005
4.5.2.2 OSAM Survey, Question 2.5 Analysis
This section shows that participants perceive the current system-level usage of OSAs
and MONAs to lag significantly behind the usage of closed proprietary and that OSAs and
MONAs usage is perceived to be the same.
Summary: Participants perceive closed proprietary systems to far exceed the number
of systems employing MONAs and OSAs. They perceive MONAs and OSAs to have
a equal share of systems.
Question: OSAM Survey, Question 2.5 asks each participant indicated the percent-
age of systems they think use MONA, OSA, and closed proprietary infrastructure.
Analysis: Matched-pairs t-test to compare means of MONA to closed, OSA to closed,
and MONA to OSA system-level usage.
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Hypothesis: acMONA, OSA, and closed proprietary system-level usage will not be
equal.
H0: µSysTypeX = µSysTypeY
HA: µSysTypeX 6= µSysTypeY
Table 4.29. OSAM 2.5 — System-level Usage of MONA, OSA, and Close Proprietary,
Matched-pairs Test Statistics, Percentage Scale




Pair 1 OSA 30.4318 44 25.94663 3.91160
Closed proprietary 64.5909 44 29.63681 4.46792
Pair 2 MONA 25.6136 44 23.46815 3.53796
Closed proprietary 64.5909 44 29.63681 4.46792
Pair 3 MONA 25.6136 44 23.46815 3.53796
OSA 30.4318 44 25.94663 3.91160
Table 4.30 gives very strong evidence against the null for Pair 1 and Pair 2. This means
there was a significant difference between closed and MONA, and closed and OSA. Sug-
gesting that the perception is that many systems still use closed proprietary systems even
though Section 4.5.2.1 shows very strong organization-level use. It is possible that this
discrepancy between organizational-level and system-level usage stems from the point made
in Section 4.5.2.1 about the weakness of the question, but it might also stem from system-
level being a subset of organization-level usage. This organization-level versus system-level
disparity might actually stem from an issue where organizations do not have a unified ap-
proach to their systems engineering and system software. This is understandable given the
differences that might exists between programs or missions, however, not having a unified
approach makes resource sharing and reuse difficult.
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Table 4.30. OSAM 2.5 — System-level Usage of MONA, OSA, and Close Proprietary,



















Pair 1 -34.159 36.320 5.475 -45.201 -23.116 2.0167 -6.238 43 0.000
Pair 2 -38.977 35.822 5.400 -49.868 -28.086 2.0167 -7.217 43 0.000
Pair 3 -4.818 17.576 2.649 -10.162 0.525 2.0167 -1.818 43 0.076
Section 4.5.1 illustrates that participants believe that open-network systems, like sys-
tems using a MONA, were seen as having an overall beneficial effect on a range of system
aspects, e.g. reuse and development efficiency. Section 4.6.2.2 shows that participants per-
ceive open-network systems to negatively impact security. Coupling those findings with the
ones here suggests that a secure open-network software development framework, like the
one in this research, could help organizations arrive at a more unified approach to systems
development by reducing this negative effect on security and maximizing the benefits like
reuse and development efficiency.
This analysis also shows that MONA and OSA usage was statistically the same, this
suggests that most of the systems employing OSAs are using the MONA variant further
emphasizing the need for a secure open-network software development frameworks.
4.6 Software Security
This section presents the findings relevant cybersecurity in space systems. These find-
ings stem from analysis of answers to questions in the CC , OSAM , Security, and Network
surveys. This section presents these findings in terms of the perception about security
among participating space systems developers with regard to the difficulties, negative as-
pects, overall importance of security, and the importance of specific security provisions.
These findings also cover the lack of perception among participating space systems devel-
opers that internal security is beneficial.
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Section 4.6.1 shows that most of the Security Survey participants had some type of
space systems cybersecurity experience which gives more context to their responses to ques-
tions on the Security Survey that dealt with security. However, they were just as likely as
not to have experience in SFSYSs and STSYSs, which shows a potential need for tools and
secured open-network software development frameworks for flight, test, and ground space
systems can help to address the experience gap by allowing developers to develop software
with a certain amount of security provisions baked into them.
Section 4.6.2 shows there is a general consensus among survey participants that security
concerns are a significant hurdle to adopting open systems approaches and that networking
has a negative effect on security in space systems and space systems development. SSSM
adds security to an existing software MONA development framework lowering the hurdle
of security in adopting open systems approaches while also addressing the perceived need
for additional security for open-network space systems.
Section 4.6.3 shows that the perception among participating developers is that security
is important to provide for space systems. This finding illustrates the need for a software
development framework for space systems that includes security provisions. Further analysis
shows consensus that security is more important for open-network space systems than it
is for traditional point-to-point space systems. This finding gives importance to SSSM as
an example of a more secure modular open-network software development framework. This
finding also relates to the consensus that there is a trend in space systems development
towards OSAs and MONAs, Section 4.5.2 covers this trend. Analysis shows that there is
consensus that security it more important for SFS and SGS than it is for other software.
Analysis also shows a lack of consensus on the difficulty of providing security provisions
for space systems, suggesting there may be a need to better understand how these security
provisions can be provided for space systems.
Section 4.6.4 shows that there is a consensus among the participating space systems
developers as to the most important security provisions and features to provide for space
systems and space systems development. This section shows provisions provided for by
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SSSM as being perceived as some of the most important space systems security provisions.
Section 4.6.5 covers a lack of consensus among the participating space systems devel-
opers that internal security is beneficial to space systems development while showing that
certain aspects of space systems were perceived as negatively affected by internal security
provisions. Some of the aspects shown as being most negatively affected by internal security
are code complexity, development costs, maintenance, and code design. Adding security to
a open-network software development framework and demonstrating a minimal increase
in code complexity allows a contribution like SSSM to address developer concerns about
adding security because it will address issues like development cost via reuse and provide
built-in security features.
4.6.1 Security Experience
This section presents findings related to developer security experience. These findings
stem from analysis of results for a question in the Security Survey. These findings are
presented in terms of the percentage of participating space systems developers that had
security experience with SFSYSs, SGSYSs, STSYSs, penetration testing, and other.
Basic analysis also shows that only 16.13% of participants had no security experience,
those that had penetration testing or other experience also had at least one other area of
security experience that related to space systems of some kind. This shows that the majority
of participants in the Security Survey claimed to have some direct experience with security.
This gives strength or weight to their responses to questions on the Security Survey that
dealt with security.
The results indicate that developers were more likely than not to have had security
experience with SGSYSs. They were just as likely as not to have experience in SFSYSs and
STSYSs, and much less likely to have experience with penetration testing or other areas.
This shows a need for growth in security experience and/or development tools that incor-
porate security provisions. Having tools and secured open-network software development
frameworks for flight, test, and ground space systems can help to address the experience
gap by allowing developers to develop software with a certain amount of security provisions
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baked into them. This is part of the driver behind adding security provisions to SSM as
proposed by this research.
This section analyzes the responses to Security Survey, Questions 2.2; as it relates to
security experience. Analysis of Question 2.2 shows that participants generally had more
security experience with space systems than with penetration testing or other areas, and
that overall they had the most security experience with SGSYSs. Section 4.6.1.1 presents
the analysis of Question 2.2.
4.6.1.1 Security Survey, Question 2.2 Analysis
This section shows that more than 50% of the participants had security experience
with SGSYSs, about 50% had security experience with SFSYSs and STSYSs, and less than
50% had security experience with penetration testing or other.
Summary: More than 50% of the participants had security experience with SGSYSs,
about 50% had security experience with SFSYSs and STSYSs, and less than 50% had
security experience with with penetration testing or other.
Question: Question 2.2 asks each participant to indicate if they have direct experi-
ence with security in each of the areas listed in Table 4.31.
Analysis: One-sample t-test with test value of 1.5, which represents an equal number
of “Yes” and “No” responses.
Hypothesis: The number of developers with security experience in the given area
will be above or below 50%, meaning the average will be significantly above or below
1.5.
H0: µS*SysSecurityExperience = 1.5
HA: µS*SysSecurityExperience 6= 1.5
or
H0: µOtherSoftwareExperience = 1.5
HA: µOtherSoftwareExperience 6= 1.5
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Table 4.31 shows that the means for SFSYSs and SGSYSs are above the neutral or 50%
mark. The SGSYS area had the only strong evidence that developers are more likely than
not to have security experience with SGSYSs.
SFSYSs and STSYSs showed very weak evidence against the null, and so it should be
concluded in this case. This means that that likelihood of encountering a developer having
security experience in SFSYSs or STSYSs is roughly the equivalent of flipping a coin if
chosen at random. A brief analysis was done that shows little evidence that additional
years of experience had any correlation with this average, but more in depth analysis or
another survey could look at this in more detail to see if there is a correlation or causation.
Table 4.31. Security 2.2 — Security Experience Mean, One-sample Test Statistics, Test
Value 1.5, 1 to 2 No-Yes Scale
Security Experience Area N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
SFSYSs 31 1.5806 0.50161 0.09009
SGSYSs 31 1.7742 0.42502 0.07634
STSYSs 31 1.4194 0.50161 0.09009
Penetration testing 31 1.1290 0.34078 0.06121
Other 21 1.1905 0.40237 0.08781
Both penetration testing and other had strong evidence that the developers are more
likely to not have security experience with penetration testing or in other areas. The “area”
might be a bit too open ended, the low experience mark could be driven by a developer’s
general lack of experience outside space systems or could be that their experience outside
space systems did not deal with security; this pushes against the concept that any software
that is not used in total isolation should consider security. While this is a good concept,
security is often not considered for general applications; this does fall in with the developer
perception found in other parts of this analysis that security was more important for space
software than for other fields.
Results show that 50% of the developers or greater were likely to have security expe-
rience in each of the space systems areas. This suggests that while they do tend to have
space related security experience they may not have experience with testing and protecting
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against actual attacks and may be dealing more with information assurance, encryption,
and static analysis.
The developers and designers of space systems might not have fully accepted or ad-
dressed that networked nature of ground systems or the trend towards open-network soft-
ware development frameworks in space systems. For SFSYSs this might mean that they
have not considered securing systems behind the COMSEC boundary as a truly intercon-
nected system. This suggests a need for security provisions like those in SSSM that control
access within a system in the case where the perimeter is penetrated to help address this
under- or un-accounted for issue.
Table 4.32. Security 2.2 — Security Experience Mean, One-sample Test Results, Test Value


















SFSYSs 2.0423 0.895 30 0.378 0.08065 -0.1033 0.2646
SGSYSs 2.0423 3.592 30 0.001 0.27419 0.1183 0.4301
STSYSs 2.0423 -0.895 30 0.378 -0.08065 -0.2646 0.1033
Penetration
testing
2.0423 -6.061 30 0.000 -0.37097 -0.4960 -0.2460
Other 2.0860 -3.525 20 0.002 -0.30952 -0.4927 -0.1264
Because of the higher rates of security experience with SGSYSs it would seem like
penetration testing should also have a higher experience rate. This lack of correlation
needs more analysis, but it might stem from these systems being closed off from the larger
Internet. However, what happens if an attacker gets in via physical or back-door access?
What happens as more commercial providers are used or as ground segments trend to a
conglomeration of different providers where network connectivity becomes more important
and more unsecured networks are used?
Having tools and secured open-network software development frameworks for flight,
test, and ground space systems can help to address the experience gap by allowing developers
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to develop software with a certain amount of security provisions baked into them. This is
part of the driver behind adding security provisions to SSM as proposed by this research.
4.6.2 Networking and Security
This section analyzes the responses to OSAM Survey, Question 2.6, and to Network
Survey, Question 2.3. Initial analysis of Question 2.6 shows that participants did not per-
ceive security to be an above average factor in prohibiting the adoption of open-systems
approaches, but additional analysis shows that the security factor was still in line with the
other factors that might limit adoption. Section 4.6.2.1 presents the analysis of OSAM
Survey, Question 2.6. Analysis of Question 2.3 shows that the participants perceive open-
network space systems to have a negative impact on security, but an overall positive impact
on the other aspects when taken as an average. Analysis also shows that these participants
perceive the impact to be more negative when compared to the perceived effect of network-
ing on other system aspects like Adaptability or Reusability. Section 4.6.2.2 presents the
analysis of Network Survey, Question 2.3. There is a consensus among the space systems
developers who participated in the OSAM and Network Surveys that, while security is not
the critical factor it is not an insignificant factor in prohibiting the adoption of open-systems
approaches. There is also consensus that open-network space systems negatively affect se-
curity. These perceptions show the importance of a solution, like SSSM, that aims to add
security to an existing open-system software development framework, addressing security
as prohibitive factor in adopting open-systems approaches by addressing the additional
security needs or risk of open-network systems.
4.6.2.1 OSAM Survey, Question 2.6 Analysis
Test 1 shows that participants do not perceive security to be a critical factor in pro-
hibiting their organization from adopting open-systems approaches. Test 2 shows that
participants do perceive security to be as limiting a factor in prohibiting open-systems
adoption as the other factors when taken as an average of their aggregate.
Test 1, a one-sample t-test, looks at the impact of security on adopting open-systems
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approaches. Test 2, a matched-pairs t-test, looks at the impact of security in relation to
other factors in adopting open-systems approaches.
Test 1
Summary: Participants do not perceive security to be a determining or prohibitive
factor in their organization adopting open-systems approaches.
Question: OSAM Survey, Question 2.6 asks each participant to select all the factors
that might prohibit the adoption of open-systems approaches by their organization.
There are 32 factors, including security. Other was also an option, but was never
selected, suggesting the list provided was comprehensive. Appendix A gives a full
listing of factors.
Analysis: One-sample t-test with test value of 0.5, which would mean that an equal
number of participants selected it as did not select it, or a neutral value.
Hypothesis: Security will not have a neutral effect on prohibiting the adoption of
open-systems approaches.
H0: µFactorProhibition = 0.5
HA: µFactorProhibition 6= 0.5
Table 4.33 shows that the mean for security is below the test value, slightly on the No side.
Table 4.34 shows that the participants did not reach a consensus on the affect of security
on the adoption of open-systems approaches.
Table 4.33. OSAM 2.6 — Prohibitive Effect on Adoption of Open-System Approaches
Mean, One-sample Test Statistics, Test Value 0.5, 0 to 1 No-Yes Scale
Aspect N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Security 43 0.37 0.489 0.075
Interestingly enough the only factor that did have a strong enough t-value to possibly
be considered a critical or primary factor in preventing adoption was “Management buy-
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in”. This could stem from a lack of ability by developers to convince management of
the benefits of adopting a open-systems approach, a system that already incorporates this
approach could be a critical linchpin in convincing management. A lot of other factors,
like developer buy in, development cost, maintenance cost, development productivity and
development efficiency, trended heavily in the other direction. This suggest they were of
little consequence, or possibly understood to be benefits of a open-systems approach. This
pattern for some of the other factors actually puts the net neutral effect of security as
more of a determining factor. This reinforces the need for a secured open-network software
development framework, like the one proposed by this research.
Table 4.34. OSAM 2.6 — Prohibitive Effect on Adoption of Open-systems Approaches

















2.0181 2.789 42 0.008 0.198 0.05 0.34
Legacy software
requirements
2.0181 1.715 42 0.094 0.128 -0.02 0.28
Investment vs.
return in money












2.0181 -0.151 42 0.881 -0.012 -0.17 0.14
Developer buy
in
2.0181 -3.192 42 0.003 -0.221 -0.36 -0.08
(continued on next page)
81
Table 4.34. OSAM 2.6 — Prohibitive Effect on Adoption of Open-systems Approaches

















2.0181 -2.789 42 0.008 -0.198 -0.34 -0.05
Maintenance
cost
2.0181 -4.631 42 0.000 -0.291 -0.42 -0.16
Development
productivity
2.0181 -5.920 42 0.000 -0.337 -0.45 -0.22
Development
efficiency
2.0181 -4.103 42 0.000 -0.267 -0.40 -0.14
Complexity 2.0181 -2.055 42 0.046 -0.151 -0.30 0.00
Maintainability 2.0262 -2.024 37 0.050 -0.158 -0.32 0.00
Bug detection 2.0181 -5.920 42 0.000 -0.337 -0.45 -0.22
Best practices 2.0181 -5.920 42 0.000 -0.337 -0.45 -0.22
Schedule 2.0181 -2.789 42 0.008 -0.198 -0.34 -0.05
Domain
knowledge
2.0181 -5.229 42 0.000 -0.314 -0.44 -0.19
Security 2.0181 -1.715 42 0.094 -0.128 -0.28 0.02
I/0 efficiency 2.0181 -5.229 42 0.000 -0.314 -0.44 -0.19
Fault tolerance 2.0181 -6.742 42 0.000 -0.360 -0.47 -0.25
Latency 2.0181 -6.742 42 0.000 -0.360 -0.47 -0.25
Determinism 2.0181 -5.920 42 0.000 -0.337 -0.45 -0.22
Interoperability 2.0181 -3.627 42 0.001 -0.244 -0.38 -0.11
Portability 2.0181 -7.758 42 0.000 -0.384 -0.48 -0.28
Testing 2.0181 -4.631 42 0.000 -0.291 -0.42 -0.16
Reusability 2.0181 -4.631 42 0.000 -0.291 -0.42 -0.16
Upgradability 2.0181 -4.103 42 0.000 -0.267 -0.40 -0.14
Flexibility 2.0181 -4.103 42 0.000 -0.267 -0.40 -0.14
Ease of use 2.0181 -5.229 42 0.000 -0.314 -0.44 -0.19
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.34. OSAM 2.6 — Prohibitive Effect on Adoption of Open-systems Approaches

















2.0196 -3.467 41 0.001 -0.238 -0.38 -0.10
Test 2
Summary: Participants perceived security to be as much as a driving factor in
prohibiting the adoption of open-systems approaches as they did the other factors.
Question: OSAM Survey, Question 2.6 asks each participant to select all the factors
that might prohibit the adoption of open-systems approaches by their organization.
There are 32 factors, including security.
Analysis: Matched-pairs t-test to compare mean of security prohibition against the
overall prohibition mean; security is excluded from the overall mean.
Hypothesis: Participants will not think security will be as prohibitive in the adoption
of open-systems approaches as the other factors.
H0: µSecurityProhibitRating = µOverallProhitbitRating
HA: µSecurityProhibitRating 6= µOverallProhibitRating
Table 4.35 shows that the security measurements actually has a mean slightly above the
overall mean more towards the “Yes” side.
Table 4.35. OSAM 2.6 — Prohibitive Effect on Adoption of Open-System Approaches
Mean, Matched-pairs Statistics, 0 to 1 No-Yes Scale




Pair 1 Security 0.37 43 0.489 0.075
Overall 0.2814 43 0.20990 0.03201
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The results in Table 4.36 give very weak or no evidence against the null, this means
that the prohibitive effect of security on the adoption of open-systems approaches is in
line with the average effect of all the factors the participants had to choose from. This
suggesting that security was consequential in the choice to adopt open-systems approaches.
It was not as critical a factor as “Management buy-in”, but it was significantly above other
factors that had very negative t-values as mentioned in Test 1. This reinforces the need
for a secured open-network software development framework, like the one proposed by this
research, to aid in the adoption of open-systems approaches.
Table 4.36. OSAM 2.6 — Prohibitive Effect on Adoption of Open-systems Approaches


















Pair 1 0.09070 0.4738 0.0723 -0.0551 0.2365 2.0181 1.255 42 0.216
4.6.2.2 Network Survey, Question 2.3 Analysis, Part 2
Test 1 shows that participants perceive using a open-network space system will have
a negative impact on the security of that system. Test 2 shows that participants perceive
using a open-network space system will have a more negative effect on security than on the
other aspects of a system that the participants were asked to consider. Network Survey,
Question 2.3 is a Pros-neutral-cons rating question.
Test 1, a one-sample t-test, looks at the impact of using a open-network space system
on the security of that system. Test 2, a matched-pairs t-test, looks at the impact of
using a open-network space system on various aspects of space systems and space systems
development as they relate to each other.
Test 1
Summary: Participants perceive networking to have a negative impact on security.
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Question: Network Survey, Question 2.3 asks each participant to record the impact
that a open-network space system has on a range of system aspects in terms of Pros,
Neutral, and Cons. Pros is coded as a 3, Neutral is coded as a 2, and Cons is coded
as a 1. The impact rating was solicited for a wide range of aspects including security,
Section 4.5.1.1 gives a full listing.
Analysis: One-sample t-test with test value of 2, which represents a neutral value.
This section focuses on the effect on security.
Hypothesis: There is some consensus among space systems developers that the
impact of open-network space systems will be negative or positive, not neutral.
H0: µSecurityImpactRating = 2
HA: µSecurityImpactRating 6= 2
Table 4.37 shows that the security measurement has a mean below the test value, on the
Cons side.
Table 4.37. Network 2.3 — Network Benefits on Security-aspect Mean, One-sample Test
Statistics, Test Value 2, 1 to 3 Cons-Neutral-Pros Scale
Aspect N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Security 29 1.4828 0.63362 0.11766
Overall (Security Included) 29 2.1899 0.22063 0.04097
Table 4.38 shows that the group perceives security to be negatively impacted by the
use of open-network space systems. Table 4.38 also shows that overall the participants
perceived open-network space systems to be beneficial which is in contrast to the perceived
effect on the security aspect of a system.
Test 2 will see if this finding or separation is significant. These results together suggest
that the developers see value in adding security to the fabric of an open-network space sys-
tem, much like the system proposed by this research. This allows space systems developers
to achieve the overall benefits of open-network space systems while addressing their security
concerns.
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Table 4.38. Network 2.3 — Network Benefits on Security-aspect Mean, One-sample Test















Security 2.0484 -4.396 28 0.000 -0.51724 -0.7583 -0.2762
Overall (Security
Included)
2.0484 4.635 28 0.000 0.18989 0.1060 0.2768
Test 2
Summary: Participants perceive networking to have a more negative impact on
security than for other system aspects.
Question: Network Survey, Question 2.3 asks each participant to record the impact
that a open-network space system has on a range of system aspects in terms of Pros,
Neutral, and Cons. Pros is coded as a 3, Neutral is coded as a 2, and Cons is coded
as a 1. The impact rating was solicited for a wide range aspects including security,
Section 4.5.1.1 covers the wider set of aspects.
Analysis: Matched-pairs t-test to compare mean of security against the overall aspect
mean.
Hypothesis: Participants will not think the impact of open-network space systems
is the same for security as it is for the rest of the list of system aspects.
H0: µOverallImpactRating = µSecurityImpactRating
HA: µOverallImpactRating 6= µSecurityImpactRating
Table 4.39 shows that the security mean is below the Overall mean, putting security on the
Cons side of the Overall mean.
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Table 4.39. Network 2.3 — Networking Impact on Security Mean. Matched-pairs Test
Statistics, 1 to 3 Cons-Neutral-Pros Scale




Pair 1 Security 1.4828 29 0.63362 0.11766
Overall (Security Excluded) 2.2104 29 0.22876 0.04248
Table 4.40 shows that participants did not perceive open-network space systems to
have the same effect on the other aspects of a system as it did on security. They perceived
the effect to much more negative on security than the other systems aspects. This suggests
a need to add additional security provisions to an open-network space system so that this
perceived negative will be less of an issue and the perceived benefits can be realized.
Table 4.40. Network 2.3 — Networking Impact on Security Mean, Matched-pairs Test




















Pair 1 0.72759 0.610950.11345 0.49520 0.95999 2.0484 6.413 28 0.000
4.6.3 Security Importance and Difficulty
Analysis of CC Survey, Question 2.1 and Security Survey, Question 2.6 shows there is
a consensus among the space systems developers who participated in the CC and Security
Surveys that security is important to provide for space systems. This analysis goes on
to show that there is consensus that security is more important for certain space-related
software categories than others and that security is more important for open-network space
systems than for traditional point-to-point space systems. Section 4.6.3.1 presents the
results from CC Survey, Question 2.1 that related to security importance. These results
show there is consensus among these developers that security is more important for SFS
and SGS software than for other software fields or STS. Section 4.6.3.2 presents the results
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from Security Survey, Question 2.6, and Security Survey, Question 2.7. The results from
Question 2.6 show there is consensus among these developers that software security is more
important for open-network space systems than for traditional point-to-point space systems.
The results from Question 2.7 show there is a lack consensus among participants that it is
difficult to add the security provisions in the question. These results illustrate the need to
provide security for space systems in general and specifically for open-network space systems.
It follows that adding security to a open-network software development framework for space
systems makes it easier to develop open-network space systems, which the developers that
participated in the CC and Security Surveys perceive as important.
4.6.3.1 CC Survey, Question 2.1 Analysis, Part 3
This section shows that the participants perceive security to be important for SFS,
SGS, and other software fields, but not specifically for STS. This section also shows that
participants perceive security to be more important for SFS and SGS than for Other Soft-
ware fields, to be more important for Other Software fields than for STS, and finally to be
more important for SGS than for SFS. This section shows security to be generally more
important for space systems than for Other Software. The section also shows that security
has an equivalent importance to reuse and code complexity across space systems software
and Other software.
This analysis covers two statistical tests. Test 1, a one-sample t-test, looks at secu-
rity importance for software in general. Test 2, a matched-pairs t-test, compares security
importance across different software areas.
Test 1
Summary: Participants perceive security to be important for SFS, SGS, and Other
software fields, but not for STS. Participants do perceive security to be generally
important for space systems software.
Question: Question 2.1 asks each participant to rate the importance of security for
SFS, SGS, STS, and Other Software fields on a 5-point Likert scale.
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Analysis: One-sample t-test with test value of 3, which represents a neutral value.
Hypothesis: Software developers will find security to be important. This hypothesis
is driven by the rise to prominence of computer security in recent years, as attacks and
compromises make major headlines, as well as the generally low risk posture assumed
when developing for space systems.
H0: µSecurityImportance ≤ 3
HA: µSecurityImportance > 3
Table 4.41. CC 2.1, Part 1 — Security Importance Mean One-sample Test Statistics, Test
Value 3, 5-point Likert Scale
Area N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
SFS 91 3.97 1.178 0.123
SGS 90 4.29 0.939 0.099
STS 89 2.94 1.237 0.131
Other Software 79 3.49 1.061 0.119
Overall 93 3.73 0.864 0.090
Table 4.41 shows that, all the importance means, except STS come out above 3. Table 4.42
shows that all of the software areas have strong evidence against the null except STS. This
means that there is a very strong evidence that the group perceives security to be important
for SFS, SGS, and Other Software fields.
STS shows little difference between the test value of 3, or there is very weak evidence
against null so it must be concluded. This means that the participants see security impor-
tance as neutral for STS. However, when SFS, STS, and SGS are considered together the
t-value is very strong, suggesting security is important for space systems as a whole when
considered as an aggregate.
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Table 4.42. CC 2.1. Part 3 — Security Importance Mean, One-sample Test Results, Test


















SFS 1.9867 7.831 90 0.000 0.0000 0.967 0.72 1.21
SGS 1.9870 13.020 89 0.000 0.0000 1.289 1.09 1.49
STS 1.9873 -0.428 88 0.669 0.6655 -0.056 -0.32 0.20
Other
Software
1.9909 4.137 78 0.000 0.0000 0.494 0.26 0.73
S*S Overall 1.9861 8.204 92 0.000 0.0000 0.735 0.56 0.91
Test 2
Summary: Participants perceive security to be more important for SFS, SGS than
for Other Software fields. Security was not perceived to more important for STS.
Question: Question 2.1 asks each participant to rate the importance of security for
SFS, SGS, STS, and other software fields on a 5-point Likert scale.
Analysis: Matched-pairs t-test to compare means of SFS, SGS, and STS against
Other Software fields. The means of SFS and SGS were also compared, they will have
the same hypothesis as before except Other Software is replaced with SFS.
Hypothesis:
H0: µS*S = µOtherSoftware
HA: µS*S 6= µOtherSoftware
Table 4.43 shows that the means for SFS and SGS are above the mean for Other Software
fields while the mean for STS is below. Table 4.43 also shows that the mean for SGS is
above the mean for SFS.
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Table 4.43. CC 2.1, Part 3 — Security Importance Mean, Matched-pairs Test Statistics,
5-point Likert Scale





Pair C1 SFS 4.03 77 1.170 0.133
Other Software 3.55 77 1.020 0.116
Pair C2 SGS 4.32 77 0.938 0.107
Other Software 3.49 77 1.047 0.119
Pair C3 STS 3.05 76 1.243 0.143
Other Software 3.54 76 1.051 0.121
Pair C4 SGS 4.28 88 0.946 0.101
SFS 3.97 88 1.198 0.128
Pair C5 S*S 3.80 78 0.847 0.096
Other Software 3.51 78 1.054 0.119
Table 4.44 shows that Pair C3 gives strong evidence against the null, but in the negative
direction. This means the group perceives security to be less important for STS than for
Other Software fields and by extension than for SFS and SGS. STS is not typically thought
of as production software, and is usually isolated from the outside world so that might be
one of the reasons for its perceived lack of importance. It is not unheard of for test software
to transition to production software, in part or in whole, so this is a bit concerning.






















0.481 1.420 0.162 0.158 0.803 1.9917 2.970 76 0.004
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.44. CC 2.1, Part 3 — Security Importance Mean, Matched-pairs Test Results,



































0.278 1.071 0.121 0.036 0.519 1.9913 2.291 77 0.025
Table 4.44 that the results for Pair C1 and Pair C2 give strong evidence that the
group perceives security to be more important for SFS and SGS than for Other Software
fields. This is likely due to generally lower risk postures for space assets and the inherent
difficulties of developing for space applications.
Pair C4 shows that security for SGS is perceived to be more important than for SFS.
This may be due to the physical isolation of objects in space and the ability of an attacker
to go through a ground system to get to a space asset. This is one of the paradigms that is
changing though, and cross-links and commercial satellite options are opening up multiple
pathways in to space flight systems. It is concerning that the community does not see SFS
security to be as important as SGS security, hopefully education and information sharing
will change this perception.
Pair C5 shows that the participants generally perceive security to be more important
for the space-related software in question than for Other Software fields.
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4.6.3.2 Security Survey, Questions 2.6 and 2.7 Analysis
This section shows that the participants perceive the security provisions in the question
to be important for traditional point-to-point and open-network space systems. This section
also shows a lack of consensus around the difficulty of adding these provisions to traditional
point-to-point or open-network space systems. This section shows that participants perceive
the security provisions to be more important for open-network space systems than for
traditional point-to-point space systems.
Test 1, a one-sample t-test, looks at security importance and difficulty for traditional
and open-network space systems. Test 2, a matched-pairs t-test, compares security impor-
tance and difficulty across traditional and open-network space systems.
Test 1
Summary: Participants perceive the security provisions to be important for both
open-network and traditional point-to-point space systems architectures. Participants
perceive the security provisions to be neither difficult or easy to provide for both open-
network and traditional point-to-point space systems architectures.
Question: Question 2.6 asks each participant to rate the importance of different
security provisions on a 5-point Likert scale. Question 2.7 asks each participant to rate
the difficulty of providing different security provisions on a 5-point Likert scale. The
participants are asked to rate these provisions on both open-network and traditional
point-to-point space systems architectures.
Analysis: One-sample t-tests with test value of 2, which represents a neutral value
on a compressed 3-point Likert scale.
Hypothesis: The µ is considered as the mean importance or difficult for security pro-
visions for open-network space systems and traditional point-to-point systems when
considered separately.
H0: µSecuritySurveyParticipants = 2
HA: µSecuritySurveyParticipants 6= 2
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Table 4.45 shows that the importance means are above the neutral test value of 2.
Table 4.45 shows that the difficulty means are roughly equal to the neutral value of 2.
Table 4.45. Security 2.6 and 2.7 — Security Importance and Difficulty Mean, One-sample
Test Statistics, Test Value 2, 3-point Likert Scale
Security Area N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Traditional Security
Importance
29 2.3852 0.47539 0.08828
Open-network Security
Importance
28 2.7340 0.35599 0.06728
Traditional Security
Difficulty
26 1.9410 0.55665 0.10917
Open-network Security
Difficulty
26 2.0377 0.55582 0.10900
Table 4.46 shows that the group perceives security to be important for traditional
point-to-point space systems. Table 4.46 also shows that the group perceives security to be
important for open-network space systems.
Table 4.46. Security 2.6 and 2.7 — Security Importance and Difficulty Mean, One-sample























2.0518 10.911 27 0.000 0.73401 0.5960 0.8721
Traditional
Security Difficulty
2.0596 -0.540 25 0.594 -0.05897 -0.2838 0.1659
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.46. Security 2.6 and 2.7 — Security Importance and Difficulty Mean, One-sample


















2.0596 0.346 25 0.732 0.03773 -0.1868 0.2622
The difficulty mean for both traditional point-to-point and open-network space systems
gives no evidence for refuting the null. This suggests that there is no consensus among
developers that providing these security provisions is difficult or not difficult for space
systems.
Test 2
Summary: Participants perceive the security provisions to be more important for
open-network space systems than for for traditional point-to-point space systems.
Question: Question 2.6 asks each participant to rate the importance of different
security provisions on a 5-point Likert scale. The participants are ask to rate these
provisions on both open-network and traditional point-to-point space systems archi-
tectures.
Analysis: Matched-pairs t-test to compare means of security provisions for open-
network space systems than for for traditional point-to-point space systems.
Hypothesis: The µ is considered as the mean importance for security provisions for
open-network space systems and traditional point-to-point systems when considered
separately.
H0: µOpenSpaceSystems = µTradSpaceSystems
HA: µOpenSpaceSystems 6= µTradSpaceSystems
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Table 4.47. Security 2.6 — Security Importance Mean, Matched-pairs Test Statistics, 3-
point Likert Scale
Security Area N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Traditional Security
Importance
28 2.4014 0.47594 0.08994
Open-network Security
Importance
28 2.7340 0.35599 0.06728
Table 4.48 shows that the group perceives the mean for these security provisions to be
more important for open-network space systems than for traditional point-to-point space
systems. This result coupled with the results from Test 1 show that there is a consensus
among developers that security is important for space systems and that it is generally more
important for open-network space systems.

























0.3327 0.4859 0.0918 0.1442 0.5211 2.0518 3.622 27 0.001
4.6.3.3 Security Importance and Difficulty Summary
Section 4.6.3 presents results that show that there is a consensus among space systems
developers that software security is more important for production space systems, namely
SFS and SGS systems; and more important for these applications than it is for Other Soft-
ware fields. These results also show that there is consensus that security is more important
for open-network space systems than it is for traditional point-to-point space systems. This
illustrates the need to provide and the importance of providing security for space systems
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in general and specifically for open-network space systems. It follows that adding security
to a open-network software development framework for space systems, which is the aim
of SSSM, makes it easier to develop secure open-network space systems, which the space
systems development community perceives to be important.
4.6.4 Important Security Provisions
Analysis of Security Survey, Question 2.8 shows there to be a consensus among the space
systems developers who participated in the Security Surveys that authorization, integrity,
identity management, and access control are the most important security provisions for
space systems. The survey also shows that abstraction layers is the least important security
provision and that mitigation and compliance were also ranked below the other provisions.
It should be noted that participants had the option to add their own provisions and rank
them, but none were added; this suggests a good list. This consensus suggests that the space
systems development community see the value in a secured space system that provides for
authorization, integrity, identity management, and access control. SSSM is a secured open-
network software development framework that provides for authorization, integrity, identity
management, and access control.
4.6.4.1 Security Survey, Questions 2.8 Analysis
This section shows that participants perceive authorization, integrity, identity man-
agement, and access control to be the most important security provisions, and abstraction
layers, mitigation, and compliance to be the least important.
Summary: Participants perceive authorization, integrity, identity management, and
access control as the most important security provisions for space systems.
Question: Security Survey, Question 2.8 asks each participant to rank the provided
security provisions from 1 to 15, 1 being the highest ranking. Participants also had
the option to write in up to three “other” provisions and rank them, but no one wrote
anything in, so other is not being consider as part of the ranking.
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Analysis: One-sample t-test with test value of 7.5, which represents a middle-of-the-
pack ranking.
Hypothesis: Certain security provisions will have a mean ranking below or above
the middle ranking suggesting they are perceived as more or less important than other
provisions that do tend towards the middle ranking of 7.5.
H0: µProvisionRanking = 8
HA: µProvisionRanking 6= 8
Table 4.49 shows that 4 of that security provision importance ranking means are decidedly
below 7.5; namely authorization, integrity, identity management, and access control. In this
case a lower mean indicates a better or “higher” ranking. Three provisions are decidedly
above the test value of 7.5, namely abstraction layers, mitigation, and compliance.
Table 4.49. Security 2.8 — Security Provision Importance Ranking Mean, One-sample Test
Statistics, Test Value 7.5, 1 to 15 Ranking Scale
Security Area N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Identity management 27 5.70 3.950 0.760
Mutual authentication 27 6.44 4.060 0.781
Authorization 27 4.78 3.693 0.711
Auditing 27 7.11 2.651 0.510
Confidentiality 27 7.56 2.722 0.524
Integrity 27 5.37 3.040 0.585
Availability 27 7.07 3.802 0.732
Well-defined interfaces 27 7.78 3.866 0.744
Abstraction layers 27 11.04 2.696 0.519
Access control 27 5.74 3.938 0.758
Compliance 27 9.44 4.032 0.776
Testing 27 8.59 4.822 0.928
Recovery 27 8.89 3.523 0.678
Mitigation 27 9.67 4.368 0.841
Table 4.50 shows that authorization, integrity, identity management, and access control
have strong negative evidence against the null. This means there was a consensus amongst
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participants that authorization, integrity, identity management, and access control were the
most important, or were consistently ranked higher than the other provisions.
Table 4.50 shows that abstraction layers, mitigation, and compliance have strong posi-
tive evidence against the null. This means these provisions had a “lower” ranking than the
average, or that the participants consistently ranked these provisions lower than the other
provisions.
Table 4.50. Security 2.8 — Security Provision Importance Ranking Mean, One-sample Test

















2.0555 -2.363 26 0.026 -1.796 -3.36 -0.23
Mutual
authentication
2.0555 -1.351 26 0.188 -1.056 -2.66 0.55
Authorization 2.0555 -3.830 26 0.001 -2.722 -4.18 -1.26
Auditing 2.0555 -0.762 26 0.453 -0.389 -1.44 0.66
Confidentiality 2.0555 0.106 26 0.916 0.056 -1.02 1.13
Integrity 2.0555 -3.640 26 0.001 -2.130 -3.33 -0.93
Availability 2.0555 -0.582 26 0.566 -0.426 -1.93 1.08
Well-defined
interfaces
2.0555 0.373 26 0.712 0.278 -1.25 1.81
Abstraction layers 2.0555 6.817 26 0.000 3.537 2.47 4.60
Access control 2.0555 -2.321 26 0.028 -1.759 -3.32 -0.20
Compliance 2.0555 2.506 26 0.019 1.944 0.35 3.54
Testing 2.0555 1.177 26 0.250 1.093 -0.81 3.00
Recovery 2.0555 2.049 26 0.051 1.389 0.00 2.78
Mitigation 2.0555 2.578 26 0.016 2.167 0.44 3.89
Table 4.50 also shows that mutual authentication, auditing, confidentiality, availability,
well-defined interfaces, testing, and recovery had weak t-values. This means that these
provisions had an average ranking.
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The list of security provisions that SSSM was designed to address covers all the impor-
tant provisions from Chapter 2, some of the average provisions, and none of the unimportant
provisions. SSSM focused on identity management, mutual authentication, authorization,
confidentiality, and integrity. Confidentiality and mutual authentication were both only
seen as having average importance, and the cut-off does have to be somewhere. Average
importance still suggest a need as well. The lower ranking for confidentiality and mutual
authentication may be tied to a certain amount of trust developers are giving to the internals
of their space system, going back to the typical COMSEC boundary model were everything
behind the gateway is trusted. This assumption does not address what happens if the
boundary is compromised or the fact that components might come from various untrusted
or less trusted sources that are all now networked together. This is changing as more and
more organizations trend towards the use of MONAs, a trend perceived by participants as
Section 4.5.2 shows. There may be a disconnect or lack of understanding here though, that
may explain the findings presented in Section 4.6.5 were the participant do not come to a
consensus on the benefit of internal network security. SSSM addresses all of the provisions
currently seen as important by participants and looks to address some provisions that will
likely become more important in the future as the reality of fully networked system because
more apparently.
Auditing is also addressed to a lesser extent and availability was left to future work;
both of these provisions are considered to be of average importance by the participants.
Their slightly lower ranking suggests that the priorities of the SSSM design are correct.
4.6.5 Internal Security Benefits
There is a lack of consensus among the space systems developers that participated in the
Security Survey that internal security is beneficial to or even that it negatively impacted
space systems and space systems development. There is consensus that certain aspects
where positively affected and certain ones were negatively affected, but for larger aggregate
set of aspects the perception is that the effect is neutral. Specially 11 aspects show a positive
effect, 17 show a neutral effect, and 11 show a negative effect. This section analyzes the
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responses to Security Survey, Questions 2.1. Section 4.6.5.1 presents the analysis of Question
2.1. These perceptions of internal security’s affect on system-aspects show that there is a
need for a secured open-network software development framework that allow developers
to address those aspects they deem to be negatively affected, improve on those that are
neutrally affected, and realize the benefits of aspects that are perceived to be positively
affected.
4.6.5.1 Security Survey, Questions 2.1 Analysis
This section shows that the perception of positive effect is the strongest for security,
best practices, code quality, information assurance, and mission assurance; the participants
perceive 11 total aspects to be positively affected. The perception of negative effect is the
strongest for code complexity, latency, and development cost; the participants perceive 11
total aspects to be negatively affected. Security Survey, Question 2.1 is a Pros-neutral-cons
rating question.
Summary: Participants perceive internal space systems security to have an overall
“neutral” affect on the system and system development aspects that they rated.
Question: Security Survey, Question 2.1 asks each participant to record the impact
that internal security in space systems has on a range of system aspects in terms of
Pros, Neutral, and Cons. Pros is coded as a 3, Neutral is coded as a 2, and Cons is
coded as a 1.
Analysis: One-sample t-test with test value of 2, which represents a neutral value.
Hypothesis: Participants will perceive internal security to have a non-neutral effect
or impact on system-aspects.
H0: µInternalSecurityImpact = 2
HA: µInternalSecurityImpact 6= 2
Table 4.52 shows that there are 11 aspects that participants perceive to be positively im-
pacted. There are 17 that are either neutrally affected or on which participants did not
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reach a consensus. Table 4.52 shows that there are 11 aspects that participants perceive to
be negatively impacted.
Table 4.51. Security 2.1 — Internal Security Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-
sample Test Statistics, Test Value 2, 1 to 3 Cons-Neutral-Pros Scale
Aspect N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Regression reduction 29 1.9655 0.77840 0.14455
Code design 29 1.6897 0.80638 0.14974
Development cost 29 1.4138 0.68229 0.12670
Maintenance cost 29 1.5517 0.63168 0.11730
Development productivity 29 1.9655 0.73108 0.13576
Development efficiency 29 1.6207 0.67685 0.12569
Code complexity 29 1.3448 0.61388 0.11399
Maintainability 29 1.9655 0.77840 0.14455
Integration 29 2.1034 0.77205 0.14337
Adaptability 29 1.8276 0.75918 0.14098
Documentation/Examples 29 2.2414 0.57664 0.10708
Encapsulation 29 2.2414 0.51096 0.09488
Bug detection 29 2.3448 0.66953 0.12433
Code quality 29 2.4483 0.50612 0.09398
Code robustness 29 2.3448 0.66953 0.12433
Best practices 29 2.6897 0.47082 0.08743
Schedule 29 1.5517 0.63168 0.11730
Code or algorithm
optimization/efficiency
29 1.6897 0.66027 0.12261
Uniformity of coding style 29 2.2759 0.45486 0.08447
Domain knowledge 29 1.8966 0.67320 0.12501
Code readability 29 2.2759 0.52757 0.09797
Security 29 2.8966 0.30993 0.05755
I/0 efficiency 29 1.7586 0.57664 0.10708
Radiation hardness 29 2.1379 0.44111 0.08191
Fault tolerance 29 2.2414 0.63556 0.11802
Hardware complexity 29 1.7241 0.59140 0.10982
Latency 29 1.4828 0.50855 0.09443
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.51. Security 2.1 — Internal Security Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-sample
Test Statistics, Test Value 2, 1 to 3 Cons-Neutral-Pros Scale (continued)
Aspect N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Determinism 29 2.1724 0.60172 0.11174
Interoperability 29 1.8966 0.67320 0.12501
Portability 29 1.9310 0.65088 0.12087
Testing 29 2.0000 0.75593 0.14037
Reusability 29 2.1724 0.60172 0.11174
Software upgradability 29 2.0000 0.65465 0.12157
Hardware
changes/flexibility
29 1.6897 0.54139 0.10053
Adoption rates/software
proliferation
29 2.0000 0.65465 0.12157
Ease of use 29 1.8621 0.74278 0.13793
Mission/Project
requirement changes
29 1.8966 0.61788 0.11474
Information assurance 29 2.5517 0.63168 0.11730
Mission assurance 29 2.5517 0.50612 0.09398
Overall 29 2.0106 0.30597 0.05682
A break down of the negatively, positively, and neutrally or inconclusively affected
aspects by development cost, development quality, assurance/risk, and resource efficiency is
shown below. For this categorization development costs are aspects that increase developer
or development resource utilization, aspects that drive up schedule or make it harder to
develop space systems. Development quality refers to the quality of software or hardware
that is produced. Assurance/risk covers systems or development aspects that deal with the
level of surety developers have that the system will handle faults, environmental stressors,
or attacks and still be able to meet mission objectives. Resource efficiency covers how well
a piece of software or hardware is able to do its job; for software that might refer to CPU
utilization, for software and hardware this might refer to maximum data throughput. These
categorization are based on researcher experience and background.
Negatively Affected
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– Development cost: development cost, maintenance cost, development effi-
ciency, schedule
– Development quality: code design, code complexity
– Assurance/risk:
– Resource efficiency: code or algorithm optimization/efficiency, I/O efficiency,
latency, hardware change flexibility, hardware complexity
Positively Affected
– Development cost: bug detection
– Development quality: encapsulation, code robustness, best practices, unifor-
mity of coding style, code readability, documentation/examples
– Assurance/ris: security, information assurance, mission assurance
– Resource efficiency:
Not Affected or no Consensus
– Development cost: ease of use, mission/project requirement changes, software
upgradability, reusability, portability, interoperability, adaptability, integration,
maintainability, development productivity, regression reduction
– Development quality: adoption rates/software proliferation
– Assurance/risk: testing, fault tolerance, radiation hardness
– Resource efficiency: determinism
Table 4.52. Security 2.1 — Internal Security Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-

















2.0484 -0.239 28 0.813 -0.0345 -0.3306 0.2616
Code design 2.0484 -2.073 28 0.048 -0.3103 -0.6171 -0.0036
Development cost 2.0484 -4.627 28 0.000 -0.5862 -0.8457 -0.3267
Maintenance cost 2.0484 -3.822 28 0.001 -0.4483 -0.6886 -0.2080
Development
productivity
2.0484 -0.254 28 0.801 -0.0345 -0.3126 0.2436
Development
efficiency
2.0484 -3.018 28 0.005 -0.3793 -0.6368 -0.1218
Code complexity 2.0484 -5.747 28 0.000 -0.6552 -0.8887 -0.4217
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.52. Security 2.1 — Internal Security Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-sample















Maintainability 2.0484 -0.239 28 0.813 -0.0345 -0.3306 0.2616
Integration 2.0484 0.722 28 0.477 0.1035 -0.1902 0.3971
Adaptability 2.0484 -1.223 28 0.232 -0.1724 -0.4612 0.1164
Documentation/
Examples
2.0484 2.254 28 0.032 0.2414 0.0220 0.4607
Encapsulation 2.0484 2.544 28 0.017 0.2414 0.0470 0.4357
Bug detection 2.0484 2.774 28 0.010 0.3448 0.0902 0.5995
Code quality 2.0484 4.770 28 0.000 0.4483 0.2558 0.6408
Code robustness 2.0484 2.774 28 0.010 0.3448 0.0902 0.5995
Best practices 2.0484 7.888 28 0.000 0.6897 0.5106 0.8687





2.0484 -2.531 28 0.017 -0.3103 -0.5615 -0.0592
Uniformity of
coding style
2.0484 3.266 28 0.003 0.2759 0.1028 0.4489
Domain
knowledge
2.0484 -0.828 28 0.415 -0.1035 -0.3595 0.1526
Code readability 2.0484 2.816 28 0.009 0.2759 0.0752 0.4765
Security 2.0484 15.578 28 0.000 0.8966 0.7787 1.0144
I/0 efficiency 2.0484 -2.254 28 0.032 -0.2414 -0.4607 -0.0220
Radiation
hardness
2.0484 1.684 28 0.103 0.1380 -0.0299 0.3057
Fault tolerance 2.0484 2.045 28 0.050 0.2414 -0.0004 0.4831
Hardware
complexity
2.0484 -2.512 28 0.018 -0.2759 -0.5008 -0.0509
Latency 2.0484 -5.477 28 0.000 -0.5172 -0.7107 -0.3238
Determinism 2.0484 1.543 28 0.134 0.1724 -0.0565 0.4013
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.52. Security 2.1 — Internal Security Benefits on System-aspects Means, One-sample















Interoperability 2.0484 -0.828 28 0.415 -0.1035 -0.3595 0.1526
Portability 2.0484 -0.571 28 0.573 -0.0690 -0.3165 0.1786
Testing 2.0484 0.000 28 1.000 0.0000 -0.2875 0.2875
Reusability 2.0484 1.543 28 0.134 0.1724 -0.0565 0.4013
Software
upgradability








2.0484 0.000 28 1.000 0.0000 -0.2490 0.2490




2.0484 -0.902 28 0.375 -0.1035 -0.3385 0.1316
Information
assurance
2.0484 4.704 28 0.000 0.5517 0.3114 0.7920
Mission assurance 2.0484 5.870 28 0.000 0.5517 0.3592 0.7442
Overall 2.0484 0.187 28 0.853 0.0106 -0.1058 0.1270
Participants did not perceive any aspects of assurance/risk aspects to be negatively
affected by adding internal security, and felt that it positively affected overall security and
assurance status of a space system while having a neutral affect on testing, fault tolerance
and radiation hardness. This suggests that adding an addition layer of security is a accept-
able way to increase a systems overall assurance and security. Development quality as a
category also showed a generally positive trend, while development cost showed a more neg-
ative/neutral affect which might mean that while software development might take longer
or cost more it would be of higher quality with internal security as part of the system.
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The participants did not perceive any resource efficiency aspects to be positively af-
fected by adding internal security. Specifically latency and algorithm optimization/efficiency
were negatively affected, with latency having one of the strongest negative t-values. Sec-
tion 4.4 shows these to be the only aspects affected negatively by reusability. Reusability
had a neutral effect on security and the reverse was also true. There is commonality in what
has to be done to a piece of software or module to make it reusable and to make it secure.
Reusability typically drives the need for an interface at which other pieces of software or
hardware can interact with a software module or unit, as mentioned previously, this level of
encapsulation and decoupling make it easier to reuse the module and make changes to the
module without affecting the rest of the system. Adding internal security to a modular sys-
tem would naturally sit at some of these interaction or interface boundaries allowing these
larger reusable pieces to also be securable units. This is something that the work carried
out for SSSM has done, the modular open-network software development framework of SSM
has interface points where security was added, i.e. the networking component of the IPC.
The idea being that the reusability of modules will be maintained and that the impact on
reusability and security will not be paid for twice.
As mentioned participants perceive development costs to generally be negatively or
neutrally affected. The negatively affected aspects were development cost, maintenance
cost, development efficiency, and schedule. The additional complexity in terms of design
and development time to add security are perceived to negatively impact development life-
cycle as well increase the resource burden on a system. Table 4.24 shows these aspects in red
and orange. SSSM adds internal security to a reusable open-network software development
framework that helps to buy down some of these development and maintenance costs. SSSM
also tries to minimize the impact on code complexity for the end users which should also
help with code design, development costs, and maintenance costs.
Some aspects appear to be at odds, like a neutral rating on maintainability but a
negative effect on maintenance cost. Development quality appears to show a discrepancy
between negative and positive effects, normally one might expect that code design would be
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tied to code robustness, encapsulation, and best practices. However, developer perception
is that code design is negatively affected while these aspects are positively affected. One
possibility here is that the participants think of this as more of the time taken to do the
design than the quality of the resultant design. It is also possible that the developers have
a different understanding of the interrelationships of the different aspects. These seemingly
contradictory perceptions suggest a need to better understand the development process of
and developed product for space systems. A open-network software development framework
that adds security can be used to better understand the real effect of adding internal security
and may in turn alleviate some developer concern about adding internal security to a space
system.
Many aspects were seen as not being impacted by internal security provisions. This is
shown by the weak t-value of the Overall mean for all the aspects together as well as the large
number of aspects that showed a neutral affect. These low magnitude t-values are shown in
gray, for these the null hypothesis cannot be refuted. The development cost category had
the largest set of aspects, development cost and schedule are often the constraining factors
for a development effort. As space systems development schedules shrink it is important
that overall assurance can increase by adding internal security provision without too much
perceived impact on development cost.
4.7 Conclusions of Survey Analysis
Appendix B contains a more detailed analysis of the survey participants. It shows that
the surveys were taken by a diverse group of space systems developers with good overall
experience in software systems development, management, hardware systems development,
and procurement. Section 4.3 showed that the participants perceive minimal code complex-
ity to be important and beneficial generally and specifically for SFS. The participants felt
that lack of cohesion and cyclomatic complexity metrics were the most important complex-
ity metrics. Section 4.4 demonstrated that the developers believe reuse is important and
beneficial for software developed for space systems. Section 4.5 showed a general consen-
sus among participants that networking is beneficial to space systems and space systems
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development. This section also showed that space systems design and implementation is
trending towards OSAs and MONAs at an organizational level. Section 4.6 showed that
security concerns are a significant hurdle to adopting open systems approaches and that
networking has a negative effect on security in space systems and space systems develop-
ment. This section also showed that security is important to provide for space systems
and security is more important for open-network space systems than it is for traditional
point-to-point space systems.
The overall consensus among participating space systems developers is that there would
be value in a reusable open-network software development framework that implements





The primary goal of the SSSM design is providing security while maintaining the
reusability that is present in SSM. To do this the design keeps as many changes as possible
behind the SSM’s original API. The design and implementation of SSSM demonstrates a
way to address both the Development Problem and Security Problem. Chapter 4 shows that
developers feel that SSM addresses issues that relate to reuse, modular open-network system
approaches, and networking, but there is room for improvement. Chapter 4 also shows that
space systems developers believe there is value in securing a reusable open-network software
development framework that implements MONA while trying to minimize the burden on
the developer.
The security research augments SSM so that the benefits of a reusable, modular open-
network software development framework can be realized while minimizing the negative
impact on security. This research achieves this by adding security provisions to SSM, this
modified version of SSM is called SSSM. This helps to address both the Development
and Security Problems by providing the capability developers need and expect in modern
development environments with additional easy-to-use security provisions. Section 5.2 cov-
ers some of the security problems that SSSM addresses for SSM. Section 5.3 covers the
changes to SSM and protocol definitions used to provide the additional security provisions
for SSM. Chapter 6 will discuss the difference, from the developer-perspective, between
implementing a secured producer-consumer paring and an unsecured producer-consumer
pairing. Chapter 6 will also present a performance evaluation that compares some resource
metrics between a secured producer-consumer paring and a unsecured producer-consumer
pairing.
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5.2 SSM Security Problem
The design of SSM does not consider security. There are no provisions in place to
restrict the flow of data or protect it while in transit, the same is true for commands. Figure
5.1 shows an example of a space system utilizing SSM for its Command and Data Handling
(CDH) system. Traffic traverses the radio-link from the ground, this could also be space-
to-space radio-link; new communication paradigms and interconnected space systems pose
additional security issues over traditional ground-based communication. Multiple points
of egress to a space system allow for increased access and availability for legitimate space
systems users, but also increase space system exposure to exploitation.
Figure 5.1 shows a Radio Manager that integrates with the radio hardware on one side
to send and receive communication and on the other side it relays this communication to the
CDH stack making use of the open-network interface provided by SSM. Applications that
schedule commands and handle various hardware subsystems make up the CDH stack, e.g. a
file-management service, a ADCS management component, or a GPS receiver management
component. In the event that a malicious ground station is able to interrogate the space
system or a malicious application (MA) is able to infiltrate the system, specifically the
perimeter is compromised, then there are no protections in place. If the payload shown in
Figure 5.1 is a high-value target then numerous entities with considerable resources might
be trying to gain access to it or otherwise compromise its mission. Figure 5.1 shows a MA,
that in conjunction with a malicious ground station, or on its own, can compromise or spoof
payload data by interjecting traffic. Such an application could compromise the functionality
of the underlying SSM infrastructure, CDH systems, and the payload in order to make the
resource unavailable, task the resource, or relay manipulated data.
A secure system should provide a set of key features, including identity management,
mutual authentication, authorization, auditing, confidentiality, integrity, availability, man-
agement, and compliance. Figure 5.1 illustrates that the vanilla version of SSM does not
provide significant coverage for any of these features; SSM was designed to be open in
order to facilitate communication across different subnets and network types without con-
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sideration for security. SSSM addresses this security concern by providing a security layer
that allows applications and components to confidentially communicate, as well as mutu-















































Fig. 5.1. Attack Scenario. Potential attack scenarios on a space system utilizing SSM for
communication with a hosted payload and a malicious application.
of the benefits gained by using a modular open-network software development framework,
e.g. the system needs to stay open, modular, ideally networked, and reusable. The design
and implementation of SSSM demonstrates a way to add security to SSM and address the
security problems and principles, that this research has discussed, while allowing developers
to realize all the benefits they see in modular, reusable open-network software development
frameworks. The design discussed in the next section seeks to enable the development of
space systems that are more secure and that can have a level of compartmentalized and
layered security. The design should provide this security while minimizing the impact on
space systems developer and ideally on system resources.
5.3 SSSM Architectural and Protocol Design
The SSSM design protects traffic in transit, identifies components, authenticates com-
ponents, and controls access to components. SSSM accomplishes this by borrowing concepts
from Kerberos, adding a Permission Table, and utilizing AES-Galois/Counter Mode (GCM),
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as implemented in OpenSSL [49], for encryption and integrity verification. SSSM supports
compilation with or without Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140–2 com-
pliance [50]. SSM provides a LS which in turn provides a mechanism for applications and
components to discover each other, share data or telemetry, and issue commands. SSSM
augments the capabilities of the LS by adding functionality that allows for the authentication
of applications and components using pre-shared keys. SSSM combines the functionality
of the Kerberos Ticket Granting Server (TGS) and Authentication Server (AS), or theKey
Distribution Center (KDC), into the SSM LS and uses pre-shared keys in place of pass-
words to authenticate each component that needs to participate in secure communication.
Section C.2 of Appendix C explains the protocols Kerberos utilizes in more detail. The LS
provides session keys for components to use to encrypt communication, as well as manage
access between components at the interface-message level. The LS contains a Permission
Table that it loads from a configuration file as depicted in Figure 5.2 and Sample 5.1 that
allow the LS to control which entities can communicate securely on an interface-message
level.
Figure 5.2 illustrates a basic example of SSSM capability and provides insight into the
architecture of SSM and subsequently SSSM. SSSM architecture is explained in more detail
in Section 5.3.1. Figure 5.2 shows three processing nodes running SSSM and communicating
over SPA ethernet (SPA-E) (Ethernet); they could, in theory, be communicating over any
other subnet combinations supported by SSM. The SPA-E subnet-manager (SM-E) compo-
nents are the subnet-managers for Ethernet-based communication. The application level of
the SSSM endpoints do not have any knowledge of the networks that a message traverses to
reach its destination. This example is simple and the Producer would not typically provide
the same data via a secured and unsecured interface, the example is shown this way for
simplicity.
SSSM addresses each of the key security features, from Section 2.3, by adding the
functionality listed below:
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 Identity management — Identities of components are tied to universally unique
identifiers and pre-shared keys
 Mutual authentication — Kerberos-like protocol using pre-shared keys1
 Authorization — Permission Table, session creation, and management by LS
 Auditing — SSM logging system to log pertinent events, e.g. failed authentication
attempts
 Confidentiality — Industry standard AES-256 encryption
 Integrity — AES-256-GCM provides verification that the data was not tampered
with
 Availability — Not addressed due to issues intrinsic to the current SPA networking
standard and the scope of the problem2
Section 5.3.1 highlights the architectural changes and additions made to SSM. Section 5.3.2
explains the protocol exchanges that facilitate authentication, authorization, and secure
communication between authenticated components.
5.3.1 Architectural Overview
SSSM adds the ability to house pre-shared keys for components, and permissions for
controlling access and setting up sessions for secure communication to the LS. SSM provides
the CAS, the LS, subnet-managers, and the SPA API for developing SPA applications in
C++. SSSM updates these components so that a developer using the SPA API to write their
applications can use the new security provisions with very few changes over non-secured
versions of the same applications. The space systems software developer does not need to
have any special security background when configuring their applications to use the security
provisions. The developer needs to use secured versions of some classes in the API and needs
to provide a permission table file. Sample 5.1 shows an example of a permission table. The
1Pre-shared keys could be changed to, or augmented by, public-key or certificate encryption schemes in
future work.
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Fig. 5.2. SSSM Usage Example. An illustration of a potential network setup that utilizes
features provided by SSSM. SSSM allows secured and unsecured traffic to share the same
network.
rest of the changes are largely transparent to the developer. Chapter 6, Section 6.2 covers
these developer-level deltas in more detail.
The CAS and LS are two of the most important services provided by SSM, these
services do not need to reside on the same processing node or even the same subnet. The
CAS gives logical address blocks out to each of the subnet-managers. The subnet-managers
use these logical address blocks to give addresses to each of the components on their subnet.
Together the LS and subnet-managers facilitate component discovery, data sharing, and
commanding. This gives components the ability to publish their capabilities as shown in
Sample 5.2. The permission table configuration file in Sample 5.1 relates to the example
SSSM setup that Figure 5.2 depicts. Section 5.3.2 explains the protocol for setting up
the secure exchange of information. The Permission Table configuration file houses the
permission rules and pre-shared keys. The LS ingests this file on startup to configure the
permission rules and pre-shared keys. In Sample 5.1, the application with the Universally
Unique Identifier (UUID) ending in aa33 on line 2 has permission to interact with the
interface-message pairing of interface identifier 1 and message identifier 1, denoted as (1,1),
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provided by the application with the UUID ending in aa44 on line 10. This permission
is shown on lines 5 and 6 where aa44 is referred to as the TargetComponent. Sample 5.2
shows the xTEDS for aa44. The data provided by (1,1) is defined on line 9.
Both applications have a key to communicate with the LS, these symmetric keys are
defined on lines 3 and 11; these lines also indicate that these applications require 32-byte
or 256-bit keys for authentication and communication. These keys are only used during
the authentication phase, another key is generated as part of a ticket to be used to com-
municate with the LS after authentication, and new keys will be generated for each session
with other components or interface-message pairings. The lifetime on line 5 indicates that
sessions with this interface-message pairing last 600 seconds or 10 minutes. Additional com-
ponents and permissions can be defined following the same format. This file centralizes the
configuration, allowing the components to only have knowledge of their own key. The LS






5 <TargetComponent uuid='faaace1a-30dc-604a-d5a8-2fbaaaa3aa44' lifetime='600' >










Sample 5.1. Permission Table for Color Producer Configuration. Permission Table that
configures the LS and allows the component with UUID ending in aa33 to communicate
with aa44 on (1,1).
creation and management, session management, encryption, permission management, and
authentication.
The two SSSM Apps depicted in Figure 5.2 illustrate a producer-consumer relationship
that is very common, specifically in the context of SSM and CDH systems, but also generally.
This is a generic example meant to illustrate a capability, as a color sensor is not generally
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a sensor in use in a CDH system. A developer builds these applications using the SPA
API that provides a SpaApplication. In order to produce an application that provides
the xTEDS interface depicted in Sample 5.2 the SpaApplication class is coupled with
the xTEDS in question. The SpaApplication sets up and performs all the network side
functionality needed to participate on a SSM network. It registers with its subnet-manager,
registers its xTEDS with the LS, and provides callbacks to respond to registered commands
and requests for notifications. The example xTEDS shows two interfaces: (1,1) and (2,1).
These are both notifications, meaning that data is produced and a consumer may subscribe
to the data. Lines 9 and 16 of Sample 5.2 indicate that data is published periodically and
that the data is a byte array. The (1,1) interface on line 9 is secured and the (2,1) interface
on line 16 is not secured.
In this xTEDS example both interfaces produce the same data, this is purely for il-
lustrative purposes. The xTEDS does not indicate if a given interface is secured or not
secured, the names here are for illustrative purposes, nor does it indicate who is allowed to
use a given interface. The designation of security and permission is made in the Permission
Table configuration file, enforced by the LS, and in the code of the Producer or owner of the
interface. In this case the developer uses the secured SecureNotificationMsg class for
interface (1,1) and the standard NotificationMsg class for (2,1). The secured notification
on (1,1) requires the use of the protocols described in Section 5.3.2 and the notification on
(2,1) works the same as it always has in SSM. Both interfaces require setup. The producer
registers the notification via xTEDS with the LS and the consumer must issue a query for
the notification. After the setup is complete the use of and production of the data is largely
identical for both the secured and unsecured versions. The updated SPA API makes the
authentication and encryption transparent to the user.
SSSM provides encryption functions and wrappers for developers as utilities, but devel-
opers do not need to use them directly. SSSM provides secured versions of various message
classes, e.g. SecureCommandMsg and SecureRequestMsg to securely support commands
without a response and commands that expect a response, respectively. SSM and the SPA
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API also make use of various communicator classes that have been updated to handle the
secured variants of SSM communication. In short, the SPA API and any associated commu-
nicators have been updated to provide for authentication with the LS and other components,
requesting sessions, handling sessions, and encryption.






6 <Application name='SecureProducer' kind='application' programMemoryRequired='1' dataMemoryRequired='1'
componentKey='ProducerComponentKey'/>
7 <Interface name='SecureData' id='1' >
8 <Notification>
9 <DataMsg name='SecureData' id='1' msgArrival='PERIODIC' msgRate='0.2'>
10 <DynamicArray name='secureString' kind='color' dataType='UINT8' maxArrayElements='1000'




14 <Interface name='PlaintextData' id='2' >
15 <Notification>
16 <DataMsg name='PlaintextData' id='1' msgArrival='PERIODIC' msgRate='0.2'>
17 <DynamicArray name='plaintextString' kind='color' dataType='UINT8' maxArrayElements='1000'





Sample 5.2. Secured Color Producer xTEDS. An xTEDS with an unsecured and secured
nofication for the same data showing that the xTEDS definition is the same for both.
The subnet-managers, e.g. SM-E and SPA-L subnet-manager (SM-L), facilitate com-
munication on the given subnet and between different subnets. Figure 5.2 shows the SM-E
and SM-L subnet-managers passing both secured and unsecured communication. Updates
have been made to these subnet managers to facilitate secured communication, e.g. handling
of a secure header.
Common secured message classes have been added with SSSM that make use of the
extended header capability of the SSM messaging system. The extended header capability
of SSM allows an arbitrary number of headers to be added to any message, SSSM makes
use of this functionality to designate security functionality. Messages classes for secure
commanding and data sharing have been added as well as message classes for authentication,
permission exchange, and session creation. Other utility classes like a ticket class have been
added to encapsulate that functionality, as well as an encryption class for wrapping access
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to the OpenSSL libraries. These modifications and additions make it easy for a developer
writing a SPA Application to add the ability to communicate securely on specific interface-
message pairings. Section 5.3.2 details the protocols used for secure communication. From
an architectural standpoint no new services or components were added, but existing services
like the LS were augmented. Existing classes were augmented and new classes were added
to support secure communication. Section 5.3.2 gives an overview of how the secured
components authenticate themselves with the LS and subsequently communicate securely
with other components.
5.3.2 Protocol Overview
SSSM models its authentication process after Kerberos. Kerberos can use symmetric
keys, passwords, or even public-key encryption to establish identity and subsequently grant
tickets that can be used to open sessions with services. SSSM makes use of pre-shared
symmetric keys, these keys are used only during initial communication with the LS or if a
component’s authentication expires and the component needs to re-authenticate; the idea
being to limit the usage of this authenticating and identifying key. This identifying key can
be updated out-of-band, but currently there is no method for an in-band or online method
for changing this key.
Figure 5.3 continues the example used in previous sections and shown in Figure 5.2
where the Consumer, or SSSM App (SA1), wants to subscribe to data from the Producer,
or (SA2 ). The messages that Figure 5.3 depicts do not include all the SpaMessage specific
header and footer message components that wrap the secured portions of the messages,
certain parts have been left off for brevity and clarity. The diagram starts after the com-
ponents have been discovered on the network, i.e. contacted their subnet-managers and
received a logical address and started the registration process with the LS, but before they
have finished the registration process. This process works the same whether a components
has secured interfaces or not. The Authentication block shows the authentication process
for SA1, but the process is the same for SA2. SA1 authenticates with the LS via a hand-
shake and receives a key that it uses for requesting access to other services or components.
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SpaSubscriptionRequest( LA_SA1,LA_SA2,...,DialogId,...,InterfaceID, MessageID,...,SUBSCRIPTION_REQUEST,... )
SecureHeader(IV,TAG), E{ SecureHeader( Timestamp,LA_SA2,LA_SA1 ), SpaData( payload ) }SKSA1_SA2
SpaSubscriptionReply( DialogId,SUBSCRIPTION_REQUEST_GRANTED )
SpaAuthenticationRequest( SecureHeader(IV,TAG),
E{ SecureHeader( Timestamp,LA_SA1,LA_LS ),
LA_SA1,Timestamp }KSA1 ) Perform UUID or Logical Address (LA) to key lookup:
 Do not respond if DNE or if authenticator is bad
 Respond with ticket if lookup is goodSpaAuthenticationReply( SecureHeader(IV,TAG), 
E{ SecureHeader( Timestamp,LA_LS,LA_SA1 ), 
LA_LS,Timestamp,Lifetime,SKLS_SA1 }KSA1 )
SpaPermissionsReply( SecureHeader(IV,TAG),
E{ SecureHeader( Timestamp,LA_LS,LA_SA1 ),
SubjectSessionTicket( IV,TAG,Timestamp,
PermissionsList( LA_SA2,UUID_SA2, 
Lifetime,Permissions,SKSA1_SA2 ) ) ,
TargetSessionTicket( IV,TAG,E{ Timestamp, 
PermissionsList( LA_SA1,UUID_SA1,
Lifetime,Permissions,SKSA1_SA2) }SKLS_SA2 ) }SKLS_SA1 )
SpaSessionRequest( SecureAuthenticator( IV,TAG, E{ LA_SA1,LA_SA2,Timestamp }SKSA1_SA2 ),
TargetSessionTicket( IV,TAG, E{ Timestamp, PermissionsList( LA_SA1,UUID_SA1,Lifetime,Permissions,SKSA1_SA2) }SKLS_SA2 ) )
SpaSessionReply( SecureHeader(IV,TAG), E{ SecureHeader( Timestamp,LA_SA2,LA_SA1 ),
SecureAuthenticator(IV,TAG, E{ LA_SA2,LA_SA1,Timestamp+1}SKSA1_SA2 ) }SKSA1_SA2 )
Setup session,
respond if
Ticket is valid 
Secure Notification
SecureHeader(IV,TAG), E{ SecureHeader( Timestamp,LA_SA1,LA_SA2 ), SpaServiceRequest( payload ) }SKSA1_SA2
SecureHeader(IV,TAG), E{ SecureHeader( Timestamp,LA_SA1,LA_SA2 ), SpaServiceReply( payload ) }SKSA1_SA2
Secure Request
Secure Command
SecureHeader(IV,TAG), E{ SecureHeader( Timestamp,LA_SA1,LA_SA2 ), SpaCommand( payload ) }SKSA1_SA2
SecureHeader(IV,TAG), E{ SecureHeader( Timestamp,LA_SA2,LA_SA1 ), SpaData( payload ) }SKSA1_SA2












generate symetric key 







E{ SecureHeader( Timestamp,LA_SA1,LA_LS ),  
LA_SA2,LA_SA1,Timestamp }SKLS_SA1 )
SpaPermissionsReply( SecureHeader(IV,TAG),
E{ SecureHeader( Timestamp,LA_LS,LA_SA1 ),
SubjectSessionTicket( IV,TAG,Timestamp,
PermissionsList( LA_SA2,UUID_SA2, 
Lifetime,Permissions,SKSA1_SA2 ) ) ,
TargetSessionTicket( IV,TAG,E{ Timestamp, 
PermissionsList( LA_SA1,UUID_SA1,
Lifetime,Permissions,SKSA1_SA2) }SKLS_SA2 ) }SKLS_SA1 )
Permission lookup, 
generate symetric key 
and tickets for session with SA2
SpaSessionRequest( SecureAuthenticator( IV,TAG, E{ LA_SA1,LA_SA2,Timestamp }SKSA1_SA2 ),
TargetSessionTicket( IV,TAG, E{ Timestamp, PermissionsList( LA_SA1,UUID_SA1,Lifetime,Permissions,SKSA1_SA2) }SKLS_SA2 ) )
SpaSessionReply( SecureHeader(IV,TAG), E{ SecureHeader( Timestamp,LA_SA2,LA_SA1 ),












Fig. 5.3. SSSM Protocol Diagram. An illustration of the protocols employed to allow
components or applications to authenticate with the LS and subsequently establish sessions
to receive tickets and communicate with other components.
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The next block shows the Query and Session Request protocol, SA1 queries for the data
or command interfaces it wants using the LS, this querying process is already part of SSM.
In this case SA1 wants to communicate with a secure interface on SA2. SA1 asks the LS
for a ticket it can use to communicate with SA2.
The Lifetime block depicts the exchange that occurs when a session is expiring and a
component wishes to get another session to maintain communication. Figure 5.2 only use
a secure notification but the protocol diagram depicts the exchange for secure notifications,
secure requests, and secure commands in the Secure Notification, Secure Request, and Secure
Command blocks of the protocol diagram in Figure 5.3.
5.3.2.1 Authentication
A secure component participates on the SSM by authenticating itself with the LS,
all components already need to register with the LS so this is a natural extension of that
process. If the LA of a component is already known then a malicious component could
try to subvert the process, but they will fail to negotiate a session with the component
without a valid session ticket from the LS. In this example SA1 needs to authenticate
with the LS. Figure 5.3 depicts the process that a component uses to authenticate with
the LS in the Authentication block. SA1 sends a SpaAuthenticationRequest to the
LS, the SpaAuthenticationRequest is an extension of the SpaMessage that is part
of SSM. The SecureHeader employed by SSSM bridges the encryption boundary, the
Initialization Vector (IV) and tag are transmitted in-the-clear while the timestamp, source
address (LA SA1 ), and destination address (LA LS) are encrypted along with the rest of
the SpaAuthenticationRequest payload. Encrypting the timestamp and addresses re-
duces the feasibility of spoofing and replay attacks as well as facilitates authentication. The
timestamp is carried out to the nanosecond and doubles as a nonce for replay attacks. While
the source and destination addresses make it more difficult for one component to meaning-
fully masquerade as another component. These addresses have to match the addresses in
the regular SpaMessage header that are used for routing.
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The authenticator portion of the SpaAuthenticationRequest message follows the en-
crypted portion of the SecureHeader borrowing the authenticator concept from Kerberos.
SA1 encrypts the secured portion of the message with the KSA1 key, this is the pre-shared
key that only the LS and SA1. SA1 sends the message to the LS, at that point it is the
job of the LS to use the LA in the SpaMessage header to look up the component and its
pre-shared key, it can fall back to the component UUID if the component has not registered
with a LA yet, but this should have already been matched during the probing process which
is not depicted here. The LS simply does not reply if the lookup fails, this reduces the load
if there is an attack, and makes it harder for a malicious entity to gain any information.
If the LS finds the component in its lookup table, then it uses the KSA1 to de-
crypt the encrypted portion of the SpaAuthenticationRequest, if the message passes
validation then the LS crafts a SpaAuthenticationReply to send back to SA1. The
SpaAuthenticationReply is basically like the SpaAuthenticationRequest except for
the authenticator portion of the message at the end. The LS uses its LA, a new timestamp,
a lifetime for which the new key is good, and a new key. The new key, denoted as KLS SA1,
is generated by the LS. This key is used for the duration of the lifetime specified, at which
point the component has to re-authenticate with the LS and get a new key. This is all
encrypted with KSA1; both parties have to know KSA1 for this exchange to work. Successful
decryption on both sides coupled with the authenticator portion of the messages allows for
mutual authentication, i.e. SA1 can also be sure that it is talking to the real LS. This
completes the authentication phase at which point the LS submits a SpaXtedsRequest to
SA1 asking for its xTEDS, and SA1 sends it using a SpaXtedsReply. Both secured and
unsecured components participate in the xTEDS exchange. The same process is carried out
for SA2. Once a component has authenticated itself with the LS, it can request permissions
for communicating with other secured components.
5.3.2.2 Query and Session Request
In this phase SA1 issues a query for the data it wishes to consume. SA1 queries for
the SecureData interface using a SpaQueryRequest, this process works basically the same
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as it does in vanilla SSM. Figure 5.3 illustrates a specific case of a query for the SecureData
interface as described in Sample 5.2. Queries work the same for other types of interfaces,
i.e. commanding or requesting. The LS responds with as many SpaQueryReply messages
as there are components that match the query, in this example there is only one. It is up
to the application developer to decide if they want to purely go with the first one or use
other criteria to decide which one to use if multiple providers exist, there is also a query for
all option which allows a developer to source all the providers.
SA1 chooses a producer or service provider, in this case SA2, and then it must re-
quest the set of permissions it has for SA2. SA1 makes this request to the LS using a
SpaPermissionsRequest message. The SpaPermissionsRequest contains a SecureHeader
like before, but instead of including the LA LS in the rest of the SpaPermissionsRequest
it contains LA SA2, the LA of the component to which SA1 wishes to subscribe, also known
as the target. SA1 encrypts this request with SKLS SA1 to protect it in transit and contains
the source address and timestamp to authenticate the sender as SA1.
The LS processes the SpaPermissionsRequest by decrypting it via LA to encryption
key lookup, the LS then uses the addresses in the request and looks up LA SA1 as the
subject and LA SA2 as the target to determine what permissions SA1 has with regard to
SA2. The LS packages up two permissions list in the reply to SA1. One list is for SA1
and this list has all the permissions SA1 has for SA2, this means that SA1 does not have
to issue separate permission requests for each SA2 interface it wishes to use. The other
permission list is for SA2 and tells SA2 what access it should grant to SA1. These list
become part of the session tickets that the LS builds for the SpaPermissionsReply, SA1
and SA2 each get a session ticket.
The LS constructs a SubjectSessionTicket for SA1 and a TargetSessionTicket
for SA2. These tickets are based off of the ticket employed by Kerberos and are signed
by the LS. These tickets allow SA1 to show it has permission to communicate with SA2
on specific interfaces as controlled by the LS. At the same time the tickets allow SA1 to
authenticate itself with SA2 and give SA2 the encryption key they use to communicate
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over the duration of their session.
The SubjectSessionTicket is for SA1 ; the PermissionList returned is from the
perspective of SA1 and includes information about the permissions that SA1 has with the
SA2. This ticket is not encrypted separately, but is encrypted in transit by SKLS SA1 because
the entire message, sans portions of the SecureHeader, is wrapped in encryption by the
LS. SA1 can decrypt the encrypted portion of the SpaPermissionsRequest message and
retrieve the SubjectSessionTicket. This gives SA1 the permissions it has with SA2,
but the SubjectSessionTicket also provides two other critical pieces of information.
It provides the encryption key that SA1 and SA2 use to communicate as well as the
Lifetime over which the session key is viable. When the lifetime expires SA1 has to make
a new SpaPermissionsRequest and get a new SubjectSessionTicket from the LS and
essentially repeat the session setup again; the Lifetime block of Figure 5.3 shows this process.
The TargetSessionTicket is for SA2 ; the PermissionList returned is from the
perspective of SA2 and lets SA2 know which permissions it should grant to SA1. This
ticket is encrypted with SKLS SA2, but is also wrapped in encryption by the whole mes-
sage encryption, this means that only SA1 can remove the outer layer and then get the
TargetSessionTicket that it needs to send to SA2 as part of the SpaSessionRequest
sent below. Only SA2 can decrypt the TargetSessionTicket because it is encrypted with
SKLS SA2, SA1 cannot decrypt this, but merely relays it when making a session request to
SA2.
The last exchange of the Query and Session Request protocol is the setup of a session
between SA1 and SA2. They use the tickets provided by the LS to setup the session. SA1
sends a SpaSessionRequest to SA2, this request contains a SecureAuthenticator and
the TargetSessionTicket. SpaSessionRequest does not use a SecureHeader because
SA2 does not have a key with which to decrypt it until after the message is decrypted.
The SecureAuthenticator can be used to validate the sender’s identity and ties it to
LA SA1, and it is encrypted with SKSA1 SA2. Using SKSA1 SA2 means that only SA1 or
the LS could have created the SecureAuthenticator. SA2 cannot get SKSA1 SA2 until it
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successfully uses SKLS SA2 to decrypt the TargetSessionTicket. At this point SA2 can
verify the SecureAuthenticator, i.e. that it decrypts with SKSA1 SA2, that the source and
destination address match, and that the timestamp is within allowance. Once SA2 decrypts
TargetSessionTicket it has the PermissionList for SA1, SKSA1 SA2, and the Lifetime
of the session. SA2 is now able to decrypt the SecureAuthenticator, this allows SA2 to
authenticate SA1 as the sender of the message and tie this identity to LA SA1, it also gives
SA2 the timestamp it uses in its response message so that SA1 can authenticate SA2 and
tie its identity to LA SA2.
SA2 uses the timestamp from the SecureAuthenticator and SKSA1 SA2 to craft
its response in the form of a SpaSessionReply. SA2 takes the timestamp from the
SecureAuthenticator and adds one to it and returns it in its SecureAuthenticator.
The SpaSessionReply message allows SA1 to authenticate SA2 when it receives the
SpaSessionReply and decrypts it using SKSA1 SA2. Now both parties have authenticated
each other and exchanged permissions, SA1 can request data from and issue commands to
SA2. This is a one way session, i.e. SA1 can request secured data from and issue secured
commands to SA2, but it does not allow for communication going the other way. SA2 can-
not request secured data from or issue secured commands to SA1 after this session setup.
SA2 would need to repeat the same Query and Session Request protocol exchange for SA1
in order to establish a session going the other way. Both parties can participate in unsecured
communication, these restrictions only deal with secured messaging. SA1 can proceed with
secured notifications, requests, or commands as shown in the Secure Notification, Secure
Request, and Secure Command blocks of Figure 5.3. This is provided that the permissions
exchanged allow for these types of communication on SA2 interfaces. Figure 5.2 shows that
SA1 is interested in secure notifications from SA2, specifically color data on (1,1) from the
color sensor.
5.3.2.3 Lifetime
The Lifetime block of Figure 5.3 shows the protocol exchange that takes place when a
session between two secure components has expired. It is basically the same as the Query
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and Session Request block, except that the queries do not have to be issued again. Both
parties have knowledge of when the Lifetime expires because it is delivered in the session
tickets from the LS. This does require a certain level of synchronization in the time used
by the components, but SA2 drops the ticket and SA1 requests a new one.
5.3.2.4 Secure Notification
The Secure Notification block of Figure 5.3 shows the secured notification exchange
that can take place after a successful session establishment. The Query and Session Re-
quest block depicts a query for SecureData, this is the name of the notification interface
depicted on line 7 of Sample 5.2 and used in Figure 5.2. The developer of SA1 makes
the query using a SecureNotificationMsg to be populated upon a successful query re-
sult; the developer of SA2 needs to make use of the SecureNotificationMsg so that the
SpaApplication and supporting objects know to publish the notification securely. Using a
SecureNotificationMsg allows the SpaApplication and supporting objects to track the
subscription and handle the encrypted SpaData messages while the subscription is active.
This sequence diagram shows the subscription being negotiated directly between SA1 and
SA2, but it can also be issued and brokered by way of the LS.
After SA1 completes the Query and Session Request exchange successfully it makes a
request to SA2 to subscribe to data that SA2 provides, assuming SA1 has the necessarily
permissions. To do this SA1 checks for the existence of a valid session, otherwise it re-
quests one, and then sends a regular SpaSubscriptionRequest completely in the clear to
SA2. This message could be encrypted and contain a SecureHeader, but initial analysis
suggested that this would be invasive and difficult given the knowledge that each layer has
along the communication path. The main downside here is that a malicious party could
essentially carry out denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by either creating more subscription
requests than a component can handle, or by canceling other components active subscrip-
tions. Subscribing on behalf of other components is allowed by the SPA Logical Interface
Standard [51] and is used by some subnet-managers; this makes it a difficult problem to
address without changing existing protocol definitions. The current plan is to leave this
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problem for future work as it may require consensus from the SSM community. The ma-
licious party still cannot decipher that data because the resulting notification in the form
of an encrypted SpaData message still requires the SKSA1 SA2 key for decryption, it would
also be difficult to actually have the resultant message routed to them because the sessions
are tied to a LA, and it also requires that a valid session exists.
Figure 5.3 shows SA2 receiving the SpaSubscriptionRequest directly and handling
it much the same way any subscription request is handled in SSM, i.e. SA2 does not
perform a permission check when determining how to respond to the request from SA1.
In general, the SpaSubscriptionRequest results in a SUBSCRIPTION REQUEST GRANTED
SpaSubscriptionReply, but a negative response could be returned if resources are maxed
out or if SA2 was shutting down; SA1 can also end the subscription at any time for similar
reasons. The SpaSubscriptionRequest contains a dialog identifier that is used in the
SpaSubscriptionReply so that SA1 can track which subscription has been granted. The
SpaSubscriptionRequest contains other information used to setup the subscription, but
does not carry any security specific data. It does carry the subscriber or consumer address,
LA SA1, which is used to perform a permission lookup before data is actually published.
SA2 sends off the SpaSubscriptionReply and starts flowing notifications according to
the notification parameters, e.g. publish frequency and delivery divisor. In the case of a
secured notification this also entails a permissions lookup. If the permission is valid then
the SpaData message has a SecureHeader added and is encrypted using SKSA1 SA2 before
being sent off to SA2 as depicted in the Secure Notification block of Figure 5.3. If the
permission is not valid then no data flows. Figure 5.3 shows a couple of message but this
could continue until the lease expires (SSM construct), the session expires (SSSM construct),
or until either party chooses to terminate the subscription for whatever reason.
The Secure Notification block of Figure 5.3 shows SA1 canceling the subscription at the
end after two SpaData messages have been passed. The process to request a subscription
and to cancel a subscription are largely the same except that the SpaSubscriptionRequest
message is initiated with a SUBSCRIPTION CANCEL flag by SA1 and the SpaSubscriptionReply
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contains a SUBSCRIPTION CANCELED enumeration to relay that the subscription has been
canceled. No additional authentication or validation is performed before a subscription is
canceled.
5.3.2.5 Secure Request
SA1 issues a query for an interface that provides a SPA request interface, this is in
place of or in addition to the SecureData query made in the Query and Session Request
block of Figure 5.3. The application developer needs to make and register the query using
a SecureRequestMsg as the underlying message type so that the SpaApplication object
and underlying communicators can properly handle the message. In keeping with with the
Figure 5.2 example, the SPA request interface is provided by SA2 ; note that our scenario
only shows a SPA notification interface, but the concept is largely the same.
In a SPA request a command is issued in the form of a SpaServiceRequest and a
response is received in the form of a SpaServiceReply. Both of these messages allow
for the passing of parameters, if specified. SA1 has to setup permissions before a secure
SpaServiceRequest can be successfully issued to SA2.
As mentioned, the developer uses SecureRequestMsg, but this message is converted to
a standard SpaServiceRequest message in transit. The Secure Request block illustrates
a Service Request exchange between SA1 and SA2, and assumes that proper query and
permission setup has already occurred. The protocol makes use of a SecureHeader, this
header caries the IV and tag used by AES-GCM in the clear and the rest of the header
and the SpaServiceRequest payload is encrypted using SKSA1 SA2. It should be noted
that there is a primary SpaMessage header that comes first for all messages, which carries
the source and destination address as well, the source address is used to perform the en-
cryption key lookup and both source and destination addresses must match the ones in the
SecureHeader after decryption.
SA1 sends an encrypted SpaServiceRequest to SA2. SA2 looks up the encryption
key and decrypts the SecureHeader and message. If the header passes validation then
SA2 acts on the message and provides a reply. This reply is in the form of an encrypted
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SpaServiceReply with a SecureHeader. This protects the reply in transit and allows SA1
to validate and authenticate the reply. However, if the header fails validation then no reply
is issued and SA2 simply drops the SpaServiceRequest. Likewise, if the SecureHeader
fails validation in the SpaServiceReply then SA1 discards the reply.
5.3.2.6 Secure Command
Issuing a secured command works much like issuing a secure request except that a
SecureCommandMsg is used and no reply is provided or expected. In order to initiate
a secured command SA1 creates its query with a SecureCommandMsg to be populated
upon a successful query result as described in the query section of the Query and Session
Request block of Figure 5.3. Using a SecureCommandMsg allows the SpaApplication
object and underlying communicators to correctly handle and encrypt the message before
it is transmitted. The API converts the SecureCommandMsg to a standard SpaCommand
message, adds a SecureHeader, and encrypts the message as shown in Figure 5.3.
The Secure Command block illustrates the command exchange between SA1 and SA2,
and assumes that a proper query and permission setup has occurred. SA1 sends an en-
crypted SpaCommand with SecureHeader to SA2. SA2 looks up the encryption key using
the source in the SpaMessage header and decrypts the SecureHeader and message. If the
header passes validation then SA2 acts on the message. Pass or fail no response is given to





This research evaluates the change in developer and system resource burden when
developing unsecured versus secured versions of the same producer and consumer software
using SSSM. An increase in developer burden reduces the reusability of SSM as it makes
it harder for developers to use the software which in turn increases the cost in terms of
dollars and schedule to develop software; all this makes reuse of the software less attractive.
An increase in system resource utilization reduces the set of hardware, typically thought of
in terms of a single board computer (SBC) or set of processing nodes, that have enough
margin to accommodate the software. This chapter discusses both of these burdens in terms
of SSM versus SSSM or unsecured versus secured to better understand the effects of adding
security to a reusable modular open-network software development framework.
Section 6.2 outlines the differences in developing secured interfaces in SSSM versus
unsecured interfaces in SSM. This comparison shows that the difference is minimal in terms
of actual application development with the main differences being a configuration file that
must be created by developers for the LS and the provisioning of keys for any secured end-
points. Section 6.3 presents the results of the side-by-side performance of SSM and SSSM.
These results show an increase in CPU and memory utilization and decreased payload
byte throughput particularly at higher message throughputs. This means that reusability
may be reduced because performance requirements and system resources need to be more
carefully considered for SSSM than they do for SSM. These results also show that there may
be some ways to address this without changes to the API that might increase developer
burden and/or that future work may need to fully address this divergence. Section 6.4
concludes the chapter by summarizing the findings of this evaluation.
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6.2 Unsecured versus Secured Development
This section explains the difference, from the perspective of a developer, between de-
veloping an interface that is unsecured and one that is secured in SSSM. This shows the
relatively low impact that adding security to SSM has on the application developer. De-
veloper cost is a significant driver of a space system development budget and minimizing
impact here is critical to maintaining the reusability of SSSM. This section uses an example
to cover three pieces of the development process. They are developing a producer; devel-
oping a consumer; and, in the case of the secured variant, creating the permissions table
that the LS uses to authenticate secured components, lookup permissions, and issue session
tickets.
6.2.1 Producer Development
This comparison uses the xTEDSs defined in Sample 6.1 and Sample 6.2. Sample 6.1
is implemented by the unsecured API producer, named ApiProducer, and Sample 6.2 is
implemented by the secured API producer, named ApiSecureProducer.
The xTEDSs are functionally the same. The only differences between the two are the
names of the application, the interfaces, and the messages. Secure has been prefixed to
each of the interfaces and messages, and inserted into the application name in the secured
version. This example uses these differing names for illustrative purposes, the Secure pre-
fix is not a requirement for using SSSM. There is no functional difference in the xTEDS
definition for unsecured versus secured development. The ApiProducer and ApiSecurePro-
ducer applications will incorporate and implement these xTEDSs. They are included as
part of the binary so the API can be provide them to the LS during registration. The
development framework includes a Python script that takes the xTEDS file as input and
creates a c-string and a Extensible Transducer Electronic Data Sheet Universally Unique
Identifier (XUUID) that can be used in the application. This process works the same for
the secured and unsecured versions.
These xTEDSs both show two interfaces. The command, requests, and notifications do
not have to be separated this way, but in this example the *CounterManagement interface,
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6 <Application name='ApiProducer' kind='application' programMemoryRequired='1' dataMemoryRequired='1'
componentKey='apiProducerComponentKey'/>
7 <Interface name='CounterData' id='1' >
8 <Notification>
9 <DataMsg name='CounterData' id='1' msgArrival='PERIODIC' msgRate='1.0' >
10 <Variable name='counter' kind='count' dataType='FLOAT32' units='count' />




15 <CommandMsg name='GetCurrentIncrement' id='2' />
16 <DataReplyMsg name='CurrentIncrementReply' id='3' >




21 <Interface name='CounterManagement' id='2' >
22 <Command>
23 <CommandMsg name='changeIncrement' id='1' >





Sample 6.1. API Producer xTEDS. The xTEDS that the ApiProducer will implement
and provide.
interface 2, is for commanding or modifying the behavior of the producer. In this example
the Api*Consumers, described later, can use this interface to change the value of a variable
that the Api*Producer maps to newIncrement. This section describes this process shortly.
The *CounterData interface groups together data a consumer or user might request or to
which they might subscribe. This example is a bit contrived, but this interface lets the
consumer get the current counter value every time it is published, or request the current
value of the increment being used to update the counter before the producers publishes it.
SSSM adds to the SPA API so the process of implementing the SpaApplication class is
basically the same in the unsecured and secured cases. Handling and producing messages
for the SSM network all works the same from the developer’s perspective. The developer
registers callback functions that the API can trigger when a command or request is received
or when a notification is about to go out. Within the function callbacks for commands and
requests the messages have already been decrypted, assuming they pass authentication and
validation, so the developer does not need to handle them any differently. In the case
of notifications the API will encrypt these messages after they leave the callback so the
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6 <Application name='ApiSecureProducer' kind='application' programMemoryRequired='1' dataMemoryRequired='1'
componentKey='apiProducerComponentKey'/>
7 <Interface name='SecureCounterData' id='1' >
8 <Notification>
9 <DataMsg name='SecureCounterData' id='1' msgArrival='PERIODIC' msgRate='1.0' >
10 <Variable name='counter' kind='count' dataType='FLOAT32' units='count' />




15 <CommandMsg name='SecureGetCurrentIncrement' id='2' />
16 <DataReplyMsg name='SecureCurrentIncrementReply' id='3' >




21 <Interface name='SecureCounterManagement' id='2' >
22 <Command>
23 <CommandMsg name='SecureChangeIncrement' id='1' >





Sample 6.2. Secured API Producer xTEDS. The xTEDS that the ApiSecureProducer will
implement and provide.
developer never has to deal with encryption or access control.
There are more complicated cases than this example, but at basic level the only dif-
ference for the developer between an unsecured and secured producer is in the declaration
of the message. Sample 6.3 shows the header file for the ApiProducer class. Line 25 shows
the declaration for the CommandMsg that the ApiProducer will use to implement the com-
mand on line 22 of the ApiProducer xTEDS in Sample 6.1 This allows the ApiConsumer
programs to change the value of the increment via command. Line 26 of the header file
shows the declaration for the RequestMsg that implements the request on line 14 of the
ApiProducer xTEDS. This allows the ApiConsumer program to retrieve the current incre-
ment via a request message. Finally, line 27 of the header file shows the declaration of the
NotifcationMsg that implements the notification on line 8 of the ApiProducer xTEDS. This
allows the ApiConsumer to subscribe to and receive the current value of the counter every
time it is published by the ApiProducer.
These three lines where m myChangeIncrementCmd, m myCurrentIncrementRequest,








7 * @class ApiProducer
8 *
9 * @brief A simple producer application which publishes a notification message and
10 * accepts a command which alters the data being published
11 */












24 // Messages from xTEDS
25 CommandMsg m_myChangeIncrementCmd; //!< Command message to change the increment
26 RequestMsg m_myCurrentIncrementRequest; //!< Request message to get the current increment
27 NotificationMsg m_myCounterNotification; //!< Notification message for the counter
28
29 // Mapped member variables
30 Float32 m_counter; //!< A counter which updates each time data is published
31 Float32 m_curIncrement; //!< Size of each increase
32 Float32 m_newIncrement; //!< Contains the new increment value set through a CommandMsg
33




37 #endif // _API_PRODUCER_HPP
Sample 6.3. ApiProducer Declaration. The header file for the ApiProducer.
and the ApiSecureProducer. These same three lines in Sample 6.4 show the difference. The
ApiSecureProducer uses SecureCommandMsg instead of CommandMsg, SecureRequestMsg
instead of RequestMsg, and SecureNotifcationMsg instead of NotifcationMsg. Review of
the two header files shows that both are the same except for the declaration of those the
messages, and the name of the class. The producers use the other member variable to track
and modify the counter, and the current increment being used for the counter. This shows
that setting up the xTEDS and the header file for the a SPA API application is very similar
for SSM and SSSM, this is by design.
Next this section looks at the implementation file for the example producers. This is
the source file shown in Sample 6.5 and the implementation is the same for the unsecured
and secured versions, except for the class name, so only one code sample is used to review
the implementation of both the ApiProducer and the ApiSecureProducer. The default








7 * @class ApiSecureProducer
8 *
9 * @brief A simple secure producer application which publishes a
10 * notification message and accepts a command which alters the
11 * data being published
12 */












25 // Messages from xTEDS
26 SecureCommandMsg m_myChangeIncrementCmd; //!< Command message to change the increment
27 SecureRequestMsg m_myCurrentIncrementRequest; //!< Request message to get the current increment
28 SecureNotificationMsg m_myCounterNotification; //!< Notification message for the counter
29
30 // Mapped member variables
31 Float32 m_counter; //!< A counter which updates each time data is published
32 Float32 m_curIncrement; //!< Size of each increase
33 Float32 m_newIncrement; //!< Contains the new increment value set through a SecureCommandMsg
34
35 CALLBACK_CONFIG(ApiSecureProducer); // Required in classes deriving from SpaApplication to properly
setup callbacks
36 };
37 #endif // _API_SECURE_PRODUCER_HPP
Sample 6.4. ApiSecureProducer Declaration. The header source file for the
ApiSecureProducer.
match the their XTEDS entries. The interface identifiers and message identifiers must
match for LS and API to properly handle messages, and in the secure version they are also
used for permissions and session creation, so they must match the entries in the permission
table configuration file as well. The consumer side does not need to know these identifiers
in advance as LS provides them in the query reply. The appInit function that follows is
called by the API and allows the developer to setup the messages that they need the API to
handle for them; the developers setup callbacks that the API uses to pass off the messages
to developer code when the messages are received or when they are about to be published.
The rest of this section walks though how a developer sets up each of the messages so they
can use them.
The command from the xTEDS is setup using m myChangeIncrementCmd, this is
constructed on line 11 with interface identifier ‘2’ and message identifier ‘1’. This pairing,






5 * @brief Constructor which sets the location of the xTEDS, the name of the application, and the xTEDS UUID
6 */
7 ApiProducer::ApiProducer(void)
8 : SpaApplication("ApiSecureProducer", API_PRODUCER_XTEDS, API_PRODUCER_XUUID),
9 m_myCounterNotification(1, 1, true, 1.0), // Set interface id and message id from xTEDS











20 * @brief Function called by API to allow user to issue queries and register messages from their xTEDS
21 *
22 * @param argc Number of command line arguments
23 * @param pArgv Array of character string command line arguments
24 */
25 void ApiProducer::appInit(Int32 argc, char** pArgv)
26 {
27 // Register provided command message
28 m_myChangeIncrementCmd.addVariable(VariableType(FLOAT32_TYPE), &m_newIncrement);
29 m_myChangeIncrementCmd.onCommandReceived = callback(&ApiProducer::onChangeCounterIncrementCmd);
30 registerCommand(m_myChangeIncrementCmd);
31
32 // Register provided request message
33 m_myCurrentIncrementRequest.addDataReplyVariable(VariableType(FLOAT32_TYPE), &m_curIncrement);
34 m_myCurrentIncrementRequest.onRequestReceived = callback(&ApiProducer::onCurrentIncrementRequest);
35 registerRequest(m_myCurrentIncrementRequest);
36
37 // Register provided notification messages
38 m_myCounterNotification.addVariable(VariableType(FLOAT32_TYPE), &m_counter); // Setup message per xTEDS
definition
39 m_myCounterNotification.addVariable(VariableType(FLOAT32_TYPE), &m_curIncrement);
40 m_myCounterNotification.onPublish = callback(&ApiProducer::preCounterMsgPublish);
41 registerNotification(m_myCounterNotification); // Register the notification message with the framework
42 }
43
44 /** @brief Will be called periodically to allow app to perform any needed processing */
45 void ApiProducer::myActiveProcessing(void)
46 {
47 LOG_INFO("Hello from my periodic callback!");
48 // Do any needed processing here
49 }
50
51 /** @brief Called when a change counter increment command is received */
52 void ApiProducer::onChangeCounterIncrementCmd(void)
53 {
54 LOG_INFO("Received change counter increment command, now incrementing by %f", m_newIncrement);
55 m_curIncrement = m_newIncrement;
56 }
57
58 /** @brief Called when a counter increment request message is received */
59 void ApiProducer::onCurrentIncrementRequest(void)
60 {
61 LOG_INFO("Received counter increment request, now replying with %f", m_curIncrement);
62 // Request's DataReply sent after returning from this function with the variable we mapped to it
63 }
64
65 /** @brief Will be called before publishing the counter data message to subscribers */
66 void ApiProducer::preCounterMsgPublish(void)
67 {
68 // Update member variables before publish
69 m_counter = m_counter + m_curIncrement;
70 LOG_INFO("Published current counter value of %f", m_counter);
71 publish(m_myCounterNotification);
72 }
Sample 6.5. Api*Producer Definition. The implemetation source file for the ApiProducer,
the implementation file for the ApiSecureProducer is the same except for the class name.
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to the command in the xTEDS in the appInit starting on line 28. Line 28 maps the variable
so that marshalling and unmarshalling methods used in the API know what variables are
included in the message. The value in this variable will be updated by the API when this
message received. The next line sets up the callback that the API should call when this
message is received, and last line in that block finishes the registration process. Line 52 of
Sample 6.5 shows the implementation of the onChangeCounterIncrementCmd function. In
this function the developer can simply use m newIncrement because the API updates the
variable when the message is received. This process works the same for the secure version,
the developer does not to deal with encryption or permissions directly, this is all handled by
the API. There is no change in process here from SSM to SSSM and using data is as simple
as mapping the variable and then using them in the message callback. The process is the
same for the request and notification messages. In the case of the variables mapped to the
notification the developer can change the value of m counter in the preCounterMsgPublish
callback before the notification message is sent out.
Creating a producer-type application using the API to create a secured or unsecured
messages is essentially the same, except for the message classes that the developer uses.
6.2.2 Consumer Development
Developing an unsecured versus secured consumer-type application is, again, basically
the same for the application developer. The developer again uses the secured versions of the
command, request, and notification messages, the same messages that are shown in Sample
6.4 are used on the consumer side as well. The header files are very similar to the ones
shown for the producer example so they are not shown. Sample 6.6 shows the source file
for the Api*Consumer examples, the files are the same except for the class name so only
one code sample is used to describe the implementation of both the ApiConsumer and the
ApiSecureConsumer. The constructors for the message classes do not need to pass in the
interface and message identifiers consumer-side, as those will be provided by the LS when
it replies to the queries that are issued by the consumer on lines 27, 33, and 40. These
queries and their associated messages will be in an unsatisfied state until the LS replies to
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the queries.
The process that the API goes through to handle the xTEDS registration and queries
is different for the unsecured versus secured versions, but at the application developer
level there is no noticeable difference aside from using different message classes. Once
the m newIncrement variable is mapped to m setIncrementCommand, on line 26 its value
can be manipulated in developer-side code and then the command can be sent, the function
starting on line 60 shows an example of this. The API takes care of marshalling the updated
value into the message before it is sent in both the secured and unsecured cases, and the
API takes care of encrypting the variable as part of the message payload before it it sent in
the secured case. This is all achieved by the API and the developer simply calls sendMsg
as shown on line 68.
A similar process is used to map variables for the m getCurIncrementRequest and
m counterNotification messages. Sample 6.6 shows how the different messages can be used
in consumer-side code, but the interaction at the developer-level is the same for SSM and
SSSM. SSSM supports both cases, secured and unsecured versions can be developed against
the SSSM version of the API by using either the unsecured or secured versions of the message
classes.
6.2.3 Policy Development
The basic vehicle for setting up security policies is explained in Section 5.3.1 of Chap-
ter 5 and it entails setting up a policy table for the LS and providing each secured component
with a unique encryption key. Sample 6.7 shows a possible configuration file for the ApiSe-
cureProducer and ApiSecureConsumer. The example permission table has comments to
help explain the relevant lines of Extensible Markup Language (XML). The table provides
the encryption keys, preferred key lengths, and permissions. Sample 6.7 shows that the
ApiSecureProducer has no permissions with regard to ApiSecureConsumer, and in our ex-
ample the ApiSecureConsumer does not provide any interfaces. Typically applications are















14 { /* do nothing */ }
15
16 /**
17 * @brief Space provided to issue queries and setup any processing needs
18 * @param argc Number of command line arguments
19 * @param pArgv Array of character string command line arguments
20 */




24 setNewIncrementQuery.message.addAttribute("name", QueryOperand(EQUAL), "ChangeIncrement", 0);
25 setNewIncrementQuery.interface.addAttribute("name", QueryOperand(EQUAL), "CounterManagement", 0);
26 m_setIncrementCommand.addVariable(VariableType(FLOAT32_TYPE), &m_newIncrement); // Map variable
27 issueQuery(setNewIncrementQuery, &m_setIncrementCommand); // Issue query
28
29 Query getCurIncrementRequestQuery(Query::REQUEST, Query::QUERY_CURRENT | Query::QUERY_CANCELLATIONS |
Query::QUERY_FUTURE);
30 getCurIncrementRequestQuery.message.addAttribute("name", QueryOperand(EQUAL), "GetCurrentIncrement", 0);
31 m_getCurIncrementRequest.addDataReplyVariable(VariableType(FLOAT32_TYPE), &m_curIncrement); // Map variables
32 m_getCurIncrementRequest.onDataReplyReceived = callback(&ApiConsumer::onCurrentIncrementDataReply);
33 issueQuery(getCurIncrementRequestQuery, &m_getCurIncrementRequest); // Issue query
34
35 Query counterQuery(Query::NOTIFICATION, Query::QUERY_CURRENT | Query::QUERY_CANCELLATIONS |
Query::QUERY_FUTURE);
36 counterQuery.message.addAttribute("name", QueryOperand(EQUAL), "CounterData", 0);
37 m_counterNotification.addVariable(VariableType(FLOAT32_TYPE), &m_counter); // Map message variables
38 m_counterNotification.addVariable(VariableType(FLOAT32_TYPE), &m_increment);
39 m_counterNotification.onDataReceived = callback(&ApiConsumer::onCounterDataReceived); // Setup events
40 issueQuery(counterQuery, &m_counterNotification); // Issue query
41




46 /** @brief Called after receiving a CounterData data message and populating mapped member variables */
47 void ApiConsumer::onCounterDataReceived(void)
48 {




53 /** @brief Called after receiving a CounterData data message and populating mapped member variables */
54 void ApiConsumer::onCurrentIncrementDataReply(void)
55 {
56 LOG_INFO("Received data reply containing current increment: %f", m_curIncrement);
57 }
58
59 /** @brief Called at the rate specified in appInit to do any active processing */
60 void ApiConsumer::activeProcessing(void)
61 {
62 if (m_setIncrementCommand.isSatisfied() && (m_recvCount % 5) == 0 && m_recvCount > 0)
63 {
64 if (m_increment > 1000) m_newIncrement = 1.1f;
65 else m_newIncrement = m_increment * 2;
66




71 if (m_getCurIncrementRequest.isSatisfied() && (m_recvCount % 3) == 0)
72 {




Sample 6.6. Api*Consumer Definition. The implemetation source file for the
ApiConsumer, the implementation file for the ApiSecureConsumer is the same except
for the class name.
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Line 14 starts the permissions that the ApiSecureConsumer has with the ApiSecurePro-
ducer target. The LS ingests the file and uses the keys and permissions to authenticate the
producer and consumer, and create a session ticket that allows the producer and consumer
applications to communicate securely on the producers (1,1), (1,2), (1,3), and (2,1) inter-
faces. The session ticket and session management is handled by the LS and API without
affecting application-level code, or burdening the developer.
1 <PermissionTable>
2 <!-- ApiSecureProducer -->
3 <SubjectComponent uuid='fccccb2a-30dc-604a-d5a8-2fbcccc3aa33' preferredKeySize='32'>
4 <!-- ApiSecureProducer to LS Key -->
5 <LookupServiceSymmetricKey key='00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff' />
6 <TargetPermissionList /> <!-- No permissions -->
7 </SubjectComponent>
8 <!-- ApiSecureConsumer -->
9 <SubjectComponent uuid='faaace1a-30dc-604a-d5a8-2fbaaaa3aa44'>
10 <!-- ApiSecureConsumer to LS Key -->
11 <LookupServiceSymmetricKey key='ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100' />
12 <TargetPermissionList>
13 <!-- ApiSecureConsumer to ApiSecureProducer permissions -->
14 <TargetComponent uuid='fccccb2a-30dc-604a-d5a8-2fbcccc3aa33' >
15 <Permission interfaceId='1' messageId='1' />
16 <Permission interfaceId='1' messageId='2' />
17 <Permission interfaceId='1' messageId='3' />





Sample 6.7. LS Permission Table for ApiSecureProducer and ApiSecureConsumer.
Permission Table that configures the LS and allows the component with UUID ending
in aa33 to communicate with aa44 on (1,1).
There is one more piece to the puzzle that the application developer needs to provide,
and that is a unique key for the secured producer and one for the consumer. These keys must
match the ones in the permission table that the developer uses to configure the LS. The keys
are provided to each application through command-line parameters, and would typically be
included as part of a script or service that manages the startup of the application. The
preferred key size is also passed to the application the same way and also needs to match the
permission table. Sample 6.8 shows how this would be setup for the ApiSecureProducer.
The key is provided as a American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII)
hexadecimal-string to represent its binary value.




3 # Start the API Producuer
4 $ ./ApiSecureProducer -k=00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
--preferred-key-size=32 &
Sample 6.8. Startup Script for ApiSecureProducer. Simple script that starts the
ApiSecureProducer with the specified encryption key and preferred key size for use with
the LS.
interfaces is the primary, and really only, additional developer-effort required to develop
secured message interfaces instead of unsecured interfaces.
6.3 Performance Evaluation
This section discusses the delta in payload byte throughput, CPU utilization, and
memory usage when security is added to a representative reusable modular open-network
software development framework. It is important to evaluate this delta in order to get a
basic understanding of how adding security has affected reusability. For example, lower
byte throughput and higher CPU utilization can reduce the scenarios where SSSM can be
used and therefore affect the reusability of software systems that use it as a core.
To this end this section presents a high-level comparison of unsecured versus secured
while providing the same functionality. This section reviews a series of test that evaluate the
delta from unsecured to secured messaging in terms of resource utilization and message or
byte throughput if a developer creates a simple set of publish/subscribe applications, namely
a secure producer/consumer set of applications versus a unsecured producer/consumer set of
applications. There is a delta from unsecured to secured in term of resource utilization and
payload byte throughput. This section shows that performance requirements and system
resources need to be more carefully considered for SSSM than they do for SSM; reusability
has taken a hit but future performance improvements and careful API usage can help to
address this.
6.3.1 Setup
This evaluation conducts a simple apples to apples comparison of a notification interface
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that is unsecured to a notification interface that is secured. This requires the creation of
two sets of producer/consumer applications, a unsecured producer/consumer and a secured
producer/consumer pair.
Each producer/consumer pair was exercised on a Linux Virtual Machine Ware (VMware)
virtual machine (VM) instance with 2 gigabyte (GB) of random access memory (RAM).
This VM is hosted on a Windows 10 machine with an i7-4700MQ CPU running at 2.40
gigahertz (GHz), 4 Cores and 8 Logical Processors. The host has 32 GB of RAM. The
host machine and VM are not representative of the resources that a typical small space
system might have and so this is not meant as a representative benchmark of performance
and resource utilization, but as a comparison between the unsecured and secured versions.
This illustrates the difference in resource usage and throughput for the two variants.
Both producer applications make use of the notification shown in Sample 6.9. The
notifications have a few bytes of management variables, i.e. msgNumber, startSeconds, and
startNanoseconds. The rest of the message is a variable size payload, this size can be varied
during execution, but for these tests the size is passed in as a command-line parameter and
fixed during execution. The producer applications will attempt to publish the notifications
at a constant rate for the duration of a test, for these tests a rate of 1000 hertz (Hz) is
always passed into the producer application and the size of the DynamicArray is changed
between runs to change the amount of message data moved per second.
Both consumer applications make use of the appInit function shown in Sample 6.10.
In this function variables are initiated, and mapped to the notification the consumers will
receive. Lines 24 and 25 show where the consumers build the query for the “MeasureData”
notification, this query is then issued on line 32 after the variables are mapped and a
callback function is setup. The variables and callback need to be setup before the query
is issued so the API can appropriately map the variables and callback before a reply to
the query is received from the LS. Lines 27 through 30 in Sample 6.10 correspond with
lines 11 through 14 in the producer xTEDS. The API will populate these variables just
prior to calling onCounterDataReceived, this allows the developer to easily access data in
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6 name='Api*MeasureProducerXteds' version='1.0' >
7 <Application name='Api*MeasureProducer' kind='application' programMemoryRequired='1' dataMemoryRequired='1'
componentKey='apiProducerComponentKey'/>
8 <Interface name='MainInterface' id='1' >
9 <Notification>
10 <DataMsg name='MeasureData' id='1' msgArrival='EVENT' >
11 <Variable name='msgNumber' kind='count' dataType='UINT16' units='count'/>
12 <Variable name='startSeconds' kind='count' dataType='UINT32' units='seconds'/>
13 <Variable name='startNanoseconds' kind='count' dataType='UINT32' units='nanoseconds'/>






Sample 6.9. Measure API Producer xTEDS. The xTEDS that both the unsecured and
secured producers use for this evaluation.
the message payload without having to index into into the message buffer. The evaluation
that follows shortly covers some of the price that comes with this ease-of-use. Once the LS
returns a the query response the applications can begin exchanging this notification.
As previously mentioned the rate at which the message are sent is held constant, but
the size of the messages is increased for each set of ten test runs. The message sizes used are:
4,000, 8,000, 16,000, 22,000, 26,000, 30,000, 34,000, 38,000, 44,000, 48,000, 54,000, 60,000,
and 64,000 bytes. These rates correspond to 4, 8, 16, 22, 26, 30, 34, 38, 44, 48, 54, 60, and
64 megabytes per second (MBps) if the message rate of 1000 Hz can be maintained; these
rates are the desired rates for each set of tests. Each producer/consumer pair is run 10 times
at each of these message sizes and the average CPU utilization, memory usage, and payload
byte throughput are computed. This average is used to combat other background process
that might compete for system resources during the test runs. The producer and consumer
receive the message rate and size via command-line from a script that runs all the tests.
The consumer multiplies the rate by a fixed test duration to know how many messages it
should receive for the given test run over the test duration if the desired message rate can be
maintained. This duration is a constant in the code base that cannot be changed without
recompiling. The tests were intended to be approximately 30 seconds in duration, but
would run longer when the consumer/producer trailed behind the desired rate or dropped
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1 void Api__MeasureConsumer::appInit(Int32 argc, char** pArgv)
2 {
3 if (m_pLsKey != NULL)
4 {
5 m_keySize = static_cast<Int32>(m_preferredKeySize);
6 }
7
8 m_pNotificationData = new (g_pPoolController) UInt8[ Api__MeasureConsumer::MAX_NOTIFICATION_SIZE];
9 m_pMsgNumberData = new (g_pPoolController) UInt16[m_sampleSize];
10 m_pStartSecondsData = new (g_pPoolController) UInt32[m_sampleSize];
11 m_pStartNanosData = new (g_pPoolController) UInt32[m_sampleSize];
12 m_pEndSecondsData = new (g_pPoolController) UInt32[m_sampleSize];
13 m_pEndNanosData = new (g_pPoolController) UInt32[m_sampleSize];
14 m_pRcvRateData = new (g_pPoolController) UInt16[ Api__MeasureConsumer::DURATION_SECONDS];
15
16 memset(m_pNotificationData, 0, Api__MeasureConsumer::MAX_NOTIFICATION_SIZE);
17 memset(m_pMsgNumberData, 0, m_sampleSize * sizeof(UInt16));
18 memset(m_pStartSecondsData, 0, m_sampleSize * sizeof(UInt32));
19 memset(m_pStartNanosData, 0, m_sampleSize * sizeof(UInt32));
20 memset(m_pEndSecondsData, 0, m_sampleSize * sizeof(UInt32));
21 memset(m_pEndNanosData, 0, m_sampleSize * sizeof(UInt32));
22 memset(m_pRcvRateData, 0, Api__MeasureConsumer::DURATION_SECONDS * sizeof(UInt16));
23
24 Query dataNotifQuery(Query::NOTIFICATION, Query::QUERY_CURRENT | Query::QUERY_CANCELLATIONS |
Query::QUERY_FUTURE);





30 m_dataNotification.addDynamicArray(VariableType(UINT8_TYPE), m_pNotificationData, &m_notificationSize,
Api__MeasureConsumer::MAX_NOTIFICATION_SIZE);
31 m_dataNotification.onDataReceived = callback(&Api__MeasureConsumer::onCounterDataReceived);
32 issueQuery(dataNotifQuery, &m_dataNotification);
33 }
Sample 6.10. ApiMeasureConsumer and ApiSecureMeasureConsumer appInit Function.
The same appInit function is used for the unsecured and secured consumers. This function
shows how the variables are setup for tracking message rates, mapping variables, and
linking the variable size data array to the xTEDS notification used for testing.
messages. The command-line arguments allowed the message rate to be varied, but that
was kept constant for these tests and only the message size was changed. Future work can
evaluate the performance of keeping the message size constant and increasing the message
rate.
In summary, the publish rate of the test notification message was held constant while
the message size is increased. Each test was run ten times at each speed with both the
unsecured and secured variants, this means there are a total of 130 test runs for unsecured
and 130 for secured. The specific concepts are outlined below:
 Publish rate — The publishing rates for the notification is held constant at 1000
Hz.
 Message payload size — Message payload for the notification was increased with
each set of test runs by 4,000 bytes, from 4000 up to 64,000 bytes. A test run consisted
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of 10 test iterations at the same payload size.
 Network throughput — Throughput only considers the size of the dynamic array.
Throughput is calculated by tracking the number of messages moved per second.
The actual number of bytes moved is higher, but this test is for comparison and not
designed to measure capability so the total number is not as important. The overhead
of the secured heard will in theory reduce the number of payload bytes that can be
moved. These tests were conducted on a local host only network with all processes
running on the same host.
 CPU utilization — CPU utilization was tracked for the producer and consumer ap-
plications during each test run. The process are competing with other SSM processes
as well as other, and user and system processes.
 Memory utilization — Memory utilization was tracked for the producer and con-
sumer applications during each test run.
6.3.2 Evaluation Results
The tests and this review of the test results is not a formal analysis of the unsecured
and secured message handling performance. These test and this evaluation seek to look
at the delta between unsecured and secured message handling. Future work can perform
a in-depth performance analysis and look at ways to optimize the secured, and even the
unsecured variants. This review is an evaluation of the secured variant against the the
unsecured version to quantify at a basic level of some of the performance-related effects
of adding security provisions to SSM. It is important to be aware of this moving forward
as significant deltas from SSM to SSSM negatively impact of the reusability of this open-
network software development framework.
First this evaluation reviews the payload throughput in bytes of the unsecured and
secured producer/consumer pairs. Figure 6.1 shows the desired payload byte throughput
in blue, this is the MBps that would be achieved if the producer/consumer pairs exchange
the messages at 1000 Hz. Figure 6.1 shows that both the unsecured and secured variants
match this desired rate until 32 MBps. They both start to deviate from the desired rate
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at around 36 MBps and still hold similar rates of around 38 MBps while attempting 40
MBps. After 40 MBps the rates start to diverge, the secured variant tops out at about 38
MBps. Trying to run at higher rates than that actually decreases throughput, this is likely
due to the queues holding messages getting backed up; this will be discussed more shortly
in terms of the memory utilization of the different applications as the test increase the
attempted payload byte throughput. CPU time is being split between queuing incoming
messages and trying to decrypt and reassemble them and empty the queue; beyond this
threshold it appears that the system starts to thrash a bit. The same thing happens for
the unsecured variant, just with a higher ceiling of about 46 MBps. This gives a 17% in
maximum throughput difference between the two, this is not an insignificant difference and
affects the reuse of SSSM in systems where higher rates are needed, or in systems that are
generally more resource limited. Future work will look at ways to optimize how the API
is used or optimizations that can made to SSM and SSSM to increase throughput. Below
36 MBps there is no difference in throughput, this brings up the next point of comparison:






























Fig. 6.1. Unsecured versus Secured Payload Byte Throughput. Comparison of attempted
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Fig. 6.2. Unsecured versus Secured CPU Utilization. Comparison of CPU utilization for
unsecured messaging and secured messaging.
Figure 6.2 shows the CPU profile at the various payload data rates and Figure 6.3
shows the memory usage at these same data rates. All of the applications start off with a
very similar CPU utilization for the 4 MBPS payload throughput. All of the applications
are using between 10% to 16% of the CPU with the ApiMeasureProducer using close to
10% and the ApiSecureMeasureConsumer using close to 16%. The ApiMeasureProducer
and the ApiMeasureConsumer make up the unsecured messaging pair and the ApiSecure-
MeasureProducer and ApiSecureMeasureConsumer make up the secured message pair. The
ApiMeasureProducer and ApiSecureMeasureConsumer generally frame the low and high for
CPU usage for all the tests. The producers in both cases use less CPU, suggesting that
the factor limiting throughput is on the receiving or consumer end of the the message ex-
change. In the case of the unsecured consumer application the API handles the reception
and unmarshalling of the messages from the producer. This works the same for the secured
consumer except the message must be decrypted before this happens. The API also copies
the values from the message into mapped variables, typically setup in the appInit function,
and triggers the callback shown in Sample 6.11.
Sample 6.11 shows the callback triggered every time a new m dataNotification message
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1 /**
2 * @brief Called after receiving a CounterData data message and populating mapped member variables,
3 * also show how access is provided to received SpaMessage, xTEDS section, and message definition.
4 *
5 * @param pMessage Pointer to actual received SpaMessage object (of subtype SpaData, SpaCommand, or
SpaDataReply)
6 * @param xtedsSection String containing the xTEDS section associated with pMessage
7 * @param msgDef String containing the message definition of pMessage
8 */





13 if (m_index < m_sampleSize)
14 {
15 m_pMsgNumberData[m_index] = m_msgNumber;
16 m_pStartSecondsData[m_index] = m_startSeconds;
17 m_pStartNanosData[m_index] = m_startNanos;
18 m_pEndSecondsData[m_index] = m_endSeconds;











Sample 6.11. ApiMeasureConsumer and ApiSecureMeasureConsumer
onCounterDataReceived Function. The same onCounterDataReceived function is used
for the unsecured and secured consumers. This function shows the work being done to
track throughput and message transit duration.
is received. It is important not to spend much time in this function because the next
message cannot be dequeued until this function returns; for this reason trackers are quickly
updated on lines 15 through 19 without performing any processing. Post-processing is
performed in the handleReport function once enough messages have been received. Notice
that m pRcvRateData is also not used in the function, but that is was mapped back in
appInit on line 30 of Sample 6.10. The entire array is copied into the m pRcvRateData
every time the notification is received even though it is not used, this takes time, and the
data in the buffer is actually available as part of pMessage passed into the callback, this
mapping to m pRcvRateData just makes it easier for a developer to use. In this consumer
nothing is done with the buffer because the intent is to measure the throughput and simply
receiving, and the secured case decrypting, the message accomplishes this. However, in this
case the mere fact the variable is mapped is causing extra work for the consumer in the
name of making the data easier to work with, at the end of this section throughput that
can be achieved without this mapping will be reviewed; keep in mind that the data is still
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available, but must be accessed through pMessage.
Coming back to the CPU usage there is a pretty linear increase in utilization for the
producers with the secure producer using more CPU, the difference grows steadily from
about 4% at the slowest speed to about 15% at the fastest speed. At lower speed this
difference is likely acceptable, but at higher speeds the separation becomes significant and
might reduce the choice of platforms that would handle the load. The CPU usage for the
consumers is much more interesting. Figure 6.2 shows jump in usage when throughput goes
from 16 MBps to 20 MBps, both show a similar jump. SSM has a maximum transmission
unit (MTU) which determines how big a message can be before it is segmented, these
applications were compiled with an MTU of 20,000 bytes; this limit includes headers and
footers. When the dynamic array size went from 16,000 bytes to 20,000 bytes to attempt
the throughput of 20 MBps the messages start being segmented. This means the message
must be reassembled on the other end, the jump in CPU appears to correlate with this new
additional work. After this the next point of interest occurs around 40 to 44 MBps, this
roughly corresponds to the payload byte throughputs where the producer/consumer pairs
are maxing out. In this window both the consumers hit their CPU usage ceiling, the secured
version hits the ceiling first and also maxes out on throughput first. The CPU ceiling is
the same for both at around 81%, the difference being that the unsecured version is moving
about 6 – 8 more MBps. It is likely that between the VM overhead, CPU clock speed, host
processes, guest processes, and consumer verse producer contention the maximum CPU has
been reach. Note that ps was used to get these CPU measurements which means consumer
was executing on the CPU 80% of the time over its process life in the maximum throughput
cases. Future work can look at optimizing SSMs handling of messages on the receiving end
as this appears to be the bottleneck for both the unsecured and secured versions.
Next this evaluation considers memory usage. Figure 6.3 shows that memory usage
stays almost constant for all the applications until they hit the throughput ceiling. Both of
the producers still show about constant memory usage after this point, but the consumer
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Fig. 6.3. Unsecured versus Secured Memory Usage. Comparison of memory usage for
unsecured messaging and secured messaging.
correlates with the secured throughput ceiling, as the rates increases past this point it
follows that the message queue that is holding the messages received from the producer start
getting backed up. The implementation of the API actually allows the message queue to
grow without bound and the queue of messages hits over 400 megabyte (MB)s for about a 30
second run; this extenuates the importance of benchmarking software on the hardware that
will host it with a representative load as early as possible in order to determine margins and
feasibility. This also suggests that future might consider bounding the amount of memory
these queues are allowed to use so that excess messages are simply dropped in order to avoid
a scenario where all system memory is allocated and new allocations fail as this would result
in an unstable system. This is also a problem for the unsecured variant as it climbs to about
320 MBs in 30 seconds. This shows about an 80 MB difference between their averages at
the maximum rate tested, and this actually down from an maximum difference of about
110 MB. If this test was carried out it is possible that the buffer overrun would converge
between the two as system resources were exhausted, this might even happen if the test
were allowed to run longer than 30 seconds. This level of testing is sufficient to show the
payload byte throughput, CPU utilization, and memory usage are only marginally different
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at lower throughputs, show strong divergence at higher throughput and start to come back
together once throughput ceilings are reached. This also shows that SSM may need updates
to better handle higher throughputs.
There may be tweaks and optimizations that can be made to increase throughput at
the cost of ease-of-use, this is a balancing act. One example of this is the use of mapped
variables, this increases ease-of-use, but it comes at a cost. Figure 6.4 shows the payload
byte throughput for the same set of tests run with line 30 in Sample 6.10 commented out
so that m pNotificationData is no longer being mapped. The data is still accessible via
pMessage, but it is no longer nicely put into m pNotificationData. This graph shows a
dramatic change in maximum throughput, and actually this set of tests does not appear to






























Fig. 6.4. Unsecured versus Secured Payload Byte Throughput. Comparison of attempted
payload byte throughput for unsecured messaging and secured messaging.
to the API, just how a developer uses the API. This might increase the complexity of the
developer’s code as they have to access data more directly and might need to use something
like direct memory access (DMA) to efficiently move the incoming data without slowing
the messages down. This access is usually hardware and/or OS dependent but might be
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needed in scenarios that require high performance; future updates to SSM could look at
adding this to the SSM portability utilities as a hardware abstraction library. This would
mean that new hardware would require new updates to the library, but could provide this
performance without affecting user-level code.
6.4 Conclusions of SSSM Evaluation
Section 6.2 shows that additional developer hardship is minimal. The developer does
have to provide a configuration file for the LS and encryption keys for any secured end-
points; beyond that they need to use secured versions of the message classes, but the
parameters for these are the same for the unsecured versions and the API handles the rest.
This shows that the change in developer burden is minimal, the developer has not had to
change their approach or add additional code. Keeping this change to a minimum in turn
keeps any negative effects on reuse to a minimum. From this perspective reusing SSSM-
based software should be just as advantageous and easy as reusing SSM-based software.
Section 6.3 shows that there is a performance hit in simply going from unsecured
to secured messaging, it also shows there may be some easy ways around this issue. At
higher rates resource limited system may not be able to handle the demands of the secured
version; this does impact the reusability of SSSM and needs to be considered for future
work. The payload byte throughput is very comparable at lower rates, even up to 36 MBps,
note that is bytes not bits. Section 6.3 also showed that CPU and memory usage were
higher for the secured producer/consumer pair, and had a large separation after the secured
version reached is maximum throughput first and message processing backed up on the
consumer side. This disparity started to converge again once the unsecured variant reaches
its maximum throughput and may fully converge if the high throughput tests were run
longer or higher payload throughput was attempted. This suggests that some optimization
to SSMs message handling would be beneficial and should help the performance of SSSM
as well.
Another set of tests without variable mapping showed that much higher rates could be
achieved for both secured and unsecured variants, this was a sort of side test and was not
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discussed in terms of memory and CPU. In this scenario both variants had much higher
throughput ceilings, achieving throughput in the 50 and 60 MBps range. The maximum
attempted rate of 64 MBps may not have realize their full maximum rates as they were just
starting to diverge from each other and the attempted rate.
Performance requirements and system resources need to be more carefully considered
for SSSM than they do for SSM; reusability has taken a hit but future performance im-





This research addresses two interrelated problems for Small Space, namely the De-
velopment Problem and the Security Problem. The crux of the Development Problem is
developing capable resilient space systems that will deploy into harsh, isolated, and con-
tested environments under the constraint of shrinking budgets and schedules. The results
of the SISDPA surveys and the on-going trends in Small Space development show a path-
forward where space systems are comprised of multi-vendor hardware and software systems;
heterogeneous systems of systems. The results of the SISDPA surveys show that develop-
ers see reuse and open-network systems as the best way to wrangle these heterogeneous
systems of systems with good abstraction, modularity, and encapsulation. The results of
SISDPA surveys as well as our daily reliance on space-backed infrastructure highlight the
importance of cybersecurity for space systems generally and that developers are specifically
more concerned when these space systems are networked systems of systems. Pulling these
threads together shows that SSSM as a secure modular reusable open-network software
development framework address both the Development Problem and the Security Problem.
7.2 Contribution
The primary contributions of this research are the crystallization of a viable path
forward for Small Space in the form of a secure modular reusable open-network software
development framework that addresses the Development and Security Problems, and a
working easy-to-use prototype of such a framework.
The SISDPA surveys and their analysis illustrate the need for a secure modular reusable
open-networking software development framework. The surveys did this by showing that
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developers believe reuse and networking is important and beneficial for software developed
for space systems, and that there was consensus amongst developers that networking has a
negative effect on security and is even a hurdle in the adoption of OSAs and MONAs. These
results show that providing better cybersecurity alleviates this security concern clearing
the path for modular reusable open-network systems that can easily combine multi-vendor
systems to provide capable resilient cost-effective space systems.
The SSSM work shows that a modular reusable open-network software development
framework can have access control, encryption, and basic policy enforcement added to it
with minimal increase in developer hardship thereby maintaining the same level of reusabil-
ity from a developer perspective. There was a non-trivial increase in resource load at higher
data throughput which will be addressed in future work. This sets up SSSM as one of the
building blocks of a secure development platform the could integrate some of the process,
tools, and additional solutions from Chapter 2.
7.3 Future Work
The problem space is always changing and growing; a software development framework,
like SSSM, can be combined with other cybersecurity processes, tools, and solutions to create
a more complete security platform. There are many different avenues for future work, here
the focus will be on a few of them.
The performance of SSM is in need of improvement and so SSSM suffers from the
same bottlenecks and adds additional burden. Performance analysis both in terms of more
directed and controlled testing, and in terms dynamic and static performance profiling will
determine were SSM and SSSM need optimization. More directed and controlled testing
will isolate the SSM core services, producer, and consumer all on separate nodes instead of
sharing resources to better characterize the overall performance of each piece. This work
will also look at holding message size constant and increasing messaging rates to understand
how handling more messages versus larger messages effects performance. Google PerfTools
will be used to better understand performance bottlenecks and potential optimizations that
might benefit SSM and SSSM thereby increasing the reusability of both software devel-
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opment frameworks. This testing could also target more representative hardware, again
allowing for better characterization, with an eye towards understanding how additional
security is affecting performance and therefor reusability.
The inherent vulnerabilities present in SSM and SSSM will be evaluated using tools like
Fortify, OpenVAS, and Metasploit. SSSM could also be used as a testbed for determining
the feasibility of using Sophia to provide continuous monitoring or using an other intrusion
detection system (IDS) and intrusion prevention system (IPS) solutions. SSSM is a candi-
date for layering on-top of other security provisions, like a secure kernel or hypervisor that
could provide a secure base and separation between process. Process separation is currently
not provided by SSSM if all the software components reside on the same processor. Combi-
nation with other tools like this helps to address the data-at-rest problem that SSSM does
not directly solve when untrusted processes or software share the same processor.
Another avenue of interest is the exploration of the applicability of SSM and SSSM to
other problem domains like a smart hub for IOT, ICSs without deterministic requirements,
and the smart grid. SSSM might be too heavy to run in full on a IOT sensor or endpoint,
but the full stack could be run on a smart-hub, and different end-point versions of the
software could be developed for different hardware against the open-network interface that
SSM and SSSM provide.
SSSM would benefit from user-interface tools that made is easier to manage and val-
idate policy, and look at complex rules, e.g. conditionally allow certain components to
communicate only if the vehicle as in contact mode.
Future work will look at more formal analysis of reusability, using metrics like code
complexity and additional surveys targeted at developer perception reusability. More di-
rected surveys and additional analysis of the existing data set can still be used to better
understand the problem space and keep track of it is changing over time. There are still
some questions that relate to this area in the survey series that can be further analyzed as
well as more detailed work with cross-tabulation.
The viability of space systems using reusable development frameworks should tracked
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in terms of the schedule costs to design, develop, test, and fly. Additional work can pull
together measurements of cost and schedule for projects using reusable development frame-
works and contrast that with more traditional development approaches. It will be difficult
to normalize this against product requirements and capability as well as development per-
sonal, but would be very valuable in understanding if developer sentiment about reusable
software actually proves to be economically beneficial. The longevity of the space systems
should be tracked so that the effectiveness of this reusable modular open-network path
can be quantified with the goal of understanding if these systems are really cheaper, more
resilient, and more secure.
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SISDPA Survey Series Instruments
A.1 Introduction
This appendix contains the material used to obtain approval from the USU’s IRB and
the material used to administer the survey, i.e. the recruitment materials and printouts for
each survey. It also includes definitions for the items used in the Pro-neutral-con questions
that was available to participants while they took the survey.
Section A.2 contains the Letter of Information submitted to USU’s IRB. Section A.3
contains the renewed approval letter from USU’s IRB. Section A.4 contains the language
used in the survey recruitment emails. Sections A.5 through A.9 contains the survey
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Introduction/ Purpose 
Dr. Stephen Clyde (PI) & Brandon Shirley (Graduate student researcher) in the Department of Computer 
Science at Utah State University are conducting a set of surveys to find out more about software 
development practices and attitudes in the space industry, specifically flight, ground, and testing software. 
We are asking you to take part in this set of surveys because of your affiliation with or involvement in the 
space industry. We are soliciting responses from approximately 3000 professionals, educators, and 
students with backgrounds and connections to the space industry. We greatly need your participation and 
your responses to the surveys will make a meaningful contribution to this research. 
 
Procedures 
Multiple surveys compromise this survey set. Currently there are six surveys (listed below) and each 
should take approximately 10 minutes or less to complete. Each survey has a brief introduction section 
that explains the overall survey set, i.e. Space Industry Software Development Practices and Attitudes 
(SISDPA), and the specific survey you are taking, e.g. Open Systems Architecture and Modularity. 
 
1) SISDPA : Core Concepts 
2) SISDPA : Development Preferences 
3) SISDPA : Open Systems Architecture and Modularity 
4) SISDPA : Security 
5) SISDPA : Reuse, Interoperability, Portability, Code Complexity 
6) SISDPA : Network 
 
Each survey will also have a common background section, this section is the same across all the surveys 
and the hope is that if you take more than one survey you will give identical responses across each survey. 
This will allow the researchers to consider your experience with regard to the responses you provide. 
 
If you agree to participate, then you may use the provided email links to access and complete the surveys. 
The links provided are anonymous. We plan to distribute the surveys over the space of a few months. We 
expect to give you two to three weeks to complete the survey, i.e. from the time you receive the original 
distribution email you will have two to three weeks to complete the survey. 
 
You can opt to only take some of them. If you start a survey but do not finish, then your partial result may 
be included in the results. You may contact Dr. Stephen Clyde or Brandon Shirley (see contact 
information provide in the “Explanation & offer to answer questions” section) if you have any questions 
with regard to participation. 
 
At the end of each survey you will be redirected to another webpage where you may provide your email 
address if you want to enter the optional drawing. Your email address will not be connected to the survey 
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New Findings 
During the course of this research study, you will be informed of any significant changes in the 
procedures, risks or benefits resulting from participation in the research, or new alternatives to 
participation that might cause you to change your mind about continuing in the study. If necessary, this 
Letter of Information may be amended to reflect said changes. 
 
Risks 
There is minimal risk involved in participating in any of the surveys in the set. The only potential stress 
factor that we foresee is the duration of taking the entire survey set. We spread out the distribution of the 
various surveys to minimize this potential stress. 
 
The surveys collect some information about your background and experience so we can better understand 
your answers and opinions, but we do not collect or store any other personal identifying information. 
There is a virtually no risk of loss of confidentiality relative to the data collective. We ensure this to be the 
case by doing the following: 
• The anonymous nature of the link used to take the survey automatically disassociates your identity 
and contact information from your responses 
• We will keep the raw survey data private and properly secured 
• We will only publish aggregated data – no individual responses will be made public 
 
Benefits 
The main benefit of this study is an increase in the body of knowledge that relates to software 
development practices and attitudes in the space industry, and to direct future research. Taking the survey 
should provide you with an opportunity to reflect on your current software development practices and 
how they affect the projects on which you have and will work. 
 
Once the survey is closed, we will analyze the data, and generate results. We will seek publication of 
these results in a conference or journal. 
 
Explanation & offer to answer questions 
The above Procedures section explains this research study. If you have other questions or research-related 
problems, you may reach Dr. Stephen Clyde at (435) 797- 2307 or Stephen.Clyde@usu.edu, or Brandon 
Shirley at (435) 994-9165 or b.l.s@aggiemail.usu.edu. 
 
Voluntary nature of participation and right to withdraw without consequence 
Participation in these surveys is voluntary. You may refuse to participate or withdraw at any time without 
consequence or loss of benefits. You may opt-out at any time by either not starting any of the surveys or 
only taking some of the surveys. The surveys you have started and/or completed will be include in the 
results; this is due the anonymous links used to administer the survey. We have no way to identify your 
responses and so we cannot remove them. Starting a survey does not obligate you to complete it, nor are 
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Payment/Compensation   
There will be seven drawings for gift cards: one for each survey and one overall drawing for the survey 
set. For each survey-specific drawing, two participants in that survey will be selected at random to receive 
a $25 gift card. For the overall drawing, two participants from the pool of all participants of any survey 
will be selected to receive a $200 gift card, such that if you have completed all of the surveys, you will 
have six entries into that drawing. At the end of each of the surveys, you will be redirected to a webpage 
that asks for an email address. A participant must enter a valid email address to be considered for that 
survey’s drawing or the overall drawing. 
 
Confidentiality 
There is virtually no risk of a privacy or confidentiality breach. The researchers will not be observing or 
collecting data on any behavior outside of what would normally occur in the work place. Research records 
will be kept confidential, consistent with federal and state regulations. Only the investigator and the 
graduate student researcher will have access to the raw data. No identifying information is associated with 
the survey, the links provided in the distribution email are anonymous.  
 
IRB Approval Statement 
The Institutional Review Board for the protection of human participants at Utah State University has 
approved this research study. If you have any questions or concerns about your rights or a research-related 
injury and would like to contact someone other than the research team, you may contact the IRB Director 
at (435) 797-0567 or email irb@usu.edu to obtain information or to offer input. 
 
Investigator Statement 
“I certify that the research study has been explained to the individual, by me or my research staff, and that 
the individual understands the nature and purpose, the possible risks and benefits associated with taking 
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In all cases, it is your responsibility to notify the IRB prior to making any changes to the study by submitting an
Amendment/Modification request. This will document whether or not the study still meets the requirements for exempt status
under federal regulations.
Upon receipt of this memo, you may begin your research. If you have questions, please call the IRB office at (435) 797-1821 or
email to irb@usu.edu.
The IRB wishes you success with your research.
4460 Old Main Hill Logan, UT 84322-4460 PH: (435) 797-1821
Fax: (435) 797-
3769 WEB: irb.usu.edu EMAIL: irb@usu.edu
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Space Industry Software Development 
Practices and Attitudes (SISDPA) 
Recruitment Letter 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Dr. Stephen Clyde and Brandon Shirley plan to conduct a set of surveys on Space Industry Software 
Development Practices and Attitudes; specifically in the areas of flight, ground, and test software. The 
letter below will accompany the link for the appropriate survey. Distribution may occur via letter, email, 
or website link. 
2 RECRUITMENT CONTENT 
The emails will vary slightly based on the distribution method, e.g. for Qualtrics generated and 
distributed emails we will have the name of the person to whom we are distributing the email. 
2.1 QUALTRICS 
From: b.l.s@aggiemail.usu.edu 
Dear firstName,  
2.2 MAILING LISTS 
From: Brandon.Shirley@sdl.usu.edu 
To whom it may concern, 
2.3 COMMON 
Subject: New Distribution of Current Survey or Reminder Email for Current Survey 
Dr. Stephen Clyde & Brandon Shirley in the Department of Computer Science at Utah State University 
are conducting a set of surveys as part of Brandon’s PhD research to find out more about software 
development practices and attitudes in the space industry. 
You have received this email because of your interest in or involvement with the space industry. We 
greatly need your participation. We are asking that anyone that has insight into in software 
development that relates to space industry participate in this survey. The beginning of the survey has 
background questions that will give context to your responses. 
The survey set is currently made of six surveys, listed below, that will be distributed over the course of a 
few months. You have a chance at receiving a gift card for participating in this survey as well as a chance 
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at receiving a gift card for your overall participation in the entire survey set. There will be seven 
drawings for gift cards: one drawing for each survey and one overall drawing for the survey set. For each 
survey-specific drawing, two participants in that survey will be selected at random to receive a $25 gift 
card. For the overall drawing, two participants from the pool of all participants of any survey will be 
selected to receive a $200 gift card. At the end of this survey, you will be redirected to a webpage that 
asks for an email address. You must enter a valid email address to be considered for this surveys 
drawing or the overall survey set drawing. 
Each survey stands on its own: opting to not participate in one survey does not exclude you in any way 
from participating in any subsequent surveys. Likewise, participating in one survey does not obligate you 
to participate in any subsequent surveys. The surveys are as follows and will be distributed in the 
following order: 
1) SISDPA : Core Concepts
2) SISDPA : Development Preferences
3) SISDPA : Open Systems Architecture and Modularity
4) SISDPA : Security
5) SISDPA : Reuse, Interoperability, Portability, Code Complexity
6) SISDPA : Network
You can you use the link below to access the __________ survey. 
We greatly need your participation and your responses to the surveys will make a meaningful 
contribution to this research while allowing you an opportunity to reflect on you current software 
development practices and how these practices affect the projects on which you have and will work. 
This survey set will be used to determine the path of future research, as well as increase the body of 
knowledge that relates to software development practices and attitudes in the space industry. 
You can access the _______ survey of the Space Industry Software Development Practices and Attitudes 
survey set using the following link: 
http://usu.qualtrics.link.com. 
You can also copy and paste the following URL into your address bar if you prefer not to use the 
provided link:  http://usu.qualtrics.link.com 
We plan to send out one reminder email a week until the survey closes. The duration of the survey will 
be two to three weeks. You will receive the reminder email regardless of where or not you have 
participated in a survey. The subject of the email will read “Reminder Email…” for these weekly 
reminders, and “New Distribution…” at the start of a new survey. 
See the http://brandon.bluezone.usu.edu/Files/LOISpaceSoftwareAttitudes_Final.pdf for the Letter of 
Intent (LOI) that explains your role as a participant should you choose to participate. If you have 
questions please direct them to Brandon Shirley, via email b.l.s@aggiemail.usu.edu, the LOI lists 
additional contact information.  
Once the survey set is closed, we will analyze the data, and generate results. We will seek publication of 
these results in a conference or journal. 
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This is a legitimate request for you participation, if you have any questions about the validity of this 
email you may refer to the Letter of Intent, contact Brandon Shirley, via email b.l.s@aggiemail.usu.edu, 
or Utah State University’s Internal Review Board administrator at (435) 797 – 0567 or email 
irb@usu.edu.  
2.4 SPECIAL NOTE FOR CORE CONCEPTS SURVEY 
Note that the Core Concepts Survey was previously distributed. If you participated in the survey already 
then please visit the survey link and you will be given the opportunity to provide your email for entry 
into the Core Concepts Survey drawing as well as the overall survey set drawing. 
3 THANK YOU CONTENT 
We will send out a thank you email to thank everyone, whether they have participated or not, that 
thanks them for participating, lets them know the current survey is closed, and notifies them of the 
timeframe within which the drawing winners will be notified. 
3.1 CONTENT 
Subject: Current Survey has ended 
Dr. Stephen Clyde & Brandon Shirley in the Department of Computer Science at Utah State University 
would like to thank everyone who participated in the ______ survey; the ______ survey has now closed. 
We will notify the winners of this survey’s drawing within __ week(s). The winners of the overall survey 
set will be notified after the entire survey set closes. 
4 CONCLUSION 
We may need to distribute some additional emails, but they we will be in line with what we have here 
and will be strictly for survey management or clarification. I may also make grammatical corrections if 
needed. 
170
Page 1 of 7 
SISDPA : Core Concepts - Survey 
Start of Block: Introduction 
Intro – Dr. Stephen Clyde & Brandon Shirley in the Department of Computer Science at Utah 
State University are conducting a set of surveys as part of Brandon’s PhD research to find out 
more about software development practices and attitudes in the space industry. 
You are being asked to take part in this set of surveys because of your affiliation with or 
involvement in the space industry. Your participation and your responses to the surveys are 
greatly needed and will make a meaningful contribution to this research. 
This survey comprises the Core Concepts portion of a survey set that makes up a survey on 
Space Industry Software Development Practices and Attitudes (SISDPA). Each question will 
ask for your input and explain how you should answer the question. 
There are two main benefits for participating in this study. One benefit is an increase in the body 
of knowledge that relates to software development practices and attitudes in the space industry 
while informing future research. The other benefit is the chance to receive a gift card for 
participating in this survey as well as a chance to receive a gift card for your overall participation 
in the entire survey set. There will be seven drawings for gift cards: one for each survey and one 
overall drawing for the survey set. For each survey-specific drawing, two participants in that 
survey will be selected at random to receive a $25 gift card. For the overall drawing, two 
participants from the pool of all participants of any survey will be selected at random to receive a 
$200 gift card. Taking the survey should provide you with an opportunity to reflect on your 
current software development practices and how they affect the projects on which you have and 
will work. 
At the end of this survey you will be redirected to another webpage where you may provide your 
email address if you want to enter the optional drawings. Your email address will not be 
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connected to the survey responses. You must enter a valid email address to be considered for 
this survey’s drawing or the overall drawing. 
If you start this survey but do not finish, then your partial result may be included in the results. 
Once the survey set is closed, we will analyze the data for inclusion in a conference or journal 
paper. 
If you have other questions or research-related problems, you may reach Dr. Stephen Clyde at 
(435) 797- 2307 or  Stephen.Clyde@usu.edu,  or Brandon Shirley at (435) 994-9165 or
b.l.s@aggiemail.usu.edu.
Please note that this survey was previously distributed. For those of you who have already 
participated and would like the opportunity to win the drawing for this survey or for the overall 
survey set you can specify that you have already participated in the next section.  
End of Block: Introduction 
Start of Block: Block 3 
Q15 – Have you already taken this survey? 
o Yes
o No
End of Block: Block 3 
Start of Block: Background 
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 Other (please specify) ________________________________________________
1.2 – Please categorize the entity for which you currently work using the options below. You 




 Other (please specify) ________________________________________________
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1.3 – How many years have you spent working in the following areas with regard to space 
systems? Please drag the sliders to indicate the number of years of experience you have for 
each area. You must click or move each slider even if you want your responses marked as zero, 
the slider will turn purple/blue upon input. 
Years 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
Software Systems Development 
Management 
Hardware Systems Development 
Procurement 
Other (please specify) 
1.4 – Based on you experience, i.e. the projects on which you have worked, what are the typical 
durations for the phases listed below? Please drag the sliders to indicate the number of months 
you think are typically spent on each phase. You must click or move each slider even if you 
want your responses marked as zero, the slider will turn purple/blue upon input. If you do not 
have direct experience, then go off of what you think is typical. 
Months 





Other (please specify) 
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1.5 – About how many missions/projects have you worked on over the course of your career in 
the following areas? Please drag the sliders to indicate the number missions/projects on which 
you have worked. You must click or move each slider even if you want your responses marked 
as zero, the slider will turn purple/blue upon input. 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 
Space Systems 
Other fields 
1.6 – About how many missions/projects do you typically work on at the same time? Please 
drag the sliders to indicate the number of projects that you typically work on at the same 
time. You must click or move each slider even if you want your response marked as zero, the 
slider will turn purple/blue upon input. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Projects/Missions 
End of Block: Background 
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Start of Block: Core Concepts 
2.1 – For each software characteristic listed in a row below, rate its importance in each of the 
four domains: Space Flight Software, Space Ground Software, Space Test Software, and Other 









1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Reuse o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
Portability o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
Interoperability o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
Minimal Code 
Complexity  o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
Rapid 






o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
Security o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
2.2 – Please order the following software characteristics according to importance, by dragging 
them so that the most important (1) comes first and the least important (7) comes last. You must 
move at least one characteristic for the question to be marked as answered, you can move it 




______ Minimal Code Complexity 
______ Rapid Development 
______ Cost of Ownership (e.g. maintenance, upgrades) 
______ Security 
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2.4 – What percentage of your time do you spend developing in the following areas? Please 
drag the bars so that the total adds up to 100. 
 _______ Space Flight Software 
 _______ Space Ground Software 
 _______ Space Test Software 
 _______ Other software fields (please specify) 
 _______ Non-software (please specify) 





End of Block: Core Concepts 
177
Page 1 of 12 
SISDPA : Open Systems Architecture 
and Modularity - Survey 
Start of Block: Introduction 
Intro – I'm Brandon Shirley, I am conducting these surveys for my PhD research at Utah State 
University. I really need your participation. There is a chance to win some gift cards. 
You are being asked to take part in this set of surveys because of your affiliation with or 
involvement in the space industry. Your participation and your responses to the surveys are 
greatly needed and will make a meaningful contribution to this research. 
This survey comprises the Open Systems Architecture and Modularity portion of a survey set 
that makes up a survey on Space Industry Software Development Practices and Attitudes 
(SISDPA). Each question will ask for your input and explain how you should answer the 
question. 
Answer as many of the questions as you want, partial surveys may still be very helpful. At the 
end of this survey, you will be redirected to a webpage that asks for an email address. You must 
enter a valid email address to be considered for survey  drawings or the overall survey set 
drawing. 
You have a chance at receiving a gift card for participating in this survey as well as a chance at 
receiving a gift card for your overall participation in the entire survey set. There will be 2 winners 
of $25 gift cards for each survey and 2 winners of $200 gift cards for the survey set. 
At the end of this survey you will be redirected to another webpage where you may 
provide your email address if you want to enter the optional drawings. Your email 
address will not be connected to the survey responses. You must enter a valid email 
address to be considered for this survey’s drawing or the overall drawing. 
If you start this survey but do not finish, then your partial result may be included in the results. 
Once the survey set is closed, we will analyze the data for inclusion in a conference or journal 
paper. 
If you have other questions or research-related problems, you may reach Dr. Stephen Clyde at 
(435) 797- 2307 or  Stephen.Clyde@usu.edu,  or Brandon Shirley at (435) 994-9165 or
b.l.s@aggiemail.usu.edu.
End of Block: Introduction 
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Start of Block: Open Systems Architecture and Modularity 





2.1 – Consider the items on the left in the context of open systems architecture in space flight 
systems. In this instance open system architecture means vendor-independent, non-
proprietary, software or device design and implementation based on official and/or popular 
standards. Place an item under Pros if positively impacted, under Neutral if not impacted or not 
applicable, and under Cons if negatively impacted by utilizing open systems architecture. Think 
of this impact in terms of multi-project, multi-mission, or multi-platform use. All items should be 
placed for the answer to be considered complete by the system. In considering partial or 
incomplete answers, unplaced items will be considered neutral. 
Pros Neutral Cons 
Regression reduction Regression reduction Regression reduction 
Code design Code design Code design 
Development cost Development cost Development cost 
Maintenance cost Maintenance cost Maintenance cost 
Development productivity Development productivity Development productivity 
Development efficiency Development efficiency Development efficiency 
Code Complexity Code Complexity Code Complexity 
Maintainability Maintainability Maintainability 
Integration Integration Integration 
Adaptability Adaptability Adaptability 
Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples 
Encapsulation Encapsulation Encapsulation 
Bug detection Bug detection Bug detection 
Code quality Code quality Code quality 
Code robustness Code robustness Code robustness 
Best practices Best practices Best practices 
Schedule Schedule Schedule 
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Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style 
Domain knowledge Domain knowledge Domain knowledge 
Code readability Code readability Code readability 
Security Security Security 
I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency 
Radiation hardness Radiation hardness Radiation hardness 
Fault tolerance Fault tolerance Fault tolerance 
Hardware complexity Hardware complexity Hardware complexity 
Latency Latency Latency 
Determinism Determinism Determinism 
Interoperability Interoperability Interoperability 
Portability Portability Portability 
Testing Testing Testing 
Reusability Reusability Reusability 
Software upgradability Software upgradability Software upgradability 














Information Assurance Information Assurance Information Assurance 
Mission Assurance Mission Assurance Mission Assurance 
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2.2 – Consider the items on the left in the context of modular open network architecture in 
space flight systems. Modular open network architecture implies that the architecture is 
designed natively for network-centric data transfer. Place an item under Pros if positively 
impacted, under Neutral if not impacted or not applicable, and under Cons if negatively 
impacted by utilizing modular open network architecture.  Think of this impact in terms of multi-
project, multi-mission, or multi-platform use.  All items should be placed for the answer to be 
considered complete by the system. In considering partial or incomplete answers, 
unplaced items will be considered neutral. 
Pros Neutral Cons 
Regression reduction Regression reduction Regression reduction 
Code design Code design Code design 
Development cost Development cost Development cost 
Maintenance cost Maintenance cost Maintenance cost 
Development productivity Development productivity Development productivity 
Development efficiency Development efficiency Development efficiency 
Code Complexity Code Complexity Code Complexity 
Maintainability Maintainability Maintainability 
Integration Integration Integration 
Adaptability Adaptability Adaptability 
Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples 
Encapsulation Encapsulation Encapsulation 
Bug detection Bug detection Bug detection 
Code quality Code quality Code quality 
Code robustness Code robustness Code robustness 
Best practices Best practices Best practices 
Schedule Schedule Schedule 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style 
Domain knowledge Domain knowledge Domain knowledge 
Code readability Code readability Code readability 
Security Security Security 
I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency 
Radiation hardness Radiation hardness Radiation hardness 
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Fault tolerance Fault tolerance Fault tolerance 
Hardware complexity Hardware complexity Hardware complexity 
Latency Latency Latency 
Determinism Determinism Determinism 
Interoperability Interoperability Interoperability 
Portability Portability Portability 
Testing Testing Testing 
Reusability Reusability Reusability 
Software upgradability Software upgradability Software upgradability 














Information Assurance Information Assurance Information Assurance 
Mission Assurance Mission Assurance Mission Assurance 
2.3 – Consider the items on the left in the context of software modularity in space flight 
systems, specifically the degree to which software is divided into functional modules. Place an 
item under Pros if positively impacted, under Neutral if not impacted or not applicable, and 
under Cons if negatively impacted. Think of this impact in terms of multi-project, multi-mission, 
or multi-platform use. All items should be placed for the answer to be considered complete 
by the system. In considering partial or incomplete answers, unplaced items will be 
considered neutral. 
Pros Neutral Cons 
Regression reduction Regression reduction Regression reduction 
Code design Code design Code design 
Development cost Development cost Development cost 
Maintenance cost Maintenance cost Maintenance cost 
Development productivity Development productivity Development productivity 
Development efficiency Development efficiency Development efficiency 
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Code Complexity Code Complexity Code Complexity 
Maintainability Maintainability Maintainability 
Integration Integration Integration 
Adaptability Adaptability Adaptability 
Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples 
Encapsulation Encapsulation Encapsulation 
Bug detection Bug detection Bug detection 
Code quality Code quality Code quality 
Code robustness Code robustness Code robustness 
Best practices Best practices Best practices 
Schedule Schedule Schedule 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style 
Domain knowledge Domain knowledge Domain knowledge 
Code readability Code readability Code readability 
Security Security Security 
I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency 
Radiation hardness Radiation hardness Radiation hardness 
Fault tolerance Fault tolerance Fault tolerance 
Hardware complexity Hardware complexity Hardware complexity 
Latency Latency Latency 
Determinism Determinism Determinism 
Interoperability Interoperability Interoperability 
Portability Portability Portability 
Testing Testing Testing 
Reusability Reusability Reusability 
Software upgradability Software upgradability Software upgradability 







Ease of use Ease of use Ease of use 
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Information Assurance Information Assurance Information Assurance 
Mission Assurance Mission Assurance Mission Assurance 
2.4 – Does or has your organization: 
Yes No 
Employed open systems 
architecture in the past  o o 
Employed modular open 
network architecture in the 
past  
o o 
Currently utilize open 
systems architecture  o o 
Currently utilize modular 
open network architecture o o 
Plan on utilizing open system 
architecture in the future  o o 
Plan on utilizing modular 
open network architecture in 
the future  
o o 
2.5 – Based on direct experience, or indirect perception, what percentage of projects/missions 
do organizations that develop space system utilize the following: (Please drag the bars to the 
appropriate percentage, the percentages do not have to total 100 as these provisions are not 
mutually exclusive) 
 _______ Open system architecture 
 _______ Modular open network architecture 
 _______ Closed proprietary systems 
 _______ Other 
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2.6 – If your organization is considering, or was to consider, adopting a open systems approach 
what factors might prohibit its adoption? (check all that apply) 
▢ Management buy in
▢ Legacy software requirements
▢ Investment vs. return in time
▢ Investment vs. return in money
▢ Compatibility with current infrastructure
▢ Ownership of existing and future software
▢ Current proprietary systems






















▢ Ease of use
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▢ Information Assurance
▢ Other ________________________________________________
2.7 – Consider the statements below with regard to software reuse from mission to mission. 
Please select the statement that is most indicative of your experience with or perception of 
software reuse. 
o Target some number of missions with a certain level of reuse in mind
o Work mission to mission while reusing if possible
o Work mission to mission with no or minimal reuse
End of Block: Open Systems Architecture and Modularity 
Start of Block: Background 
















▢ Other (please specify) ________________________________________________
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1.2 – Please categorize the entity for which you currently work using the options below. You 




▢ Other (please specify) ________________________________________________
1.3 – How many years have you spent working in the following areas with regard to space 
systems? Please drag the sliders to indicate the number of years of experience you have for 
each area. You must click or move each slider even if you want your responses marked as zero, 
the slider will turn purple/blue upon input. 
Years 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
Software Systems Development 
Management 
Hardware Systems Development 
Procurement 
Other (please specify) 
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1.4 – Based on you experience, i.e. the projects on which you have worked, what are the typical 
durations for the phases listed below? Please drag the sliders to indicate the number of months 
you think are typically spent on each phase. You must click or move each slider even if you 
want your responses marked as zero, the slider will turn purple/blue upon input. If you do not 
have direct experience, then go off of what you think is typical. 
Months 





Other (please specify) 
1.5 – About how many missions/projects have you worked on over the course of your career in 
the following areas? Please drag the sliders to indicate the number missions/projects on which 
you have worked. You must click or move each slider even if you want your responses marked 
as zero, the slider will turn purple/blue upon input. 
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1.6 – About how many missions/projects do you typically work on at the same time? Please 
drag the sliders to indicate the number of projects that you typically work on at the same 
time. You must click or move each slider even if you want your response marked as zero, the 
slider will turn purple/blue upon input. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Projects/Missions 
End of Block: Background 
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SISDPA : Security - Survey 
Start of Block: Introduction 
Intro – I'm Brandon Shirley, I am conducting these surveys for my PhD research at Utah State 
University. I really need your participation. There is a chance to win some gift cards. 
You are being asked to take part in this set of surveys because of your affiliation with or 
involvement in the space industry. Your participation and your responses to the surveys are 
greatly needed and will make a meaningful contribution to this research. 
This survey comprises the Security portion of a survey set that makes up a survey on Space 
Industry Software Development Practices and Attitudes (SISDPA). Each question will ask for 
your input and explain how you should answer the question. 
Answer as many of the questions as you want or as much of a question as you want, partial 
surveys may still be very helpful. At the end of this survey, you will be redirected to a webpage 
that asks for an email address. You must enter a valid email address to be considered for 
survey drawings or the overall survey set drawing. 
You have a chance at receiving a gift card for participating in this survey as well as a chance at 
receiving a gift card for your overall participation in the entire survey set. There will be 2 winners 
of $25 gift cards for each survey and 2 winners of $200 gift cards for the survey set. 
At the end of this survey you will be redirected to another webpage where you may 
provide your email address if you want to enter the optional drawings. Your email 
address will not be connected to the survey responses. You must enter a valid email 
address to be considered for this survey’s drawing or the overall drawing. 
If you start this survey but do not finish, then your partial result may be included in the results. 
Once the survey set is closed, we will analyze the data for inclusion in a conference or journal 
paper. 
If you have other questions or research-related problems, you may reach Dr. Stephen Clyde at 
(435) 797- 2307 or  Stephen.Clyde@usu.edu,  or Brandon Shirley at (435) 994-9165 or
b.l.s@aggiemail.usu.edu.
End of Block: Introduction 
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Start of Block: Security 





2.1 – Consider the items on the left in the context of internal security in space systems. This 
would be security mechanisms in addition to the traditional gateway COMSEC, that add 
additional security provisions, e.g. auditing, component authentication, and access control. 
Place an item under Pros if positively impacted; under Neutral if not impacted, not applicable, 
or if you are not familiar with the term; or under Cons if negatively impacted by using internal 
security provisions. Keep in mind that some of these items have overlap with other items. All 
items should be placed for the answer to be considered "complete" by the system. In 
considering partial or incomplete answers, unplaced items will be considered neutral.  
Pros Neutral Cons 
Regression reduction Regression reduction Regression reduction 
Code design Code design Code design 
Development cost Development cost Development cost 
Maintenance cost Maintenance cost Maintenance cost 
Development productivity Development productivity Development productivity 
Development efficiency Development efficiency Development efficiency 
Code Complexity Code Complexity Code Complexity 
Maintainability Maintainability Maintainability 
Integration Integration Integration 
Adaptability Adaptability Adaptability 
Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples 
Encapsulation Encapsulation Encapsulation 
Bug detection Bug detection Bug detection 
Code quality Code quality Code quality 
Code robustness Code robustness Code robustness 
Best practices Best practices Best practices 
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Schedule Schedule Schedule 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style 
Domain knowledge Domain knowledge Domain knowledge 
Code readability Code readability Code readability 
Security Security Security 
I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency 
Radiation hardness Radiation hardness Radiation hardness 
Fault tolerance Fault tolerance Fault tolerance 
Hardware complexity Hardware complexity Hardware complexity 
Latency Latency Latency 
Determinism Determinism Determinism 
Interoperability Interoperability Interoperability 
Portability Portability Portability 
Testing Testing Testing 
Reusability Reusability Reusability 
Software upgradability Software upgradability Software upgradability 
Hardware 
changes/flexibility 














Information Assurance Information Assurance Information Assurance 
Mission Assurance Mission Assurance Mission Assurance 
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2.2 – Do you have direct experience with security in the following areas: 
Yes No 
Space flight systems  o o 
Space ground systems o o 
Space test systems  o o 
Penetration testing  o o 
Other (please specify)  o o 
2.3 – Based on direct experience, or indirect perception, what percentage of space flight 
systems do you think use the following security provisions for internal protection, i.e. within 
space vehicle systems? Please drag the bars to the appropriate percentage, the percentages 
do not have to total 100 as these provisions are not mutually exclusive. 
 _______ Identity Management Ability to establish identity of components 
 _______ Mutual Authentication Method for components to authenticate each others identities 
 _______ Authorization (includes access control) Method for determining permissions of 
each component 
 _______ Auditing Tracking pertinent system events 
 _______ Encryption  Ability to protect data in transit and at rest 
 _______ Network Segmentation Separating networks physically or virtually 
 _______ Recovery Ability to recover from attacks 
 _______ Mitigation Ability to prevent attacks 
 _______ None No internal provisions 
 _______ Other (please specify) 
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2.4 – Based on direct experience, or indirect perception, what percentage of space ground 
systems do you think use the following security provisions for internal protection, i.e. within the 
ground system? Please drag the bars to the appropriate percentage, the percentages do not 
have to total 100 as these provisions are not mutually exclusive. 
 _______ Identity Management Ability to establish identity of components  
 _______ Mutual Authentication Method for components to authenticate each others identities 
 _______ Authorization (includes access control) Method for determining permissions of 
each component 
 _______ Auditing Tracking pertinent system events 
 _______ Encryption  Ability to protect data in transit and at rest 
 _______ Network Segmentation Separating networks physically or virtually 
 _______ Recovery Ability to recover from attacks 
 _______ Mitigation Ability to prevent attacks 
 _______ None No internal provisions 
 _______ Other (please specify) 
2.5 – Based on direct experience, or indirect perception, what percentage of space test systems 
do you think use the following security provisions for internal protection, i.e. within the test 
system? Please drag the bars to the appropriate percentage, the percentages do not have to 
total 100 as these provisions are not mutually exclusive. 
 _______ Mutual Authentication Method for components to authenticate each others identities 
 _______ Identity Management Ability to establish identity of components 
 _______ Authorization (includes access control) Method for determining permissions of 
each component 
 _______ Auditing Tracking pertinent system events 
 _______ Encryption  Ability to protect data in transit and at rest 
 _______ Network Segmentation Separating networks physically or virtually 
 _______ Recovery Ability to recover from attacks 
 _______ Mitigation Ability to prevent attacks 
 _______ None No internal provisions 
 _______ Other (please specify) 
2.6 – For each security feature listed below, rate its importance in each of the two domains: 
Open Networked Space Flight Software Systems and Traditional (Point-to-point) Flight Software 
Systems. 1 means "not important" and 5 means "very important."  Use the "Other" items to 
represent provisions or features that you feel are missing from this list. 
Open Networked Space Flight 
Software Systems 
Traditional Space Flight Software 
Systems 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
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Identity 
Management - 
Ability to establish 
identity of 
components  






others identities  






o o o o o o o o o o 
Auditing - Tracking 
pertinent system 
events  
o o o o o o o o o o 
Confidentiality - 
Ability to ensure 
data is private  
o o o o o o o o o o 
Integrity - Ability to 
ensure data is has 
not been tampered 
with  
o o o o o o o o o o 





o o o o o o o o o o 
Well-defined 




Idea being to limit 
potential misuse  








o o o o o o o o o o 
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Access control -  
Ability to ensure 
permissions are 
enforced  
o o o o o o o o o o 
Network 
Segmentation -  
Separating 
networks physically 
or virtually  
o o o o o o o o o o 




o o o o o o o o o o 
Testing -  Static 
and dynamic 
analysis from a 
security 
perspective  
o o o o o o o o o o 
Recovery - Ability 
to recover from 
attacks  
o o o o o o o o o o 
Mitigation - Ability 
to prevent attacks  o o o o o o o o o o 
Other (please 
specify) o o o o o o o o o o 
Other (please 
specify) o o o o o o o o o o 
Other (please 
specify) o o o o o o o o o o 
2.7 – For each security feature listed below, rate the difficulty of providing for it in each of the 
two domains: Open Networked Space Flight Software Systems and Traditional (Point-to-point) 
Flight Software Systems. 1 means "not difficult" and 5 means "very difficult."  Use the "Other" 
items to represent provisions or features that you feel are missing from this list. 
Open Networked Space Flight 
Software Systems 
Traditional Space Flight Software 
Systems 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
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Identity 
Management o o o o o o o o o o 
Mutual 
Authentication o o o o o o o o o o 
Authorization  o o o o o o o o o o 
Auditing   o o o o o o o o o o 
Confidentiality o o o o o o o o o o 
Integrity  o o o o o o o o o o 
Availability  o o o o o o o o o o 
Well-defined 
interfaces o o o o o o o o o o 
Abstraction 
layers o o o o o o o o o o 
Access 
control o o o o o o o o o o 
Network 
Segmentation o o o o o o o o o o 
Compliance o o o o o o o o o o 
Testing o o o o o o o o o o 
Recovery o o o o o o o o o o 
Mitigation o o o o o o o o o o 
Other o o o o o o o o o o 
Other o o o o o o o o o o 
Other o o o o o o o o o o 
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2.8 – Please order the following software security provisions and features, in the context space 
flight software systems (C&DH), according to importance. Drag them so that the most important 
(1) comes first and the least import (17) comes last. You must move at least one characteristic
for the question to marked as answered, you can move it back if you feel the initial ordering is
correct. Use the "Other" items to represent provisions or features that you feel are missing from
this list, if you do not feel anything is missing then simply leave the text entry boxes empty and
put them last.
______ Identity Management - Ability to establish identity of components
______ Mutual Authentication - Method for components to authenticate each others identity
______ Authorization -  Method for determining permissions of each component
______ Auditing - Tracking pertinent system events
______ Confidentiality - Ability to ensure data is private
______ Integrity - Ability to ensure data is has not been tampered with
______ Availability -  Ensure that components are available when expected
______ Well-defined interfaces -  Clearly defined hardware and software interfaces; idea
being to limit potential misuse
______ Abstraction layers -   The separation of concerns to facilitate interoperability and
platform independence
______ Access control -  Ability to ensure permissions are enforced
______ Compliance -  Ensure protocols are correctly implemented
______ Testing -  Static and dynamic analysis from a security perspective
______ Recovery - Ability to recover from attacks
______ Mitigation - Ability to prevent attacks
______ Other (please specify)
______ Other (please specify)
______ Other (please specify)
2.9 – Please designate your opinion of the effect of publicly releasing software of its security. 
o Negatively effects security
o No effect on security
o Positively effects security
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2.10 – Please designate your opinion of the effect of open sourcing software on system security. 
o Negatively effects security
o No effect on security
o Positively effects security
End of Block: Security 
Start of Block: Background 
















▢ Other (please specify) ________________________________________________
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1.2 – Please categorize the entity for which you currently work using the options below. You 




▢ Other (please specify) ________________________________________________
1.3 – How many years have you spent working in the following areas with regard to space 
systems? Please drag the sliders to indicate the number of years of experience you have for 
each area. You must click or move each slider even if you want your responses marked as zero, 
the slider will turn purple/blue upon input. 
Years 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
Software Systems Development 
Management 
Hardware Systems Development 
Procurement 
Other (please specify) 
200
Page 12 of 13 
1.4 – Based on you experience, i.e. the projects on which you have worked, what are the typical 
durations for the phases listed below? Please drag the sliders to indicate the number of months 
you think are typically spent on each phase. You must click or move each slider even if you 
want your responses marked as zero, the slider will turn purple/blue upon input. If you do not 
have direct experience, then go off of what you think is typical. 
Months 





Other (please specify) 
1.5 – About how many missions/projects have you worked on over the course of your career in 
the following areas? Please drag the sliders to indicate the number missions/projects on which 
you have worked. You must click or move each slider even if you want your responses marked 
as zero, the slider will turn purple/blue upon input. 
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1.6 – About how many missions/projects do you typically work on at the same time? Please 
drag the sliders to indicate the number of projects that you typically work on at the same 
time. You must click or move each slider even if you want your response marked as zero, the 
slider will turn purple/blue upon input. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Projects/Missions 
End of Block: Background 
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SISDPA : Reuse, Interoperability, 
Portability, Code Complexity - Survey 
Start of Block: Introduction 
Intro – I'm Brandon Shirley, I am conducting these surveys for my PhD research at Utah State 
University. I really need your participation. There is a chance to win some gift cards. 
You are being asked to take part in this set of surveys because of your affiliation with or 
involvement in the space industry. Your participation and your responses to the surveys are 
greatly needed and will make a meaningful contribution to this research. 
This survey comprises the Reuse, Interoperability, Portability, Code Complexity portion of a 
survey set that makes up a survey on Space Industry Software Development Practices and 
Attitudes (SISDPA). Each question will ask for your input and explain how you should answer 
the question. 
Answer as many of the questions as you want and as much of a question as you want, partial 
surveys may still be very helpful. At the end of this survey, you will be redirected to a webpage 
that asks for an email address. You must enter a valid email address to be considered for 
survey drawings or the overall survey set drawing. 
You have a chance at receiving a gift card for participating in this survey as well as a chance at 
receiving a gift card for your overall participation in the entire survey set. There will be 2 winners 
of $25 gift cards for each survey and 2 winners of $200 gift cards for the survey set. 
At the end of this survey you will be redirected to another webpage where you may 
provide your email address if you want to enter the optional drawings. Your email 
address will not be connected to the survey responses. You must enter a valid email 
address to be considered for this survey’s drawing or the overall drawing. 
If you start this survey but do not finish, then your partial result may be included in the results. 
Once the survey set is closed, we will analyze the data for inclusion in a conference or journal 
paper. Please see the Letter of Intent for additional information about the surveys. 
If you have other questions or research-related problems, you may reach Dr. Stephen Clyde at 
(435) 797- 2307 or Stephen.Clyde@usu.edu, or Brandon Shirley at (435) 994-9165 or
b.l.s@aggiemail.usu.edu.
End of Block: Introduction 
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Start of Block: Reuse, Interoperability, Portability, Code Complexity 





2.1 – Please select what you think are the current, desirable, and obtainable percentages of 
reuse from mission to mission or project to project in relation to space flight software. 




2.2 – Please select what you think are the current, desirable, and obtainable percentages of 
reuse from mission to mission or project to project in relation to space ground software. 
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2.3 – Please select what you think are the current, desirable, and obtainable percentages of 
reuse from mission to mission or project to project in relation to space test software. 




2.4 – Please select what you think are the current, desirable, and obtainable percentages of 
reuse from mission to mission or project to project in relation to other software fields. 




2.5 – Please select what you think are the current, desirable, and obtainable percentages of 
reuse from mission to mission or project to project in relation to space flight hardware. 
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2.6 – Please select what you think are the current, desirable, and obtainable percentages of 
reuse from mission to mission or project to project in relation to space ground hardware. 




2.7 – Please select what you think are the current, desirable, and obtainable percentages of 
reuse from mission to mission or project to project in relation to space test hardware. 




2.8 – Please select what you think are the current, desirable, and obtainable percentages of 
reuse from mission to mission or project to project in relation to space test hardware. 
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2.9 – Please select what you think are the current, desirable, and obtainable percentages of 
reuse from mission to mission or project to project in relation to hardware in other fields. 




2.10 – Consider the items on the left in the context of software reuse across space systems, 
where software reuse means the ability to leverage the code or designs for any module from on 
system on another system. Place an item under Pros if positively affected, under Neutral if not 
affected or not applicable, or under Cons if negatively affected by attempting 
to maximize reuse. Think of this impact in terms of multi-project, multi-mission, or multi-
platform use. Keep in mind that some of these items have overlap with other items. All items 
should be placed for the answer to be considered complete by the system. In 
considering partial or incomplete answers, unplaced items will be considered neutral. 
  See Term definitions for specification of the items. If you are using a mouse then you can also 
hover over the items for a definition. 
Pros Neutral Cons 
Regression reduction Regression reduction Regression reduction 
Code design Code design Code design 
Development cost Development cost Development cost 
Maintenance cost Maintenance cost Maintenance cost 
Development productivity Development productivity Development productivity 
Development efficiency Development efficiency Development efficiency 
Code Complexity Code Complexity Code Complexity 
Maintainability Maintainability Maintainability 
Integration Integration Integration 
Adaptability Adaptability Adaptability 
Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples 
Encapsulation Encapsulation Encapsulation 
Bug detection Bug detection Bug detection 
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Code quality Code quality Code quality 
Code robustness Code robustness Code robustness 
Best practices Best practices Best practices 
Schedule Schedule Schedule 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style 
Domain knowledge Domain knowledge Domain knowledge 
Code readability Code readability Code readability 
Security Security Security 
I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency 
Radiation hardness Radiation hardness Radiation hardness 
Fault tolerance Fault tolerance Fault tolerance 
Hardware complexity Hardware complexity Hardware complexity 
Latency Latency Latency 
Determinism Determinism Determinism 
Interoperability Interoperability Interoperability 
Portability Portability Portability 
Testing Testing Testing 
Reusability Reusability Reusability 










Adoption rates/software proliferation 





Mission/Project requirement changes 
Information Assurance Information Assurance Information Assurance 
Mission Assurance Mission Assurance Mission Assurance 
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2.11 – Consider the items on the left in the context of interoperability in space systems, 
specifically semantic interoperability, i.e. having a common information exchange description 
that allows components to communicate in a meaningful way. Place an item under Pros 
if positively impacted, under Neutral if not impacted or not applicable, or under Cons if 
negatively impacted by attempting to maximize interoperability. Think of this impact in terms of 
multi-project, multi-mission, or multi-platform use. Keep in  mind that some of these items have 
overlap with other items. All items should be placed for the answer to be considered 
complete by the system. In considering partial or incomplete answers, unplaced items 
will be considered neutral. 
  See Term definitions for specification of the items. If you are using a mouse then you can also 
hover over the items for a definition. 
Pros Neutral Cons 
Regression reduction Regression reduction Regression reduction 
Code design Code design Code design 
Development cost Development cost Development cost 
Maintenance cost Maintenance cost Maintenance cost 
Development productivity Development productivity Development productivity 
Development efficiency Development efficiency Development efficiency 
Code Complexity Code Complexity Code Complexity 
Maintainability Maintainability Maintainability 
Integration Integration Integration 
Adaptability Adaptability Adaptability 
Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples 
Encapsulation Encapsulation Encapsulation 
Bug detection Bug detection Bug detection 
Code quality Code quality Code quality 
Code robustness Code robustness Code robustness 
Best practices Best practices Best practices 
Schedule Schedule Schedule 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style 
Domain knowledge Domain knowledge Domain knowledge 
Code readability Code readability Code readability 
Security Security Security 
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I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency 
Radiation hardness Radiation hardness Radiation hardness 
Fault tolerance Fault tolerance Fault tolerance 
Hardware complexity Hardware complexity Hardware complexity 
Latency Latency Latency 
Determinism Determinism Determinism 
Interoperability Interoperability Interoperability 
Portability Portability Portability 
Testing Testing Testing 
Reusability Reusability Reusability 










Adoption rates/software proliferation 





Mission/Project requirement changes 
Information Assurance Information Assurance Information Assurance 
Mission Assurance Mission Assurance Mission Assurance 
210
Page 9 of 18 
2.12 – Consider the items on the left in the context of software portability in space systems, 
specifically an increase in ability to move software from platform to platform with minimal or no 
changes. Place an item under Pros if positively impacted, under Neutral if not impacted or not 
applicable, or under Cons if negatively impacted. Think of this impact in terms of multi-project, 
multi-mission, or multi-platform use. Keep in mind that some of these items have overlap with 
other items.  All items should be placed for the answer to be considered complete by the 
system. In considering partial or incomplete answers, unplaced items will be considered 
neutral. 
  See Term definitions for specification of the items. If you are using a mouse then you can also 
hover over the items for a definition. 
Pros Neutral Cons 
Regression reduction Regression reduction Regression reduction 
Code design Code design Code design 
Development cost Development cost Development cost 
Maintenance cost Maintenance cost Maintenance cost 
Development productivity Development productivity Development productivity 
Development efficiency Development efficiency Development efficiency 
Code Complexity Code Complexity Code Complexity 
Maintainability Maintainability Maintainability 
Integration Integration Integration 
Adaptability Adaptability Adaptability 
Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples 
Encapsulation Encapsulation Encapsulation 
Bug detection Bug detection Bug detection 
Code quality Code quality Code quality 
Code robustness Code robustness Code robustness 
Best practices Best practices Best practices 
Schedule Schedule Schedule 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style 
Domain knowledge Domain knowledge Domain knowledge 
Code readability Code readability Code readability 




 Page 10 of 18 
I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency 
Radiation hardness Radiation hardness Radiation hardness 
Fault tolerance Fault tolerance Fault tolerance 
Hardware complexity Hardware complexity Hardware complexity 
Latency Latency Latency 
Determinism Determinism Determinism 
Interoperability Interoperability Interoperability 
Portability Portability Portability 
Testing Testing Testing 
Reusability Reusability Reusability 










Adoption rates/software proliferation 





Mission/Project requirement changes 
Information Assurance Information Assurance Information Assurance 
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2.13 – Consider the items on the left in the context of reduced or minimal software code 
complexity in space systems. Place an item under Pros if positively impacted, under Neutral if 
not impacted or not applicable, or under Cons if negatively impacted by attempting to minimize 
code complexity. Keep in  mind that some of these items have overlap with other items. All 
items should be placed for the answer to be considered complete by the system. In 
considering partial or incomplete answers, unplaced items will be considered neutral. 
  See Term definitions for specification of the items. If you are using a mouse then you can also 
hover over the items for a definition. 
Pros Neutral Cons 
Regression reduction Regression reduction Regression reduction 
Code design Code design Code design 
Development cost Development cost Development cost 
Maintenance cost Maintenance cost Maintenance cost 
Development productivity Development productivity Development productivity 
Development efficiency Development efficiency Development efficiency 
Code Complexity Code Complexity Code Complexity 
Maintainability Maintainability Maintainability 
Integration Integration Integration 
Adaptability Adaptability Adaptability 
Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples 
Encapsulation Encapsulation Encapsulation 
Bug detection Bug detection Bug detection 
Code quality Code quality Code quality 
Code robustness Code robustness Code robustness 
Best practices Best practices Best practices 
Schedule Schedule Schedule 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style 
Domain knowledge Domain knowledge Domain knowledge 
Code readability Code readability Code readability 
Security Security Security 
I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency 
Radiation hardness Radiation hardness Radiation hardness 
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Fault tolerance Fault tolerance Fault tolerance 
Hardware complexity Hardware complexity Hardware complexity 
Latency Latency Latency 
Determinism Determinism Determinism 
Interoperability Interoperability Interoperability 
Portability Portability Portability 
Testing Testing Testing 
Reusability Reusability Reusability 
Software upgradability Software upgradability Software upgradability 
Hardware 
changes/flexibility 














Information Assurance Information Assurance Information Assurance 
Mission Assurance Mission Assurance Mission Assurance 
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2.14 – Consider the items on the left in the context of plug-and-play components and associated 
software in space systems. A terrestrial example of plug-and-play is the Human Interface 
Device (HID) protocol and a celestial example is the Space Plug-and-Play Avionics 
(SPA) Standard. Place an item under Pros if positively impacted, under Neutral if not impacted 
or not applicable, or under Cons if negatively impacted by attempting to minimize code 
complexity. Keep in  mind that some of these items have overlap with other items. All items 
should be placed for the answer to be considered complete by the system. In 
considering partial or incomplete answers, unplaced items will be considered neutral. 
  See Term definitions for specification of the items. If you are using a mouse then you can also 
hover over the items for a definition. 
Pros Neutral Cons 
Regression reduction Regression reduction Regression reduction 
Code design Code design Code design 
Development cost Development cost Development cost 
Maintenance cost Maintenance cost Maintenance cost 
Development productivity Development productivity Development productivity 
Development efficiency Development efficiency Development efficiency 
Code Complexity Code Complexity Code Complexity 
Maintainability Maintainability Maintainability 
Integration Integration Integration 
Adaptability Adaptability Adaptability 
Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples 
Encapsulation Encapsulation Encapsulation 
Bug detection Bug detection Bug detection 
Code quality Code quality Code quality 
Code robustness Code robustness Code robustness 
Best practices Best practices Best practices 
Schedule Schedule Schedule 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style 
Domain knowledge Domain knowledge Domain knowledge 
Code readability Code readability Code readability 
Security Security Security 
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I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency 
Radiation hardness Radiation hardness Radiation hardness 
Fault tolerance Fault tolerance Fault tolerance 
Hardware complexity Hardware complexity Hardware complexity 
Latency Latency Latency 
Determinism Determinism Determinism 
Interoperability Interoperability Interoperability 
Portability Portability Portability 
Testing Testing Testing 
Reusability Reusability Reusability 










Adoption rates/software proliferation 





Mission/Project requirement changes 
Information Assurance Information Assurance Information Assurance 
Mission Assurance Mission Assurance Mission Assurance 
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2.15 – For each metric listed in a row below, rate its importance with regard to measuring code 
complexity.1 means "not important" and 5 means "very important." Note that some of these only 
related to object-oriented programming. 





o o o o o 
Depth of 
inheritance o o o o o 
Class 
coupling o o o o o 
Methods per 
class o o o o o 
Lack of 


























o o o o o 
Lines of 




o o o o o 
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End of Block: Reuse, Interoperability, Portability, Code Complexity 
Start of Block: Background 
















▢ Other (please specify) ________________________________________________
1.2 – Please categorize the entity for which you currently work using the options below. You 




▢ Other (please specify) ________________________________________________
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1.3 How many years have you spent working in the following areas with regard to space 
systems? Please drag the sliders to indicate the number of years of experience you have for 
each area. You must click or move each slider even if you want your responses marked as zero, 
the slider will turn purple/blue upon input. 
Years 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
Software Systems Development 
Management 
Hardware Systems Development 
Procurement 
Other (please specify) 
1.4 – Based on you experience, i.e. the projects on which you have worked, what are the typical 
durations for the phases listed below? Please drag the sliders to indicate the number of months 
you think are typically spent on each phase. You must click or move each slider even if you 
want your responses marked as zero, the slider will turn purple/blue upon input. If you do not 
have direct experience, then go off of what you think is typical. 
Months 





Other (please specify) 
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1.5 – About how many missions/projects have you worked on over the course of your career in 
the following areas? Please drag the sliders to indicate the number missions/projects on which 
you have worked. You must click or move each slider even if you want your responses marked 
as zero, the slider will turn purple/blue upon input. 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 
Space Systems 
Other fields 
1.6 – About how many missions/projects do you typically work on at the same time? Please 
drag the sliders to indicate the number of projects that you typically work on at the same 
time. You must click or move each slider even if you want your response marked as zero, the 
slider will turn purple/blue upon input. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Projects/Missions 
End of Block: Background 
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SISDPA : Network  - Survey 
 
Start of Block: Introduction 
Intro – I'm Brandon Shirley, I am conducting these surveys for my PhD research at Utah State 
University. I really need your participation. There is a chance to win some gift cards. 
You are being asked to take part in this set of surveys because of your affiliation with or 
involvement in the space industry. Your participation and your responses to the surveys are 
greatly needed and will make a meaningful contribution to this research. 
This survey comprises the Network portion of a survey set that makes up a survey on Space 
Industry Software Development Practices and Attitudes (SISDPA). Each question will ask for 
your input and explain how you should answer the question. 
Answer as many of the questions as you want and as much of a question as you want, partial 
surveys may still be very helpful. At the end of this survey, you will be redirected to a webpage 
that asks for an email address. You must enter a valid email address to be considered for 
survey drawings or the overall survey set drawing. 
You have a chance at receiving a gift card for participating in this survey as well as a chance at 
receiving a gift card for your overall participation in the entire survey set. There will be 2 winners 
of $25 gift cards for each survey and 2 winners of $200 gift cards for the survey set. 
At the end of this survey you will be redirected to another webpage where you may 
provide your email address if you want to enter the optional drawings. Your email 
address will not be connected to the survey responses. You must enter a valid email 
address to be considered for this survey’s drawing or the overall drawing. 
If you start this survey but do not finish, then your partial result may be included in the results. 
Once the survey set is closed, we will analyze the data for inclusion in a conference or journal 
paper. Please see the Letter of Intent for additional information about the surveys. 
If you have other questions or research-related problems, you may reach Dr. Stephen Clyde at 
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Start of Block: Network 





2.1 – Do you have direct network experience in the following areas? You must select "Yes" or 
"No" for each area for the answer to be complete. 
Yes No 
Purely Point-to-Point (serial, 
etc.)  o o 
Master-slave (includes 
networks like I2C where only 
one component can 
communicate at a time)  
o o 
Purely open  (Spacewire, 
Ethernet, etc.)  o o 
Hybrid Networks 
(combination of point-to-point 
and open network solutions)  
o o 
Other o o 
2.2 – Based on direct experience, or indirect perception, what percentage of space systems do 
you think use the following network types? Please drag the bars so that the total adds up to 100. 
 _______ Purely Point-to-Point (serial, etc.) 
 _______ Master-slave (includes networks like I2C where only one component can 
communicate at a time) 
 _______ Purely Open  (SpaceWire, Ethernet, etc.) 
 _______ Hybrid Networks (combination of point-to-point and open network solutions) 
 _______ Other 
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2.3 – Consider the items on the left in the context of networked space systems, meaning a 
collection of three or more systems connected on an internal network instead of point-to-point 
links. Place an item under Pros if positively impacted, under Neutral if not impacted or not 
applicable, and under Cons if negatively impacted by using networked space systems. Think of 
this impact in terms of multi-project, multi-mission, or multi-platform use. All items should be 
placed for the answer to be considered complete by the system. In considering partial or 
incomplete answers, unplaced items will be considered neutral. 
See Term definitions for specification of the items. If you are using a mouse then you can also 
hover over the items for a definition. 
Pros Neutral Cons 
Regression reduction Regression reduction Regression reduction 
Code design Code design Code design 
Development cost Development cost Development cost 
Maintenance cost Maintenance cost Maintenance cost 
Development productivity Development productivity Development productivity 
Development efficiency Development efficiency Development efficiency 
Code Complexity Code Complexity Code Complexity 
Maintainability Maintainability Maintainability 
Integration Integration Integration 
Adaptability Adaptability Adaptability 
Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples Documentation/Examples 
Encapsulation Encapsulation Encapsulation 
Bug detection Bug detection Bug detection 
Code quality Code quality Code quality 
Code robustness Code robustness Code robustness 
Best practices Best practices Best practices 
Schedule Schedule Schedule 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Code or algorithm 
optimization/efficiency 
Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style Uniformity of coding style 
Domain knowledge Domain knowledge Domain knowledge 
Code readability Code readability Code readability 
Security Security Security 
I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency I/0 efficiency 
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Radiation hardness Radiation hardness Radiation hardness 
Fault tolerance Fault tolerance Fault tolerance 
Hardware complexity Hardware complexity Hardware complexity 
Latency Latency Latency 
Determinism Determinism Determinism 
Interoperability Interoperability Interoperability 
Portability Portability Portability 
Testing Testing Testing 
Reusability Reusability Reusability 










Adoption rates/software proliferation 





Mission/Project requirement changes 
Information Assurance Information Assurance Information Assurance 
Mission Assurance Mission Assurance Mission Assurance 
End of Block: Network 
Start of Block: Background 
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▢ Other (please specify) ________________________________________________
1.2 – Please categorize the entity for which you currently work using the options below. You 




▢ Other (please specify) ________________________________________________
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1.3 – How many years have you spent working in the following areas with regard to space 
systems? Please drag the sliders to indicate the number of years of experience you have for 
each area. You must click or move each slider even if you want your responses marked as zero, 
the slider will turn purple/blue upon input. 
Years 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
Software Systems Development 
Management 
Hardware Systems Development 
Procurement 
Other (please specify) 
1.4 – Based on you experience, i.e. the projects on which you have worked, what are the typical 
durations for the phases listed below? Please drag the sliders to indicate the number of months 
you think are typically spent on each phase. You must click or move each slider even if you 
want your responses marked as zero, the slider will turn purple/blue upon input. If you do not 
have direct experience, then go off of what you think is typical. 
Months 





Other (please specify) 
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1.5 – About how many missions/projects have you worked on over the course of your career in 
the following areas? Please drag the sliders to indicate the number missions/projects on which 
you have worked. You must click or move each slider even if you want your responses marked 
as zero, the slider will turn purple/blue upon input. 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 
Space Systems 
Other fields 
1.6 – About how many missions/projects do you typically work on at the same time? Please 
drag the sliders to indicate the number of projects that you typically work on at the same 
time. You must click or move each slider even if you want your response marked as zero, the 
slider will turn purple/blue upon input. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Projects/Missions 




 Adaptability - Ability of a system to adapt itself efficiently and quickly to changes in
circumstance
 Adoption rates/software proliferation - Likelihood that software will be used and developed by
other parties
B 
 Best practices - Adherence to industry best practices standards
 Bug detection - Ease with which bugs and be detected and corrected
C 
 Code complexity - Cyclomatic Complexity (structural complexity), Depth of Inheritance, Class
Coupling, Lines of Code (LOC)
 Code design - The difficulty to architect software, e.g. amount of constraints and requirements
placed on a software design
 Code or algorithm optimization/efficiency - Overhead incurred while completing operations
 Code quality - How well software complies with its design based on functional requirements
 Code readability - Ease with which a programmer can understand written code
 Code robustness - Codes ability to handle failure scenarios or misuse
D 
 Development cost - Cost in terms of schedule and money to develop a system
 Development efficiency - Overhead incurred in hardware and software development, e.g.
management time, design time
 Determinism - Ability of a system to always produce the same output given the same input
 Development productivity - Ability to produce software and hardware
 Documentation/Examples - Documentation of how a system works or how to use it
 Domain knowledge - Amount of knowledge or background need to use software or hardware
E 
 Ease of use - Ease with which a non-developer can use the system, i.e. someone who was not
involved in the implementation of the system
 Encapsulation - Bundling data with functionality (if desired)
F 
 Fault tolerance - Ability of a system to remain operational in the event of failures
H 
 Hardware changes/flexibility - Ease with which a system, including software, can handle
changes to hardware components
 Hardware complexity - Metrics for hardware complexity are not well-defined, base this more on
your perception
228
A.10 Survey Pro-neutral-con Term Definitions
I 
 Information Assurance - Process of getting the right information to the right place at the right
time
 Integration - Ease with which system components can be integrated
 Interoperability - Specifically semantic interoperability (this generally encompasses Syntactic
interoperability)
 I/0 efficiency - Overhead incurred during input and output operations, e.g. network transfer or
write to nonvolatile storage
L 
 Latency - Time delay experienced by a system
M 
 Maintainability - Tipping point at which it becomes cheaper or less risky to rewrite code than to
change it
 Maintenance cost - Cost in terms of schedule and money to update code with bug fixes and new
features
 Mission Assurance - Ability to achieve success of design, development, testing, deployment, and
operations
 Mission/Project requirement changes - Ease with which new requirements can be addressed
P 
 Portability - The ability of software to be used on multiple platforms
R 
 Radiation hardness - Resistance to damage or malfunctions caused by ionizing radiation and
high-energy electromagnetic radiation
 Regression reduction - Introduction of new bugs or loss of features as new features are added
or maintenance is performed
 Reusability - Ability to reuse existing assets (hardware or software) in new missions or projects
S 
 Schedule - Ability to adhere to a given timeline
 Security - The basics: confidentiality, integrity, and availability
 Software upgradability - The ease with which new versions of software can be deployed to a
system
T 
 Testing - How easily the system can be tested
U 




SISDPA Survey Participant Backgrounds
B.1 Introduction
This appendix reviews the development roles with which participants identified as well
as the years of experience that they have in different areas of space systems development,
e.g. hardware systems or software systems development. It is important to understand who
took the surveys in order to give context to the consensuses and perceptions that are reached
on the relevant questions in each of the different surveys. These roles are not analyzed to
a level where statistical significance is considered, rather this section presents more of a
snapshot of who took each survey and the experience level mixture for each survey.
This analysis looks at two questions from the background section of each survey. These
questions are the same for all the surveys. The first question is Question 1.1, this question
asks participants to select their development roles. Unfortunately, this question is not
specific enough in terms of current versus past, or duration of time in a role for it to be
counted. Noting this shortcoming, this question still gives a window into the roles with
which the participants identify and participate in at some level.
SE had the best representation in terms specialized and combination roles for all of
the surveys; this may not be the best representation for the entire community on general
issues, but it is a good balance for a set of surveys focused primarily on the software
development aspects of space systems. systems engineer (SysE)s, technical lead (TL)s,
program manager (PM)s, and principal investigator (PI)s all had good representation across
all the surveys when considered as inclusive roles. Each of the sections that follow give an
overview of the role breakdown.
The second question is Question 1.3, this question asks each participant to specify
the years of experience they have in software systems development, management, hardware
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Software systems Management Hardware systems Procurement Other
Fig. B.1. Survey Experience Means. The average years for experience for software systems
development, management, hardware systems development, procurement, and other for
each of the five surveys.
Figure B.1 shows the area experience averages across all the surveys. Figure B.1 shows
that software systems development experience mean is fairly consistent across all of the
surveys at between 8 and 10 years. Management shows greater variance across the surveys,
but still averaged over 5 years for all the surveys. The hardware systems development
experience average ranged between 6 and 10 years. The procurement average was a bit
weaker dipping under 4 for the CC Survey, but generally holding in the 4 to 8 year range.
Finally, other varied the most going as low as a year and as high as almost 8 years. This
shows close to a 5 year plus experience average in all the surveys across all the development
areas excluding other. This suggests that the participants have a good body of knowledge
to draw upon when answering the questions for all of the surveys.
Sections B.2 through B.6 cover the role and experience breakdowns for each of the
surveys. These roles and experience breakdowns show strong SE representation and good
development experience mixtures.
232
B.2 CC Survey — Roles and Development Experience
Table B.1 shows that SEs had the strongest representation with 16 participants that
identified strictly as an SE, or about 17%. These are participants that identified exclusively
as SEs, this is the largest exclusive representation by far. Those that had an aggregate
inclusive of SEs accounted for 47 of the participants or about 48%. This bodes well for a
survey focused on software. It also shows a good representation of electrical engineer (EE)s
and aerospace engineer (AE)s at close to 15% each, when considered as aggregate roles,
showing that technical areas that might deal more with hardware are also represented.
SysEs were the next biggest exclusive group with 7 or about 7%. In considering roles
that were inclusive of SysEs then the total is 40, or about 41%. The next highest aggregate
inclusive groups was made up of TLs with 29 participants, or about 30%, even though TL
exclusive participants only account for 3 of the total. Low exclusive counts for TLs and
SysEs suggest that either these types of roles tend to engage in multiple roles at once or that
they have a lot of experience in different roles before becoming TLs or SysEs, unfortunately
the survey question did not adequately specify how this question should be answered. It
would be ideal or at least better to break this out into at least two questions: one focusing
on concurrent currently active roles and one focusing on cumulative or past roles in order
to better understand this experience versus active roles relationship.





Inclusive Count Inclusive Share
SE 16 16.49% 47 48.45%
EE 1 1.03% 12 12.37%
SysE 7 7.22% 40 41.24%
ME 2 2.06% 8 8.25%
AE 6 6.19% 14 14.43%
PM 5 5.15% 16 16.49%
TL 2 2.06% 29 29.90%
TE 0 0.00% 4 4.12%
(continued on next page)
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Inclusive Count Inclusive Share
PI 3 3.09% 8 8.25%
Other 6 6.19% 9 9.28%
Roles like TLs and SysEs tend to be thought of big pictures roles, meaning that they
encompass larger portions of a program or mission than a more focused role like a TE.
This is evidenced in Table B.1 where both the TL and SysE roles have relatively normal
exclusive aggregate shares of 2.1% and 7.2%, but jump to 29.9% and 41.2% respectively
when their inclusive share is considered. This result shows that participants that identified
with these roles also tended to be involved with multiple other roles, as mentioned before
it is hard to say if this is due to experience or concurrent roles. It is notable that the SEs
had actually had the largest inclusive share, at 48.5%. This is likely driven by at least two
factors. First, SEs where the largest exclusive aggregate by a factor of 2. Second, software
tends to have to touch every segment of a mission in one way or another.
Figure B.2 gives the overall role affiliations of each of the respondents that took the
survey. Figure B.3 shows the experience breakdown for each role for software systems
development, management, hardware systems development, procurement, and other areas.
Note these roles are not exclusive so there is overlap. Some of these groups are not really
large enough to give a good average, but remember this is really just for illustrative purposes
and some understanding of the group that took the survey. The PM and PI showed strong
overall years of experience in all the roles, but also showed 10+ years of experience in
management.
SEs showed the strongest skew towards their “discipline”, but it is not clear if this
relates to the higher number of SEs in general or a real difference in how focused SEs are
with respect to other roles. The higher number of SEs might allow for a more representative
experience ratio.
Once again these sections are more to illustrate the demographic, a lot of effort could
have spent analyzing this area, but that was not the focus of this research and future work
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Fig. B.2. CC Survey, Question 1.1 — Aggregate Roles. The aggregate make-up of partici-
pants in terms of their self-identified roles for those that only participated in the background

































Fig. B.3. CC Survey — Non-aggregate Roles vs. Average Experience. The average years
of experience in the different development disciplines for each of the non-exclusive roles.
might look at this either via detailed analysis of these surveys or a more role-experience
targeted survey.
B.3 OSAM Survey — Roles and Development Experience
Table B.2 shows that SEs had the strongest representation with 9 participants that
identified strictly as an SE, or about 20%. Roles inclusive of SEs totaled 17 participants
or about 39% that were SE inclusive. The next closest dedicated role was made up of
PMs, they accounted for 6 of the participants or about 14%. If PM inclusive roles sets are
included then the total goes to 17 or about 39%. SysEs, TLs, and PMs continued their
trend of belonging to multi-role aggregates.





Inclusive Count Inclusive Share
SE 9 20.45% 17 38.64%
EE 1 2.27% 7 15.91%
(continued on next page)
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Inclusive Count Inclusive Share
SysE 2 4.55% 16 36.36%
ME 0 0.00% 3 6.82%
AE 0 0.00% 8 18.18%
PM 6 13.64% 17 38.64%
TL 0 0.00% 15 34.09%
TE 0 0.00% 3 6.82%
PI 1 2.27% 5 11.36%
Other 1 2.27% 4 9.09%
They can have low exclusive aggregate counts, and still have a high count when inclusive
aggregates are considered; PMs were a bit of an exception because they had a relatively high
exclusive aggregate count this time, but their inclusive coverage was still disproportionately
high when compared to other roles like AEs or EEs. SysEs, TLs, and PMs account for about
36%, 39%, and, 34%, respectively, of the OSAM Survey participants when considered as
inclusive aggregates.
Figure B.4 shows the participant roles for the OSAM Survey. Figure B.5 shows the
experience breakdown for each role that participated in the OSAM Survey. All the roles in
this survey show really good overall experience in all the areas, and generally the averages
are higher in this survey than the are for the first two surveys. This time EEs show the
strongest skew towards their discipline. PM and PIs show very strong overall experience,
this is expected for those types of roles. AEs also show good experience across the board.
B.4 Security Survey — Roles and Development Experience
Table B.3 shows that the strongest pure role was again SEs with 5 participants, or
about 16%. The SE inclusive aggregate totaled out at 13 participants or about 42%. Next
came the SysE dedicated role, they accounted for 4 of the participants or about 13%. The
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Fig. B.4. OSAM Survey, Question 1.1. — Aggregate Roles. The aggregate make-up of
participants in terms of their self-identified roles.
PMs continued their trend of belonging to multi-role aggregates at higher rates then any of
the other roles, aside from SEs, which was the dominant role overall.





Inclusive Count Inclusive Share
SE 5 16.13% 13 41.94%
EE 0 0.00% 1 3.23%
SysE 4 12.90% 17 54.84%
ME 0 0.00% 1 3.23%
AE 0 0.00% 4 12.90%
PM 0 0.00% 9 29.03%
TL 0 0.00% 10 32.26%
TE 0 0.00% 1 3.23%
PI 0 0.00% 4 12.90%
(continued on next page)
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Inclusive Count Inclusive Share
Other 3 9.68% 4 12.90%
To that end TLs and PMs both accounted for 0 of the participants in terms of ex-
clusive roles, but when counted in inclusive aggregate they accounted for 32% and 29% of
the participants respectively. The other roles that had 0 participants when considered in
exclusive aggregate, e.g. EE, AE, and ME, only accounted for between 3% and 12% when
considered in inclusive aggregate and actually averaged around 6%.
Figure B.6 shows the participant roles for the Security Survey. Figure B.7 shows the
experience breakdown for each roles that participated in the Security Survey. The roles
did not have as balanced experience levels for this survey as they did for the previous
surveys. For example, the EEs show a strong skew towards hardware systems and a little
management but no other experience. There is only one EE in this case. SEs again show
the strongest skew towards software systems development experience. As usual PM, TLs,
and PIs show very strong overall experience.
B.5 RIPCC Survey — Roles and Development Experience
Table B.4 shows that the largest pure role was again SEs with 5 participants, or about
17%. The SE inclusive aggregate totaled out at 15 participants or about 56%. No other
role had a significant exclusive share, the next closest being PMs and Other with 2 each or
about 7% each. Even with SysEs, TLs, and PMs not having much in the way of exclusive
share they still have a strong showing when considered in inclusive aggregate. SysEs, TLs,
and PMs continued their trend of belonging to multi-role aggregates at higher rates then



























Fig. B.5. OSAM Survey — Non-aggregate Roles vs. Average Experience. The average
years of experience in the different development disciplines for each of the non-exclusive
roles.





Inclusive Count Inclusive Share
SE 5 17.24% 15 51.72%
EE 1 3.45% 4 13.79%
SysE 1 3.45% 14 48.28%
ME 0 0.00% 1 3.45%
AE 0 0.00% 6 20.69%
PM 2 6.90% 11 37.93%
TL 1 3.45% 10 34.48%
TE 0 0.00% 1 3.45%
PI 0 0.00% 1 3.45%
Other 2 6.90% 2 6.90%
The other roles ranged from 3% to 21% when considered in inclusive aggregates, giving
an average of about 9%. The high of 21% was driven by the AE role, and this actually
a trend that was consistent across all the surveys, i.e. the AEs consistently came next in
terms of inclusive aggregate after SEs, SysEs, TLs, and PMs.
Figure B.8 shows the participant roles for the RIPCC Survey. Figure B.9 shows the
experience breakdown for each role that participated in the RIPCC Survey. The PI role
had a pretty strong software systems and management experience skew, but also just a lot
of experience. This is being driven by one individual as only one PI participated in this
survey. This survey again benefited from a good mix of experience amongst the roles. The
experience means may look lower, but this is because of the very high means for the PIs
experience that are compressing the scale. The SEs and EEs again show a strong skew
towards their disciplines. As usual PMs, TLs, and PIs show very strong overall experience.
B.6 Network Survey — Roles and Development Experience
Table B.5 shows that the largest pure role was again SEs with 5 participants, or about
16%. The SE inclusive aggregate totaled out at 18 participants or about 56%. No other
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Fig. B.6. Security Survey, Question 1.1 — Aggregate Roles. The aggregate make-up of
participants in terms of their self-identified roles.
about 6%. SysEs, TLs, and PMs continued their trend of belonging to multi-role aggregates
at higher rates then any of the other roles, aside from SEs, coming in at 44%, 31%, and
40%, respectively. The other roles ranged from 3% to 22% when considered in inclusive
aggregates, giving an average of about 11%. This time the EEs were the next highest mark
at 22%, but the AE role was not far behind at 19%. No TEs participated in this survey,
even when inclusive aggregates are considered.





Inclusive Count Inclusive Share
SE 5 15.63% 18 56.25%
EE 2 6.25% 7 21.88%
SysE 1 3.13% 14 43.75%
ME 0 0.00% 4 12.50%
(continued on next page)
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Inclusive Count Inclusive Share
AE 0 0.00% 6 18.75%
PM 2 6.25% 10 31.25%
TL 1 3.13% 13 40.63%
TE 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
PI 1 3.13% 4 12.50%
Other 0 0.00% 1 3.13%
Figure B.10 shows the breakdown of participants by aggregate roles of those who par-
ticipated in the Network survey. Figure B.11 shows the experience breakdown for each roles
that participated in the Network Survey. The experience means here show similar trends
as the other surveys that had good experience mixes. The exception being the Other role
with 20 years of other experience, there is only one participant that identified this way. It is
odd because they also identified as an SE, but do not appear to claim any software systems



























Fig. B.7. Security Survey — Non-aggregate Roles vs. Average Experience. The average
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Fig. B.8. RIPCC Survey, Question 1.1 — Aggregate Roles. The aggregate make-up of





























Fig. B.9. RIPCC Survey — Non-aggregate Roles vs. Average Experience. The average
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Fig. B.10. Network Survey, Question 1.1 — Aggregate Roles. The aggregate make-up of

























Fig. B.11. Network Survey — Non-aggregate Roles vs. Average Experience. The average





This appendix presents a more detailed description of the existing work used by SSSM.
Specifically SSM and Kerberos, this appendix exists to provide context for a reader who
is not familiar with SSM or Kerberos. Both are leveraged heavily to create SSSM and
understand them is helpful in understanding what SSSM brings to the table. If the reader
is already familiar with SSM and Kerberos then this appendix does not cover any new
ground. This appendix is referenced in various other chapters were additional background
might be helpful.
C.1 SSM
SSM is an open networked architecture that allows for communication amongst com-
ponents without distinction between software and hardware entities [6]. SSM is essentially
a self-configuring network geared towards space systems. There are many self configuring
network examples in terrestrial systems, and while an expert may be needed to optimize
them, they can largely configure themselves. SSM attempts to remove the need for exper-
tise by replacing it with well-defined protocols and routing infrastructure [7,52]; the intent
being to make is easier to develop software systems for space applications. SSM supports
Ethernet, I2C, SpaceWire, Controller Area Network (CAN), and local subnets, with plans
to support more, while allowing the communication across various subnets to be transpar-
ent to the communicating endpoints [6]. In the example SSM network depicted in Figure
C.1 there is a heterogeneous network comprised of local subnets: a I2C subnet, a Ethernet
subnet, and a SpaceWire subnet. SpaceWire stems from the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 1355–1995 standard for Heterogeneous Interconnect publish
in 1995 [53]. IEEE 1355 was later adapted in 2003 to apply to space systems, specifically
SpaceWire [54,55].
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Consider a scenario where one of the SPA SpaceWire (SPA-S) Components wants
to subscribe to data from one of the SPA I2C (SPA-1) components. Setting up this relay
requires querying for the data, setting up the subscription, and then receiving the data. The
subscription traffic traverses an I2C subnet, a local subnet, an Ethernet subnet, another local
subnet, and a SpaceWire subnet. This is handled by the SPA Data Link Layer that is part
of SSM and is realized by the SPA Subnet Managers [6]. In this case the subnet managers
that are facilitating this communication are the SM-L, the SPA-1 subnet-manager (SM-1),
the SM-E, and the SPA-S subnet-manager (SM-S).3 SSM provides a set of services, namely
the CAS and the LS that along with the subnet managers help to provision the network

































Fig. C.1. SSM Network Topology Example. An example heterogeneous SSM network
comprised of local, SpaceWire, Ethernet, and I2C subnets.3
C.1.1 The LS and xTEDS
The LS acts as a directory service, systems or applications register with the LS when
they join the network by sending the LS some information about what services, commands,
3Figures and examples are adapted from “Scalable Network Approach for the Space Plug-and-Play
Architecture” [6].
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or interfaces they provide. Figure C.3 depicts the life-cycle of two components or applica-
tions on an SSM network, the diagram leaves off some detail. This life-cycle and the process
of finding services and negotiating communication exists in the ‘Applications and Devices’
or SPA Application level of the the OSI-like [56] SPA Network Model in Figure C.2. This
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Fig. C.2. OSI to SPA Network Stack Comparison. A comparison between the OSI and SPA
Network layers.3
level or layer is charged with the transactions that occur in the Registration, Query, Sub-
scription, and Data Exchange blocks shown in Figure C.3 and described below; it should
be noted that actual data discovery occurs in the Transport or SPA xTEDS Interface layer
and so there is some overlap between the two layers.
This example follows a Consumer or SSM App (S1 ) who wishes to subscribe to some
data, at the start of this interaction S1 does not need to know who provides the data,
the subscription can be provider agnostic, or the query can be tailored to restrict or filter
providers. Figure C.3 deals with a subscription which is a Notification in Sample C.2,
Sample C.2 is explained in more detail later in this section, and the other message types
248
are covered.
To begin each component or application on the network registers with the LS, this
is shown in the Registration block of Figure C.3, and happens after probing that involves
the subnet managers. During the registration process each component supplies information
about what services, commands, or interfaces they provide, which the LS uses to build up
a catalog of what is available and from whom. In this example both S1 and S2 register
with the LS by providing an overview of their capabilities using markup as shown in Sample
C.2. Once S1 is registered it queries the LS for some data to which it wants to subscribe.
In Figure C.3 this data is provide by S2, also referred to as a producer. It is typical when
using SSM to describe these data relationships in terms of a producer and a consumer, so
in this example S1 is consuming the data produced by S2 ; this terminology also holds for
commands or requests in SSM terminology.
1 <SpaQuery targetType='Notifcation'>
2 <Interface>
3 <Attribute name='name' operand='eq' value='ExampleInterface'/>
4 <Interface>
5 <Message>
6 <Attribute name='name' operand='eq' value='ExampleData'/>
7 </Message>
8 </SpaQuery>
Sample C.1. Notification Query. An example query that would be issued to the LS in
order to find a provider of a notification with an interface named ‘ExampleInterface’ and
message named ‘ExampleData’.
This query is shown in the Query block of Figure C.3 where S1 sends a SpaQueryRequest
to the LS. The basic syntax of the query is shown in Sample C.1, additional attributes could
be added to make the query more restrictive. The LS check sa table of registered compo-
nents and look for a match to the query from S1. This matches against the ‘registration
information’ provided by S2 shown in Sample C.2 and explained in more detail shortly.
The LS returns a SpaQueryReply with information about S2 to S1 that S1 can then use
to make a subscription request as shown in the ‘Start Subscription’ block, if desired. This
querying process works the same for the three different messaging types that are about to
be explained.
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This subscription request comes in the form of a SpaSubscriptionRequest message
with some information about the data in which S1 has interest. The message contains
the producer and consumer logical addresses, a dialog identifier, the interface and message
identifiers for the message in question, and a flag indicative of the subscription action or
type. The producer logical address (LA S2), and the interface (InterfaceId) and message
(MessageId) identifiers, are provided by the LS in the SpaQueryReply in the Query block
and uniquely identify a path to the message in question. The identifiers for the message
are coded in the “registration information” provided by S2 during registration, this “regis-
tration information” is explained in more detail shortly. The dialog identifier (DialogId) is
used to correlate messages that relate to the subscription between S1 and S2. The “Start
Subscription” block shows S2 replying with a SpaSubscriptionReply message containing
the correlating DialogId and a flag indicating that the subscription was granted. The
exchange now moves on to the next phase shown in the “Data Exchange” block of Figure
C.3 where S2 starts relaying data to S1 in the form of a SpaData message which con-
tains the corresponding DialogId and data. Now S1 and S2 can share data for some
time as shown in the “Data Exchange” block. Either party can terminate the subscrip-
tion at any time. The “Stop Subscription” block in Figure C.3 shows S1 canceling the
subscription by passing a SpaSubscriptionRequest that is almost identical to the one
in the “Start Subscription” block except the subscription indicates a cancellation via the
SUBSCRIPTION CANCEL flag. Finally, S2 responds with a SpaSubscriptionReply and the
subscription has been terminated. S1 can restart the subscription at any time.
The “registration information,” i.e. information about services provided, that an ap-
plication or component shares with the LS is standardized so that all parties engaged in
communication can understand how messages are formatted and what messages are avail-
able. SSM makes use of an XML Transducer Electronic Data Sheet also referred to as
xTEDS to encapsulate a XML specification of the data products and commands available
from a component [57]. xTEDS is a schema to describe the characteristics of interfaces
provided by each component and the messages used to accept and relay information via
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those interfaces. The main characteristics encapsulated in an xTEDS are: interface char-
acteristics, messages by interface (data products and command messages), data types used
in messages, message formats, timing constraints, one-dimensional arrays, and some range
specification [58]. When systems register with the SPA Network implemented as SSM they
send a copy of their xTEDS to the LS, these xTEDS can also be cached, and a XUUID
can be used instead. This exchange of xTEDS information is part of data discovery and
connections and so correlates with the Transport or SPA xTEDS Interface layers.
IEEE defined a Transducer Electronic Data Sheet (TEDS) standard as part of the IEEE
1451.4 standard [57,59]. Various work for configuring networks of transducers with relation
to modular space systems started in the early of first decade of the new millennium [60,61].
Around the middle of the 2000’s xTEDS was created by USU as an extension of the TEDS
standard using XML. It was originally developed by Utah State University in conjunction
with Satellite Data Model (SDM) to allow for the configuration of on-board subsystems.
SDM is a predecessor to SSM. xTEDS saw continued updates under work sponsored by the
ORS program office of the United States Air Force at Kirtland and Utah State University.
Sample C.2 depicts a very basic xTEDS example.
Sample C.2 contains one Interface shown on line 7. This Interface contains a
Notification, a Request, and a Command message. An xTEDS may contain multiple
Interfaces and a Interface may contain multiple messages. Each Interface has a
Interface identifier, shown on line 7, that is unique within a given xTEDS. Each Message
has a Message identifier, shown on lines 8, 13, and 20, which are unique within a Interface;
the unique Interface and Message identifier pairings allow a message to be defined uniquely
within an xTEDS while allowing like functionality to be grouped together in an Interface.
These unique Interface and Message identifier pairings also allow the security additions to
SSM to specify permissions at a very granular level, Section 5.3 documents this granularity
and security.
These messages are implemented in SSM as SpaMessage objects, specifically SpaData,
for Notifications; SpaServiceRequest and SpaServiceReply for Requests; and SpaCommand
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Fig. C.3. SSM Notification Lifecycle Example. Example of a SSM Application (S1 ) querying
the LS for and subscribing to data produced by S2 for some duration and then stopping
the subscription.3
for Commands. These messages are also referenced in Figure 5.3 where Section 5.3.2 ex-
plains the additions to SSM that have been made for this research. The purpose and
structure of each message type is explained in more detail below:
Notification
Notifications can be thought of as data that a consumer subscribes to from a producer.
The consumer queries the LS to find the data it wants, shown in Figure C.3, and then
subscribes to said data. In this example S1 is querying for the ‘ExampleData’ message
shown on line 9 in the Notification of the xTEDS example in Sample C.2. This data is
encapsulated in a SpaData message that allows the data to traverse the various subnets
and be understood on the receiving end by the consumer or S1 in Figure C.3. The message
header contains, among other items, the producer address, the interface identifier, and
message identifier; these items allow the consumer to identify which message it is receiving
and handles it appropriately as implemented by the developer. The hand-off of the SpaData
to the developer is handled by the SSM API via callback function. The payload of the
SpaData message contains the actual data described in the xTEDS on line 9 and placed
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there by the producer. In this example the payload contain a dynamically sized array of
bytes that could contain up to 1000 elements, in this case bytes. The consumer receives
these bytes from the producer and then decide what to do with them. The Notifications can
be event driven or periodically produced at some interval. In this example the ExampleData
notification is produced periodically at a rate of 1 Hz, this is designated on line 9 of the
example xTEDS.
Request
Requests can be thought of as a command followed by a response. In SSM this Re-
quest is implemented as a SpaServiceRequest, or CommandMsg in the xTEDS, and a
SpaServiceReply, or DataReplyMsg in the xTEDS. These are one-off exchanges where
one command gets one response. In the example xTEDS in Sample C.2 the Request is
on line 13. The next line shows a CommandMsg named ExampleRequestCommand that has
no variables or parameters. The DataReplyMsg that follows contains a single variable of
UINT32 type or a 4-byte unsigned integer. This lets both parties understand the relayed
data and how it should be interpreted.
Command
This is simply a message that S1 sends to S2 that S2 handles without providing any
response to S1, or a command without a response. At present anyone on the SSM network
can locate this command and send the command without any type of verification, truly
an open interconnect, being able to control this access, when desired, is when the research
described in Chapter 5 comes into play. In the example xTEDS Sample C.2 the Command is
on line 20. This command is named “ExampleCommand”, this name is something for which
a consumer looking for the command could query from the LS; the consumer could also
query for the variable name on line 22, which is someCommandVariable, or other attributes
that are not present or specially called out in this simple example. In this case the xTEDS
owner is expecting a consumer or command user to send a command with a FLOAT32 in
network byte order as part of the payload of the command. The receiver of this command
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could pass the handling of the FLOAT32 to a callback so that a developer can perform some
operations or logic determinant on the value of said variable.






6 <Application name='SsmApp2' kind='application' programMemoryRequired='1' dataMemoryRequired='1'/>
7 <Interface name='ExampleInterface' id='1'>
8 <Notification>
9 <DataMsg name='ExampleData' id='1' msgArrival='PERIODIC' msgRate='1.0' >
10 <DynamicArray name='someDataMsgVariable' kind='color' dataType='UINT8' maxArrayElements='1000'




14 <CommandMsg name='ExampleRequestCommand' id='2'>
15 </CommandMsg>
16 <DataReplyMsg name='ExampleDataReply' id='3'>




21 <CommandMsg name='ExampleCommand' id='4'>





Sample C.2. Basic xTEDS. An example xTEDS showing simple notifcation, request, and
command message all under a single inferface.
C.1.2 CAS, Subnet Managers, and LAs
The previous section explained the LS, xTEDS, and basic messages. The question that
still remains is: how do these messages make it from one component to another? This
traversal requires an addressing and a routing scheme. The SDL implementation of SSM
provides an implementation of the “Applications and Devices” level of the SPA Model, this
maps to the Application, Presentation, and Session levels in the OSI Model. This is the
level that most of the SSSM additions and modifications targeted as well as some changes
at the SPA Messaging level to allow for proper message handling and setup as described in
Chapter 5.
SSM makes use of logical addresses LAs that are translated to physical addresses as
then traverse the various subnets. This requires that some entity be available to disperse
unique logical addresses in addition to the physical addresses tied to each of the subnets.
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It is important to first understand what an LA is and then what entities are charged with
supplying and translating these LAs within an SSM network.
The LA is a hardware medium independent method for addressing components, this
is what allows all the different subnet types to use a common addressing scheme. The LA
exists at the SPA Messaging or Network Layer shown in Figure C.2. The LA does have to
be mapped to a hardware specific address as messages traverse the actual physical network;
this mapping is done at a lower level and information needed is in routing tables like the one
depicted in Table C.1. This table belongs to one of the Ethernet subnet managers denoted
as SM-E, the SM-E in question, is denoted with a LA of [2,0] in Figure C.4. This subnet
manager is the first step for SpaData messages flowing from S2 to S1 as these messages
traverse the local subnet, an Ethernet subnet, another local subnet, and then a SpaceWire
subnet. The ability to flow in-to, out-of, and within subnets is part of this SPA Messaging
or Network Layer and is explained in more detail shortly. LAs are 4-byte addresses. They
have a 2-byte subnet identifier and a 2-byte component identifier; this allows for 65,536
component address per subnet and 65,536 subnets [6]. The notation for this is [2,0] where
the ‘2’ denotes the subnet identifier and the ‘0’ denotes the component identifier or address.
Table C.1. Routing Table for Subnet Manager: Ethernet (SM-E)3











(continued on next page)
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Table C.1. Routing Table for Subnet Manager: Ethernet (SM-E) (continued)




Figure C.4 shows all the components and subnet managers with example LAs. This
is where the CAS comes into play. The CAS takes a special static known logical address
of [0,1], its subnet identifier is 0 and its component identifier is 1. A known address is
used so that subnet managers can find the CAS. The subnet managers in Figure C.4 are
two SM-Ls, two SM-Es, one SM-1, and one SM-S. Figure C.4 also has various components
within each of the subnets: I2C components (SPA-1), Ethernet components (SPA-E), Local
components (SPA local (SPA-L)), and SpaceWire components (SPA-S). S2 is a SPA-L
node on the same Local subnet that houses the CAS, the LS, amongst other things, and S1
























































Fig. C.4. SSM Routing Example. Route that a message takes from S2 to S1, e.g. when
S2 is sending Notifications or SpaData messages to S1. SM-E [2,0] uses the routing table
in Table C.1 to identify where the message is routed to next in its trip to the ultimate
destination of [6,1] or S1.3
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Each subnet requires a certain degree of management to perform discovery on a physical
or network topology level. This management is provided by SPA Subnet Managers and
contained in the SPA Data Link or SPA-X Protocols layer as shown in Figure C.2. Each of
the subnet managers issues and responds to probes so that the network can be mapped out
continuously and so that each subnet manager can locate the CAS and the other subnets
and populate its routing table. Each component or end-point also has a routing table, but
for components that are not on its subnet the entries point to its subnet manager or another
relevant manager if it bridges their subnet.
The CAS tells each subnet manager which subnet identifier or address block it gets,
this gives the subnet manager a block of component identifiers or addresses it can give out
to components on its subnet. For the example routing table in Table C.1 the SM-E received
a subnet identifier of 2, it takes a component identifier of 0, and then it has 65,535 address it
can give out to its subnet; whether this many components can even exist on a given subnet
depends on the subnet type. Once the routing tables are built up the components can find
the LS and register, the querying and other messaging described in Section C.1.1 can now
take place as shown in Figure C.3.
Figure C.4 shows a message as it traverses various subnets on its trip from S2, a SPA-L
component, to S1, a SPA-S Component. This is a path that a SpaData message might take
in the ‘Data Exchange’ block of Figure C.3 after the query has finished and the components
begin communicating. The first hop the SpaData message takes is to the SM-E at LA [2,0].
This assumes that S2 already has an entry for S1 in its routing table, otherwise it might
have to hit its SM-L at [1,0] first. S2 has an entry in its routing table for LA [6,1] with a
LA of [2,0], much like the SM-E at [2,0] has an entry in its routing for LA [6,1] with an LA
of [4,0]. S2 then has to look up [2,0] to see how to get there in terms of a physical address.
Each entry in the table represents the next hop a message should take to reach its final
destination. This means that S2 looks up [6,1] and sees [2,0] and so it forwards its message.
The example routing table in Table C.1 for the SM-E at [2,0] shows that next hop is to
[4,0]. The SM-E at [2,0] then has to look up the [4,0] address to see how to get a message
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there. The table shows that this LA maps to a physical Ethernet address with with an
Internet Protocol (IP) address of 12.24.48.55 and a port of 3333. The SM-E at [2,0] sends
the message to the SM-E at [4,0] over Ethernet using the physical address it found in its
routing table.
Now the message is at the SM-E at [4,0] which also has a routing table that it uses to
look up the next hop to reach [6,1]. Figure C.4 shows that the SM-E found the next LA
to be [6,0] as indicated by the next hop taken by the SpaData message shown in red. The
SM-E at [4,0] has to first look up [6,1] which returns [6,0], and then send the message to
[6,0]. The [6,0] needs to resolve the LA to a local address in the table or SM-E needs to
probe the SM-L at [5,0] for the path. This is a port number or socket on the local host. This
brings the message to the SM-S at [6,0], now the SM-S at [6,0] resolves the [6,1] address to
a SpaceWire physical address and send it the SPA-S component at LA [6,1] and S1 receives
the SpaData message without understanding of the path of the message. Each component
generally needs to understand the path to the next hop. SSM provides the management
needed at each subnet to convert logical addressing to the appropriate network routing and
properly relay messages to the appropriate endpoint or next subnet managers.3 The part
of the traversal where LAs are translated to physical address and transfer over physical
medium exists in SPA Physical Layer where SpaceWire, I2C, Universal Serial Bus (USB),
Ethernet, CAN, or sockets are used to actually move the bits.
SSM is an example of a totally modular open network architecture. This means that
any component can communicate with any other component; the other thing to note is
that security was not considered in the design. This can be a problem if a malicious entity
somehow gains access to any portion of the network; there is no assurance of availability,
integrity, or confidentiality. Any component can masquerade as another component, issue
any command, subscribe to any data, carry out a DoS or availability type attack, or various
other types of attacks. This can exacerbate problems over a system more typical in a space
system where everything is not interconnected, but SSM, and open networked systems in
general, have a unique ability to address the concerns of availability, integrity, and confi-
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dentiality. SSM is modeled after a typical network stack with layered functionality, so it
lends itself to security additions used in similar networked systems to add security.
C.2 Kerberos
Kerberos is a longstanding example of a centralized authentication system. Kerberos
can be augmented with other services to provide authorization data or control permis-
sions [46]. The rest of this section explains the basic protocols that are used to perform
authentication of a Subject or client, and optionally the Target or service, and to establish
a secure session between the two entities. This is discussed as a authentication platform
that is intended to make service sharing easier, SSSM leverages these protocol concepts to
bring the same ease of use to securing SSM. These protocols are described here to give
context to the modifications to SSM described in Chapter 5.
Kerberos utilizes a centralized KDC that must be available, it should be noted this
service should be secure and reliable since it poses a single point of failure. This issue can
be minimized using replication, but other security provisions may be necessary to protect
the over-all functionality of the network. One of the benefits of this type of centralized
system is that the identity of who has sessions open with whom is known; this means that
service utilization, and to some extent, failed attempts can be tracked on a per system basis.
The AS and the TGS comprise the KDC as shown in Figure C.5. These two services,
together with secret information stored on the system that wishes to authenticate itself,
allow said system to establish itself as its claimed identity and, with the help of some other
protocols, get access to the services on the network to which it has the proper permis-
sions. The KDC achieves this using symmetric key cryptography, or the secret information
previously mentioned, this could also be thought of as a password. Kerberos now allows
for the use of public key cryptography during certain phases of the authentication process,
but for the purposes of this research, and resource utilization, symmetric keys are utilized.
The clients use the secret or key that they share with the AS in conjunction with special
protocols to authenticate themselves. Figure C.5 diagrams each of the steps outlined below
and Table C.2 provides definitions for the terms that are being used.
259
Step 1 (Subject/AS exchange):
 Subject asks the AS for a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) to the TGS by sending
Auth1
 AS looks up the Subject in its database, then generates a session key (SKS TGS)
for use between the Subject and the TGS
 AS encrypts SKS TGS using the Subjects private key and sends to Subject
 AS uses the TGSs secret key (known only to the AS and the TGS) to create and
send the Subject a TGT which also includes SKS TGS
Step 2 (TGS exchange):
 Subject decrypts the message and recovers SKS TGS, then uses it to create an
Auth2
 Subject sends Auth2, along with the TGT, to the TGS, requesting access to the
Target
 TGS decrypts the TGT and recovers SKS TGS which it then uses to decrypt
Auth2
 TGS verifies information in the Auth2 and TGT, if everything matches then the
Subject has authenticated to the TGS and the TGS lets the request proceed
 TGS creates SKS T for the Subject and Target to use and encrypts it using
SKS TGS and sends it to the Subject
 TGS creates TK-TS which includes SKS T along with some identifying informa-
tion that is then encrypted with the Targets key and sends it to the Subject
Step 3 (Subject/Target exchange):
 Subject decrypts the message and gets the SKS T (Subject cannot decrypt TK-
TS)
 Subject creates Auth3, and sends Auth3 and TK-TS to the Target
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 Target decrypts and checks the TK-TS and then decrypts Auth3 using SKS T
found in TK-TS, and verifies that the information matches and that TK-TS is
still valid
 (Optional) Target returns Auth4, which contains the previous timestamp + 1
from Auth3, encrypted with SKS T proving to the Subject that the Target actu-
ally knew its own secret key and could decrypt TK-TS and then Auth3
Step 4 (Secure communications):
 The Target knows that the Subject is who they claim to be, and the two now
share SKS T for secure communications
Table C.2. Kerberos Terminology4
Term Name Description
Subject Subject The client/consumer/entity that wants to communicate
with the Target
Target Target The server/producer/entity that provides a service
(handles commands or produces data) with which a
Subject wants to communicate
AS Authorization
Service
This service is responsible for authenticating




This service is responsible for handling a Subjects request
to communicate with a given Target. It does this by
creating TK-TS and SKS T upon request. It needs another
service to decide if a Subject is allowed to communicate




Comprised of the AS and TGS, and so is responsible for
authenticating subjects, creating tickets, and creating keys
Auth1 Subject to
AS Auth
This is the authenticator used to authenticate the Subject




This is the authenticator used to authenticate the Subject
to the TGS, E{subjectName, subjectAddress,
timeStamp}SKS TGS
(continued on next page)
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This is the authenticator used to authenticate the Subject





This is the authenticator used to authenticate the Target





This is a Ticket issued by the AS that allows the holder of
the ticket to request access to Targets. E{subjectName,
subjectAddress, validity, SKS TGS}KTGS, where validity is
the duration for which the TGT is valid.
SKS TGS Session Key
Subject/TGS
This is the key for communicating between the Subject and
TGS, or Key(Subject, TGS)
SKS T Session Key
Subject/
Target
This is the key for communicating between the Subject and
the Target, or Key(Subject, Target)
TK-TS Session
Ticket
This ticket is used to initiate a session between the subject
and the target. It helps authenticate the Subject to the
Target, E{subjectName, subjectAddress, validity,
SKS T}KTarget.
Using Kerberos imposes some requirements on a system that utilizes it. For example,
the ability to prevent replay attacks is predicated on some level of time synchronization
between clients, services, and the KDC. Another restriction when using symmetric key
encryption is that service and/or client on the network needs its own Kerberos key that is
shares with the KDC.
4It should be noted that Kerberos realms have been dropped from the depiction of Kerberos as only a
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Fig. C.5. Simplified Kerberos Authentication Exchange. Depiction of the exchange between
a Subject, that wants to use a service provided by the Target, and the KDC to get a session
ticket, and ultimately communicate with the Target.
